

PSYCHOLOGY

THE MOTIVE POWERS

Psychology.

THE COGNITIVE POWERS.

BY

JAMES McCOSH, D. D , LL. D., Litt. D.

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PSYCHOLOGY

THE MOTIVE POWERS

EMOTIONS, CONSCIENCE, WILL

BY

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OF DIVINE GOVERNMENT," "INTUITIONS OF THE MIND,"
"LAWS OF DISCURSIVE THOUGHT," "REALISTIC
PHILOSOPHY," "PSYCHOLOGY," "THE
COGNITIVE POWERS," ETC.

NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

1887

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The Riverside Press, Cambridge :
Electrotyped and Printed by H. O. Houghton & Co.

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE COGNITIVE AND MOTIVE POWERS.

FROM a very old date there was a distinction drawn, more or less loosely, between the powers of mind which give knowledge and those which stir up feeling and lead to action. In the Hebrew Scriptures we read on the one hand of "understanding," "comprehension," "imagination," "reins," and on the other hand, of bowels of pity and compassion. The word "heart," in the Old Testament and in the New, seems to include all that is in the mind prior to action, all "thoughts," "devices," "imaginationes." Plato and the Greeks generally had, on the one hand, such powers as αἴσθησις, νοῦς, λόγος, δόξα, πίστις, on the one hand, and πάθη, θυμὸς, ἐπιθυμητικόν, on the other. Aristotle drew the distinction between the Nostic power on the one hand, and the Orective power on the other, and this was more definitely expressed by his commentator, Philoponus.¹ This last phrase was translated into Latin and called the Appetent or Motive. Cicero says, "Motus animorum duplices sunt; alteri cogitationes, alteri appetitus,"² the one inquiring into truth.

¹ Aristotle, III. 10; Philoponus's *Proem*: in *Lib. de Anima Aris.* See Monboddo's *Ancient Met.* B. II. 7, where great importance is attached to the distinction.

² Cic., *De Offic.* I. 29.

the other impelling to action. In the scholastic ages the distinction was between the intellect (*mens*) and the will; in modern English theology between the understanding and the will; in common literature between the judgment and the feelings; in common conversation between the head and the heart. It appears to me that it is of great importance to keep up this twofold distinction.

Having treated of the cognitive powers in a previous volume, I am in this to unfold the characteristics of the motive, as they have been called the orectic, the impulsive, the appetent powers; the feelings, the affections, the sentiments, the heart.

The most common division of the faculties in the present day is the threefold one adopted by Kant: cognition, feeling, and will. It proceeds on a real and important distinction, which must ever be kept in view. Unfortunately, as I think, it leaves out the moral power or conscience, which is entitled to have a separate place as one of the characteristics of man, specially distinguishing him from the lower animals.

It is of moment to keep up the old twofold division as being the deepest, as having run through the ages, and as being embodied in our habitual thoughts and common literature. There are some advantages in keeping the feelings and the will under one head: the motive. Under the two grand heads, with their sixfold subdivisions, we can rank all the leading powers and manifestations, and determine their offices and their differences. In particular, under the second division, that of the motive powers, we distinguish between the feelings and the will while we include the moral power.

Having treated of the cognitive powers in Vol. I., I am in this to unfold the characteristics of the motive

powers, as they are called the orective, the appetent, the impulsive powers; the feelings, the sentiments, the affections, the heart, as distinguished from the Gnostic, the cognitive, the intellect, the understanding, the reason, the head.

These motive powers fall under three heads: the emotions, the conscience, the will. It is not to be understood that these are unconnected with each other, or with the cognitive; emotions contain an idea which is cognitive. The conscience may be regarded as combining characteristics of each of the two grand classes; being cognitive as discerning good and evil, and motive as leading to action; the will has to use the other powers as going on to action.

Emotion occupies more room than the other two in this treatise, inasmuch as its operations are more varied, and as the account usually given of it (so it appears to me) is more defective.

THE EMOTIONS.

PREFATORY NOTE.

I AM not satisfied with the account which has been given of the feelings and emotions in our books of mental science, and thence transferred into the common thought and literature of modern times.

The word "feeling" in English, and the word "sensibility" in French, with their cognate phrases "feel," "sentiment," and "sentir," are very vague and ambiguous. They may embrace two such different mental properties as sensation, on the one hand, and emotions, as of fear, hope, grief, and anger, on the other. Some writers lose themselves and confuse their readers by speaking of all our mental states, even our intellectual exercises, as feelings. The word "Gefühl" in German is scarcely less ambiguous, sometimes designating mere affections of the senses, at other times our higher faiths.

Those who translate English, French, and German into Latin and Greek have always experienced a difficulty in getting words in these classical languages to correspond to those I have named in the modern tongues. It is a curious circumstance that we have no such loose phrase in the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures as our "feelings."

In these circumstances it is surely desirable to have the emotions separated from the feelings, and to have a

renewed attempt to give an analysis, a description, and classification of them, as distinguished from other mental qualities.

The vagueness of the idea entertained favors the tendency on the part of the prevailing physiological psychology of the day to resolve all feeling, and our very emotions, into nervous action, and thus gain an important province of our nature to materialism.

This part of the work is largely an abridgment of my work on the Emotions, which any one may consult who wishes to see the illustrations and disquisitions which I have not copied into this book.

In this work I treat of the emotions as psychical acts, but I do not overlook their physiological concomitants and effects. I enter little into controversy. My aim has been to expound the truth, and leave it to shine in its own light.

INTRODUCTION.

ELEMENTS INVOLVED IN EMOTIONS.

FOUR persons of very much the same age and temperament are traveling in the same vehicle. At a particular stopping-place it is announced to them that a certain individual has just died suddenly and unexpectedly. One of the company looks perfectly stolid; a second comprehends what has taken place, but is in no way affected; the third looks and evidently feels sad; the fourth is overwhelmed with grief, which finds expression in tears, sobs, and exclamations. Whence the difference of the four individuals before us? In one respect they are all alike,—an announcement has been made to them. The first is a foreigner, and has not understood the communication. The second had never met with the deceased, and could have no special regard for him. The third had often met with him in social intercourse and business transactions, and been led to cherish a great esteem for him. The fourth was the brother of the departed, and was bound to him by native affection and a thousand interesting ties, earlier and later. From such a case we may notice that in order to emotion there is need, first, of some understanding or apprehension. The foreigner had no feeling, because he had no idea or belief. We may observe further that there must be, secondly, an affection of some kind, for the stranger was not interested

in the occurrence. The emotion flows forth from a well, and it is strong in proportion to the waters, — is stronger in the brother than in the friend. It is evident, thirdly, that the persons affected are in a moved or excited state. A fourth peculiarity has appeared in the sadness of the countenance and the agitations of the bodily frame. Four elements have thus come forth.

First, there is the affection, or what I prefer calling the motive principle, the motive or the appetite. In the illustrative case, there are the love of a friend and the love of a brother. But the appetite, to use the most unexceptionable phrase, may consist of an immense number and variety of other motive principles, such as the love of pleasure, the love of wealth, or revenge, or moral approbation. These appetences may be original, such as the love of happiness; or they may be acquired, such as the love of money, or of retirement, or of paintings, or of articles of *vertu*, or of dress. These moving powers are at the basis of all emotion. Without the fountain there can be no flow of waters. The passenger who had no regard for the person whose death was reported to him was not affected with grief. The two who loved him felt sorrow, each according to the depth of his affection.

Secondly, there is an idea of something, of some object or occurrence, as fitted to gratify or disappoint a motive principle or appetite. When the friend and brother of the departed did not know of the occurrence they were not moved. But as soon as the intelligence was conveyed to them and they realized the death, they were filled with sorrow. The idea is thus an essential element in all emotion. But ideas of every kind do not raise emotion. The stranger had a notion of a death having occurred, but was not moved. The idea excited emotion in the breasts of those who had the affection, because the event

apprehended disappointed one of the cherished appetences of their minds.

Thirdly, there is the conscious feeling. The soul is in a moved or excited state—hence the phrase emotion. Along with this there is an attraction or repulsion: we are drawn toward the objects that we love, that is, for which we have an appetite, and driven away from those which thwart the appetite. To use looser phraseology, we cling to the good, and we turn away from the evil. This excitement, with the attractions and repulsions, is the conscious element in the emotion. Yet it all depends on the two other elements, on the affection and the idea of something fitted to gratify or disappoint it. The felt excitement or passion differs according to the nature of the appetite and the depth of it, and according to what the idea that evokes it contains. A smaller gain or loss does not affect us so much as a greater, and the greatness or smallness of the gain or loss is determined by the cherished affection. What is a loss to one is not felt to be so by another, because the ruling passions of the two men differ.

Fourthly, there is an organic affection. The seat of it seems to be somewhere in the cerebrum, whence it influences the nervous centres, producing soothing or exciting and at times exasperating results. This differs widely in the case of different individuals. Some are hurried irresistibly into violent expressions or convulsions. Others, feeling no less keenly, may appear outwardly calm, because restrained by a strong will; or they may feel repressed and oppressed till they have an outlet in some natural flow or outburst. But it is to be observed that this organic affection is not the primary nor the main element in anything that deserves the name of emotion, such as hope and fear, joy and sorrow, reproach and

despair. A sentence of a few words announces to a man the death of his brother, and reaches his mental apprehension by the sense of hearing. First he understands it, then he feels it by reason of his cherished affection, and then there is the nervous agitation. Emotion is not what it has often been represented by physiologists, a mere nervous reaction from a bodily stimulus, like the kick which the frog gives when it is pricked. It begins with a mental act, and throughout is essentially an operation of the mind.

He who can unfold these four elements and allot to them their relative place and connection will clear up a subject which is only imperfectly understood at present, and show what emotion is in itself, and what its place in the human constitution. Each of these aspects has been noticed in works written both in ancient and modern times. The Scottish school of metaphysicians, and especially Dugald Stewart, have sought, but not in a very searching manner, to determine man's springs of action. It will be shown that Aristotle and the Stoics knew that in all emotion there is a phantasm or opinion involved. Dr. Thomas Brown has given us an eloquent description of the mental excitement, which, however, is chiefly left to novelists, who often make mistakes. Physiologists have had to take up the organic action, hitherto with not much success. But so far as is known to me, the four elements have not been exhibited in their combination and their mutual relation by any one.

Some may prefer to call by the name of aspect what I have called element, and to this I do not object. The emotion is after all one, with four aspects determined by four elements.

BOOK I.

THE FOUR ELEMENTS OR ASPECTS OF EMOTION.

CHAPTER I.

FIRST ELEMENT: APPETENCES OR MOTIVES.

SECTION I.

WHAT APPETENCES ARE.

BY the word appetite I understand what is commonly but vaguely designated by "motive," "spring of action," "disposition," "inclination," affection." But all these have larger and more indefinite, not to say ambiguous, significations, and have more or less of the element of will. It is necessary to remark thus early that appetite has nothing in it of the nature of voluntary action, which belongs to a very different department of the mind. It is simply a tendency in the mind to crave for an object for its own sake. It is not desire; it precedes desire and leads to it. It is not action, but a spring of action. The phrase I prefer is a convenient one, as the noun has cognate adjectives: appetible and inappetible. It has been noticed, though it has seldom been formally announced, that, as the basis of all emotion, there is a mental principle determining its nature and its intensity; this I call an Appetence, or a Motive.

It would be of great service to every branch of mental science to have an approximately good classification of

the appetences by which mankind are swayed. This is a difficult work, more so than a classification of plants or animals, the determining motives being so many and so varied in appearance and in reality. Some seem to act under no guiding principle, as if on an unaccountable impulse; but if we reflect, we shall find that they must have been pursuing some end, indulging a lust or passion, or restlessly seeking a change of state or position. In many cases the man himself could not tell us, and we could never discover, what swayed him, but we may be sure that there was a glittering object attracting him. Every man we meet with, hurrying to and fro on the streets of a great city, dancing in a ball-room, or idling in a summer saunter, has, after all, an end which he is seeking. "For every man hath business and desire, such as it is." It may be possible to form, if not a perfect, a good provisional arrangement of man's springs of action.

It is obvious that men cannot be swayed by every conceivable motive. No man can be made to choose pain as pain. He may choose pain, but it is supposed to promote some other end which has power with him, because it may secure pleasure, or reputation, or moral good. There are motives swaying some which have little or no power over others. Multitudes are led by the love of property or of reputation, while others scarcely feel these inclinations. Of some, we are sure that they are incapable of doing a mean or dishonorable deed. Of others, we believe that they will never perform an act of benevolence or of self-sacrifice. When a crime is committed, there may be certain persons suspected; there are others of whom all are sure that they have had no participation in it. Let us try to ascertain the motives by which all mankind are swayed, and which we call —

SECTION II.

PRIMARY APPETENCES.

I. Every man is swayed by the love of pleasure and the aversion to pain. This is not the result of deliberation, or an exercise of choice; it is instinctive. We shrink from suffering as suffering; we lay hold of enjoyment as enjoyment. Through a great part of our waking moments we are influenced by these ends, — seizing this, and avoiding that. Even when we resist these motive powers, — as when we stretch forth our hand to ward off a blow intended for our neighbor, — we feel them, and have to counteract them by some higher considerations.

Little more need be said on this subject; indeed, little more can be said. “Pain” and “pleasure” cannot be defined; this, not because of their complexity, but of their simplicity, there is nothing simpler into which to resolve them. They do not need to be defined, for all sensitive beings know what they are. I rather think that all pain originates in a derangement of our organism. But it is not felt as pain till perceived by the conscious soul.

The question arises, Is this the only consideration by which man can be influenced? The language used by many leaves upon us the impression that this is so, — it is so in their estimation. Some theorists derive all our motives from this one. This, however, is not the view which presents itself at first sight, which shows such an infinite variety of other attractions, such as kindness, sympathy, the desire for power and for society. But they tell us that we have found power and social intercourse leading to enjoyment, and they argue that the very idea of these, as associated with pleasure, raises

appetence. While the principle doubtless has its modifying influence, it cannot account for the whole phenomena as exhibited in human nature. There are appetences other than those looking to pleasure and pain, such as the love of children for parents and for brothers and sisters, arising so early, abiding so steadfastly, and so marked, in individuals and in families, that they are evidently in the very nature and tendency of the soul.¹

II. Man is inclined to promote the happiness and avert the unhappiness of his fellow-men. No doubt he may be able to restrain this disposition by a cherished selfishness. But there will be times when, in spite of all attempts to repress it, it will come forth in some kind deed or word. So far as the great body of men and women and children are concerned, there is a disposition to oblige, to help a fellow-creature, if this can be done without injuring their own interests; and, in the case of not a few, it is a benevolence which prompts to self-sacrifice and labors for the good of others. Besides the instincts which lead us to seek our own good, there are evidently others which incline us to find for our fellow-men the things which we regard as good for ourselves.

III. There are the attachments to relatives, as of parents to children, and of children to parents, of brothers and sisters to one another, and, I may add, of grandmothers and grandfathers to their grandchildren, and often of more distant kindred. In all such cases there is a natural appetency, and this is called forth by the idea of the person and of the relationship of that person. Take the case of a mother. There is a fountain within ready to flow out. It does not appear till there is a child, though it seems to manifest itself at times in an irregu-

¹ As to the theory which draws them by evolution from pleasure and pain, see Section III.

lar manner in the attachment of a childless woman to animals or other pets, or in the craving for an adopted son or daughter. Let there be an idea of the relation in which the child stands to the mother, of the child being her offspring, and being dependent on her, and associated with her now and for life, and the stream begins to flow. It is the same with all other relative attachments, say paternal, filial, sisterly, or brotherly. First there is a predisposition, and then an idea of the intimate connection. Along with this there are frequently natural affinities, or common tastes and tendencies, which draw the related parties closer to each other. We have all read tales in which a mother is represented as recognizing her long-lost child, and a sister falling into the arms of a brother whom she never saw, simply on meeting. But there is no ground for making such a representation. The natural likenesses in mind, body, and feature may predispose relatives towards one another; but, after all, there must be ground to lead to and justify the discovery. The affection thus called forth by the appetite and apprehension is made livelier and stronger by frequent intercourse, by exchanges of affection, by offices of kindness, by common ends and pursuits, and may be lessened, and in some instances all but destroyed, by clashing interests, — say, about money, — by quarrels, and even by long separations.

IV. The native tastes and talents, and our very acquired ones when they become part of our nature, prompt to action, and excite emotion when gratified or disappointed, and this independent of pleasure, or pain, or any other end. This seems true of our organic activity. The lamb frisks, the colt gambols, impelled by a life in their frames; the child solves the problem of perpetual motion; and all our lives, till the vital energy is dried

up, and aged men and women are satisfied with their couch and their chimney-corner, we are impelled to movement and change of movement, owing to the organs of our frame demanding action. We see this strikingly in the musical talent, which often comes out in very early life. Our intellectual powers, our memory, our reasoning, all tend to act, and will act, unless restrained. Talents, arithmetical, mathematical, mechanical, artistic, poetical, historical, metaphysical, fitted for the study of objects in nature, inanimate and animate, sun, moon, and stars, plant and animal, will all find a field to work in, even in the most unfavorable circumstances. These may show themselves in childhood, and continue dominant throughout the whole life, determining, it may be, in spite of difficulties, the man's trade or profession, and, indeed, his whole earthly destiny, and possibly prompting him, though engrossed with earthly business, to devote the few leisure hours he has to writing a work on natural history, a poem, or a philosophical treatise. Not only are there intellectual, there are emotional and, it may be added, moral powers, seeking out their appropriate objects, and making the possessors search for lovely landscapes or beautiful paintings, or leading them to visit the house of mourning, and relieve distress.

V. There are the appetites, as of hunger, thirst, rest, of motion, or sex. They originate in the body, but they become mental. They crave for their objects, and this for their own sakes, not merely for the pleasure they give, or the pain from which their gratification delivers us. It is not the pleasure that gives rise to the appetite; it is rather the action of the appetite that gives rise to the pleasure, — though doubtless the two move in the same direction, and each gives an impetus to the other.

VI. There is the love of society. This propensity appears among the lower animals, some tribes of which are gregarious. It comes forth in very early life among children, who draw towards others of about the same age. With some, as they advance in life, it becomes a strong and confirmed passion, so that they cannot live without the excitement produced by running round the circle of society, till they become giddy and fall. Solitude, except for a time to soothe the mind, is felt to be irksome by most people. Solitary confinement is one of the severest of punishments, and when carried out rigidly has been known to end in lunacy. It is to be observed that persons associate most pleasantly together when their trains of mental association run in the same direction, or parallel to each other. Hence it is that people of the same craft or profession, tradesmen, merchants, lawyers, doctors, preachers, students, teachers, are apt to meet with each other in larger or smaller companies. I have noticed that the most popular men and women in society are those whose trains of thought and of conversation, and whose opinions and sentiments, are in thorough accordance with the circles in which they move. The best liked people are those whose whole manner and style of remark is a sort of flattery to those they meet.

VII. There is a love of esteem, commendation, praise, glory, appearing also in early life, and capable of becoming a dominant passion. It is apt to associate itself with the motive last mentioned; and the young delight in a smile, an approving word, or a gift from those whom they love, or with whom they associate, from father, mother, teacher, and sometimes stronger than any others, from companions. This principle, the desire to keep or retain the good opinion of others, often makes the tyranny exercised over boys by their companions, in workshop,

in school, and college, more formidable than any wielded by the harshest masters or rulers. As persons advance in life it becomes a desire to stand well with the circle in which they move, their professional circle, or the gay circle, or the fashionable circle, or the respectable circle, or the good moral circle, or their religious circle, say, their congregation or the denomination of which they are members. The fear of losing the esteem or incurring the censure of their social set or party is sometimes a means of sustaining good resolutions, and of keeping people in the straight course; quite as frequently it tempts to cowardice, as they have not the courage to do the right and oppose the evil, since it would make them unpopular. In the case of many the desire becomes a craving for reputation, a passion for fame, burning and flaming, and it may be consuming the soul. This often leads to great deeds in war and in peace, in the common arts and in the fine arts, in literature and science. But being ill regulated or carried to excess it is often soured into jealousy, or envy, or issues in terrible disappointment. Being thwarted, it may become a love of notoriety, which commonly springs up in the breasts of persons who, having met with opposition, or failed to secure from the good the applause which they expected perhaps by honorable means, or having incurred odium, possibly undeserved, are bent on having reputation by any kind of means, or from any sort of people. The passion may become so strong as to need no aid from the pleasure derived from it,—nay, may lead the man to injure his health and incur suffering, in order to secure posthumous fame of which he can never be conscious.

VIII. There is the love of power. It is conceivable that this motive might be generated by the love of pleasure and the aversion to pain, for in ordinary circum-

stances power enables us to multiply our enjoyments and to avoid suffering. But then it appears in so marked a form in individuals and in families that we are forced to conclude that it is native; we discover that it is often inherited from ancestors. It is the grasping of power combined with the thirst for fame which constitutes ambition, the character of the ambition depending on the relative strength of the two elements: the former leading to the performance of more brilliant feats, but the other leading to the more determined action, the two united producing the men whom the world calls great, but who have often been the servants, or rather the very slaves, of their passions. The love of dominion is the most unrelenting of all the passions by which man can be swayed, being the power which gives its strength and persistence to tyranny under all its forms.

IX. There is the love of property, what is called acquisitiveness. This is often represented as springing from the love of power, always combined with the love of pleasure. Wealth gives us means of securing many kinds of enjoyment, and no doubt is commonly coveted because it is so associated in our minds. But there are cases in which the passion appears in very early life, and in which it is handed down from father to son, and runs in families. We see it in an instinctive form in the lower animals, as when the dog hides his bones for future use.

It is necessary, in order to make our enumeration of primary springs of action complete, to mention two others; but it will not be necessary to dwell upon them, as they will fall to be noticed more appropriately in a later part of this volume.

X. There is the æsthetic sentiment, making us seek and delight in the beautiful, the picturesque, the humorous, and the sublime.

XI. There is the moral sentiment, prompting us to seek and to do what is good.

From these leading forms as they mingle with each other and are influenced by circumstances, there proceed others, which are called : —

SECTION III.

SECONDARY APPETENCES.

From the time of Hobbes of Malmesbury, in the middle of the seventeenth century, there has been a tendency among metaphysicians to make the original inlets of knowledge as few as possible. Locke made them only two, sensation and reflection, and Condillac, with his followers in France, reduced them to one, sensation. For two centuries ingenuity strained itself to the utmost to derive all our ideas, even those of God and necessary truth and duty, from the two sources, or more frequently from one. I make this historical remark simply as introductory to another: that during the same period there was a like determination to diminish the original motive principles of the mind. Hobbes by a summary process referred all men's activities to motives drawn from pleasure and pain. During the last century and the beginning of this, wasted labor was spent in showing that, given only one or a few springs of action, the whole of man's conduct can be explained by the association of ideas.

There has been a change in all that theorizing since Darwinism has become a power. All along thinkers not carried away by the dominant philosophy were slow to believe that there were no special intellectual powers, that there were no special propensities native to mankind generally, to races or individuals; they thought

they saw traces of these appearing at a very early age and going down in families. Since the doctrines of evolution and heredity have come into prominence, the current of opinion has entirely changed. Now the number of powers and propensities in human nature is supposed to have become so great by differentiation and specialization that it is impossible to enumerate them and difficult to classify them. Having tried to give a provisionally good arrangement of the primary appetences, let us now look at the others.

One general principle will be acknowledged by all: The secondary appetences imply primary, and grow upon them as the mistletoe does upon the oak. We can understand, in a general way, how this is effected. Undoubtedly cerebral and nervous action are implied, but this is not the only nor the main power at work. Materialists talk confidently of being able to explain the whole of mental action by brain structure. But there is an impassable gulf between a disposition of the cerebro-spinal mass and a desire of some kind, say, to attain a high ideal, or to reach communion with God. It is by mental rather than material laws that secondary affections are fashioned. Association of ideas plays an important part, which has been carefully unfolded by the Scottish school from the days of Turnbull and Hume down to the time of Mr. J. S. Mill. Money may be coveted, first, as procuring pleasure, and then, perhaps, by gratifying the desire for power or applause; but by being associated with them it becomes identified with them, and carries all these with it, and in the end seems to be desired for its own sake. The processes are first mental, but they produce an effect on the cerebral structure (what Carpenter calls unconscious cerebral affection), and the mind now works in accordance with it; and the whole becomes

hereditary, and may go down from father or mother, or quite as frequently in some of the peculiarities, from grandfather and grandmother to their descendants. They are confirmed by repetition till they become habits and a second nature.

It is a property of our nature, however we may explain it, that these derived principles may become primary, and seek, apparently for their own sake, objects which were at first desired, because they tended to promote farther ends. We have all heard of persons clinging to their money after they were fully aware that they could draw no enjoyment from it,—say, when they knew they were dying. The ruling passion is often strong in death, and this passion may be a derivative one.¹

The derivative appetences may and do assume an immense number and variety of forms, which run into and are mixed up with each other. Some are appropriately called secondary, being derived immediately from a primary. Others might be called tertiary or quaternary, as they may be derived from principles of action which are themselves derived, very frequently from a number of principles, original and derivative, woven together in all sorts of ways, so that it is difficult to unravel the web.

SECTION IV.

SUPPLEMENTARY.

Evolution of Emotions.

The supporters of the evolution hypothesis will not be satisfied with the account given above. They tell us that the only original motive of the mind is a desire of happiness and an aversion to pain. From this they draw all the others, even those usually supposed to be

¹ There is a well-authenticated story of a miser sending, before he died, for an undertaker, and cheating him in the bargain made for his funeral.

primary. Society is felt first to be pleasant, and then is sought for its own sake. It is the same with the love of property and the love of power. Attempts were made an age or two ago to show how this process might be accomplished in the breast of the individual during the few years of the formation of his character. This theory has been abandoned. It is now argued that the motives by which mankind are swayed are the growth of many and long ages, have come down from animal to man, and go down from one generation of man to another. There are difficulties in the way of the acceptance of this hypothesis. It supposes that man is descended from the brutes, in the end from an ascidian, or a cell, or an aggregate of molecules. It may be safely said that no one has been able to show how that is done. With these doubts hanging over the nature and limits of evolution and heredity, I have thought it wise not to connect my exposition of human motives with the development hypothesis. Should that doctrine come to be established and be successfully applied, it might throw light on the origin of human appetences, but would scarcely affect our account of the appetences themselves. Assuming the one original appetite of pleasure and pain, the hypothesis would have to show how all the derivative ones, such as the social and moral ones, take their particular shapes. I wish it to be distinctly understood that in this treatise I undertake not to determine the origin of motives in the ages past and among the lower animals; I am satisfied if I give an approximately correct account of them as they now act in the human mind. In all inquiry into the origin of things, when we have not historical proof, we must commence with ascertaining the nature of the objects themselves, and then we may seek to devise an hypothesis which will explain all the facts.

SECTION V.

SUPPLEMENTARY.

Do the Derivative Appetences bear a Conscious Reference to the Original Ones?

A very nice and difficult question is here started. Does the mind, in following a derived impulse, have any reference to those from which it is derived? The secondary one, let us suppose, is the love of money, derived from the primary one, the love of pleasure. In grasping the coin does the man think merely of the money, or is there some idea — it may be very vague — of the enjoyment expected to be

derived from it? Or, to put the question in a more general form, has the money come to be loved for its own sake, or for the pleasure which has come to be associated with it?

Is it necessary to call in a new principle? Might it not all be accounted for by the principle of association, acting till the product becomes organic and hereditary? Let us suppose that, actuated by the love of pleasure, the man finds that wealth is the means of imparting and increasing enjoyment. Henceforth enjoyment is associated with wealth, and the wealth is coveted because of the felicity. Money bringing enjoyment is the idea that stirs up the desire. It is not necessary to suppose that we are distinctly conscious of the contemplated enjoyment entering into the act. The object, say the wealth, may bulk so largely in our view that the other element is not specially noticed. The man may not deliberately choose the pleasure; on the contrary, if there were time and disposition to think, it might be seen that the object, say ill-gotten wealth, is sure to land us in misery; but the object has associated itself with a primary impulse, and draws him on if some other motive does not oppose.

There is a circumstance that imparts force to this latter view. We find that when the secondary appetite ceases to gratify the primary one, it is apt to be weakened, and may in the end all but disappear, or appear only as the result of an old habit. It is thus that so many become disgusted with the objects which once they desired so eagerly. The woman formerly loved is found, or imagined to be, unworthy, mean, selfish, or corrupt, may have ceased to afford the pleasure she at one time did, or has wounded the vanity or thwarted some of the favorite ends of her lover, and is henceforth avoided or repelled. In this way all persons with correct moral principle, or indeed with good sense, become wearied with sensual indulgences, which are associated with remorse and filth. Fame and property may become burdensome, because of the cares and anxieties which they bring.

Whichever of these theories we adopt, it must ever be admitted that there are in the breast of every individual natural appetences; these not merely the love of happiness, which is acknowledged to be universal, but various social instincts and sympathies. These tend to act, in spite of the most adverse circumstances, and show themselves in disappointed feelings when the means of gratification are denied. In conducting this discussion, we have come to discover a most important practical principle; this is the most effective way of removing or counteracting an evil appetite, or one we wish to be rid of. Let us gather a set of associations round another object of an opposite

tendency. Let us cure a low ambition by cultivating a high one; and this may be done by connecting it in our thoughts with some primary appetite of a high character, such as the love of good to ourselves or others. Lust is best corrected by cherishing a pure love. Idleness or listlessness may be overcome by determining to pursue a noble end. As we do so, our associations will cluster round the object, to which we will be drawn by all the force of a primary affection.

SECTION VI.

DIFFERENCES OF APPETENCES IN DIFFERENT INDIVIDUALS.

Some of these, such as the love of happiness and the reverse, operate in the hearts of all men; others, such as the love of polite society and refinement, are confined to a few. There are persons who are incapable of being moved by ends which powerfully attract others: thus their worldly substance so engrosses some that they cannot understand how any one should set a high value on knowledge; while with others the thirst for learning overpowers the love of gold and every other sordid disposition. Some inclinations seem to be personal and peculiar to the individual, as you see in that youth a tendency to solitary musing not known among any of his kindred. Others are hereditary, and run in families, it may be penuriousness, or vanity, or the love of excitement or of strong drink; or are characteristic of races, as the love of war or of conquest. Some are strong in youth, and become weaker in old age, as the appetites and the amorous affections with all their concomitants, and very often also the love of gayety and small ambitions. Some are apt to be strong in the female character, such as the love of dress and of admiration, of sympathy with joy and sorrow; others are, usually, stronger in the male sex, as pride, courage, and the love of adventure and speculation. Some of the motives are fixed,

like a stationary engine drawing up freighted carriages day and night, such as the love of power, and ambition generally ; others, as the love of excitement and amusements, move on with circumstances, like the locomotive advancing with its accompanying train.

In commonplace minds, indeed with a large body of mankind, the main motives are simply the desire to secure the ordinary gratification and avoid the common annoyances of life, along with the gratification of the appetites and some domestic affections. They eat, they drink, they sleep ; they do their necessary business ; they lay hold of the easily available enjoyments of society, and avoid, more or less carefully, the pains inflicted by natural laws ; and they thus pass through life doing little evil and no good. Still, even in the breasts of such, there will at times be deeper impulses making themselves felt, as a fit of passion, sorrow for the loss of a friend, a generous affection, a high aspiration, a reproach of conscience, an awe from a supernatural power, — showing that man has the remains of a higher nature in him, but kept under by the lower appetences, as seeds are by the snows and frosts of winter. It is the office of religion, like the returning spring, to melt the ice and awaken the seeds into life, and nourish them aright.

In some the passions are few and weak. In these cases the temperament is apt to be dull, and the character feeble, though it is possible that there may be much good sense and solid judgment, not liable to aberrations from prejudice. These people act wisely, but are not able to give impulse to others. Most men and women are under a number of motives, no one of them being very strong. The result is a mediocre character, which may be good or evil, as it is directed. In some the moving powers are so balanced that an equilibrium is

established, and you feel confident that the man will be guilty of no extravagance or absurdity; and this not because of any moral quality, but simply because of an equipoise of instincts. Some are moved by a few strong passions, such as self-sufficiency, self-righteousness, pride, and hold their place in society. Others are moved by benevolence, with its fountains and streams of tenderness and almsgiving, and by generous impulses of various kinds, and they spread a happy influence in society. Some are under the dominion of a few petty partialities with enmities and friendships, and the result is an eccentric character, with whims, oddities, foibles, and caprices. Others are impelled by a number of strong tendencies: the passions are vehement, and there are attachments, sympathies, lusts, spites, hatreds, revenges, all acting with or contrary to each other. Such a combination, when the capacities are weak, produces a weak and vacillating character; but if the intellectual talents be great, a strong character for good or for evil, for friendship or enmity, for defense or attack, for building or for destroying, for elevating or for disturbing a community, while the man himself lives in a region of storms, and complains of the opposition he is ever meeting with. These are a few of the forms which natural character takes.

SECTION VII.

CONSPIRING APPETENCES.

Sometimes the cords all draw in one and the same direction. The man is healthy; he has all the comforts of life; his business is prosperous; his family are united; he is respected in the community; he is not troubled with ambitious aims; and he feels happy, — why should he not? There are times when prodigious violence is the

result of a confluence of winds and waves. Henry VIII. so determinedly persevered in his purpose of procuring a divorce, because wearied of his bigoted wife, in doubt as to the lawfulness of his marriage, and in love with Anne Boleyn. A man fleeing for his life, with death in pursuit, will bound over a stream into which in less stimulating circumstances he would fall and perish. I have known students, at a competitive examination, by a gathering and concentration of force doing as much intellectual work in a few hours as they could have done in as many days without the combined stimulus of fame, rivalry, and expected profit. From like combined causes have proceeded, on great emergencies, bursts of extemporaneous eloquence, as that of Abraham Lincoln at Gettysburg, such as could not have been produced by the most labored preparation. It is not that the grand result in such cases is the product of the moment; there is a concentration of powers which have long been collecting, a long gathering of the winds now bursting out in the hurricane, a deposition for years which now falls on the instant in the avalanche. It was thus that the love of intellectual employment, of fame, and power, and a desire to promote the glory of their country, all allured on an Alexander, a Cæsar, a Napoleon, to brilliant feats of conquest. After a like manner, the man of a devout nature, like Mohammed and Cromwell, is carried along as by a trade-wind; the power is within, but he feels as if it were something without him and above him, and calls it the inspiration of the Almighty. Or, under very different impulses, finding that a long-coveted honor is denied him, and roused into ungovernable rage, he curses as bitterly as Shimei did and may threaten blows or murder. Or, after long dreaming of some expected elysium, he "wakes, and finds his only hope lost." Or the conscience

is roused from its lethargy by an unexpected calamity, and brings vividly before him divers aspects of one sin after another, or of that one sin which haunts him like a ghost, and a hell is created before the time, and he feels as if torn by furies gnawing at his vitals.

SECTION VIII.

CONFLICTING APPETENCES.

We have just seen that the motives may join their streams and give great impetus and momentum to the action. In other cases they cross each other, and this in all sorts of ways. Sometimes they directly oppose and thus arrest each other. Sometimes they clash, and produce distractions. So the issue may be inaction, or it may be a compromise, or it may be a terrible fight.

Passions may contend in two ways. First there may be the operation at one and the same time of two inconsistent propensities: there may be, on the one hand, ambition or a love of money prompting to action, and on the other a love of ease and of immediate pleasure, inclining to repose; or there may be a sense of duty resisting a desire to please or a lust for sensual gratification. Were the two equally balanced, they might counteract each other, and inaction be the statical result.¹ We see this in so many who would like to gain a certain end but are hindered by a fear of difficulties or by conscience, and who have to content themselves with doing nothing, except perhaps cherishing sullenness, or who become distracted by reason of the striving of winds

¹ "Did you ever see a blacksmith shoe a restless horse? If you have, you have seen him take a small cord and tie the upper lip. Ask him what he does it for, he will tell you it gives the beast something to think about." Wendell Phillips's *Speeches and Lectures*.

and waves, there being all the while no onward movement.

But more frequently both passions act. On the principle of the parallelogram of the forces, the man follows an intermediate course. This is apt to be the case with your prudent man, who takes as much of pleasure as he can have without injuring his health or reputation. Or, the man gives in now to one motive, and now to another, and he goes by fits and starts, or is known as a man of shifts and expedients. When the motives are not strong, his conduct is tremulous, like the sea when rippled by the breezes. When they are more powerful, the character seems eccentric or untrustworthy, or inconsistent to the world. "He that wavereth is like a wave of the sea." "A double-minded man is unstable in all his ways." We feel that we cannot confide in him, for the motives which swayed him to-day do not influence him to-morrow. His course is a zigzag one, perhaps an interrupted one, and regarded by all as a contradictory one. In most cases the forces are not equal, and the path pursued is curved, perhaps crooked. Sometimes a number of affections are in activity at one and the same time, producing an orbit more difficult to determine than that of the solar system among the stars. The result is apt to be a constant variation, or an unstable equilibrium secured by multiplied balancings ever liable to be deranged.

Or, secondly, the conflict may arise from the regurgitations of one and the same appetite, as now the stream flows on and is gratified, and again is beat back by circumstances, as by a rock, and is disappointed. The affection is the same, but the circumstances and the idea differ, as now there is the appetible to attract, but forthwith the inappetible to repel. Thus love may lead the

man to dote on the person loved, or be jealous of her; now it looks as if he were ready to lay down his life for her, and anon as if he were resolved to take away her life, according as he regards her as returning his affection or favoring a rival.

The conflicts may be keen and long continued between the flesh and the spirit, between passion and prudence, between the love of earthly enjoyment and the attainment of a high ideal. Often do these conflicting passions produce a fearful agitation, like that of the Bay of Biscay, by the meeting of several tides or currents. The source and the power are deep down in the heart, but they appear on the surface in lashings, crestings, and foam. The person feels his state to be intolerable, but cannot stay it. We see it strikingly exhibited in times of suspense, in which, let it be observed, while there is a suspense of the judgment, there is no suspense of the motives. A critical event is at hand, which is to determine for good or for evil our destiny for life. An office for which we are a candidate is to be settled, or an important offer has been made, which has to be accepted or rejected. What elevations and depressions, what hopes and fears, as the person looks now at the one side, and now at the other, and as chances seem favorable or unfavorable! If in the mean time steps have to be taken to secure the issue, the exertion may so brace the frame as to keep it from brooding on the results. But if the person has simply to wait, then what alternations of heights and hollows! What agony on the part of the prisoner when the jury has retired and has not returned to announce the verdict! What tumultuous waves move through the bosom of the mother, as she sits watching by the sick-bed of her child through that dismal night which she knows to be the crisis of the fever. Or in-

formation reaches her that the vessel in which she knows her son was has been shipwrecked; she is so situated that weeks must elapse before she can learn whether he was actually drowned. And what weeks! How long they are! And what terrible tremors by day and visions at night! the very hopes which she momentarily cherishes revealing, what the lightning flash does, only the circumambient darkness. What ups and downs, what exaltations and sinkings of heart, as the lover waits for the answer to his proposal. Some have felt the anxiety to be so intense that they wish for the answer to come, even though it should be adverse, rather than continue longer in this state of crucifying apprehension.

In many cases the combination is chemical rather than mechanical, and there is a boiling and a fermentation. A mother hears of her son being slain on the field of battle, fighting bravely for his country, and having only time, ere he expired, to send one message, and that of undying love to her. There is necessarily a terrible outburst of grief, as she thinks how he died, far away from her, with none to stanch his wounds, and that she will never see him again in this world. But then that son was generous and brave, and he remembered me in his last conscious moments, and I would rather be the mother of that son than of a king or an emperor. But all this only intensifies her sorrow, when she reflects that this son is now torn from her. In all such cases each natural feeling works its proper effect in so far relieving, or it may be intensifying, those combined with it. What a horror of thick darkness, when the mother has to brood over the grave of a son who died in a fit of drunkenness!

SECTION IX.

DOMINANT APPETENCES.

There are some in whom there are a few dominant passions; some in whom there is only one, — the love of the miser for his gold, of the ambitious man for power, of a lover for his mistress, of a mother for her children. To this last class may be referred the man of one idea, that is, of a favorite project, which may make him a somewhat troublesome member of society; but if the idea be good, may so concentrate his thoughts and intensify his energies, which others waste, as to enable him to accomplish an important end. In cases where the intellect is weak and the views narrow, you have the angular man, the man of crotchets and hobbies. The primary appetite genders others, which feed and support it. The one passion becomes the centre round which other agencies circulate, — associated ideas, plans and projects, private and public interests with daily activities, — as planets do round the sun, and satellites round the planets. It may come to be the impelling and the guiding power of the whole life, of the affections which cherish it, and of the actions which are the execution of it. The product is commonly an energetic character, which pursues a path of its own, and moves along like a steam-engine upon the rails set for it, with irresistible power and great speed. Weaker natures have to bend before it, as trees do before the tempest. Men thus moved and moving often come to have sway over their districts, over their states, over continents, and over ages to come. It has to be added that they often meet with opposition from men as determined as themselves, they have to rattle on over flinty rocks, and fire is struck by

the collision ; or they are arrested in their course, and perhaps are burned as martyrs. Which of these issues is to follow may depend on their intellectual force, or on the preparedness of the age to receive them.

The ruling passion differs, of course, in different individuals. In some cases it leads to deeds of self-sacrifice and devotion which may be regarded as sublime, as when Horatius of old kept the bridge, and Leonidas withstood the Persians at Thermopylæ ; as when the mother hesitates not to risk her life in defense of her child, and the sister nurses a brother in a raging fever breathing infection all around, and the martyr dies for the faith. In many cases it is partly for good and partly for evil, as the love of fame when it leads to dashing feats, but may be accompanied with sour jealousy and biting envy, which attacks reputations and disturbs the peace of the community. When the actor is of weak capacity, he is driven along by his passion, as the ship with full-spread sail, but without ballast, or rudder, or compass, is by the winds and waves. When the motive is totally self-regarding, as it is in the case of the miserly, the ambitious, the intemperate, the licentious, it burns within like a fire, absorbing all things into itself, even the powers that oppose it, and devouring them in its flame, which may spread all around and become the bane of the community. When it is thwarted, as it is constantly liable to be, very possibly by the very obstacles it has raised up, its agitations become as noisy and restless as those of the ocean upon an opposing precipice. When it is totally and finally disappointed, as it must often be, then the bearer and the cherisher of it, Napoleon Bonaparte for instance, at St. Helena, is like an imprisoned vulture nibbling restlessly at its cage.

In all cases the heavy weight is apt to disturb the equi-

librium of the soul, which becomes misshapen and would be the better of being balanced by some other affections. It fortunately happens that certain minor tastes and kindly dispositions often come in to soften the hardness and selfishness of the character. Macaulay, absorbed in literature, was willing at any time to turn aside from it to write for the amusement of the relatives he loved. What a relief to the business man to unbosom himself in the evening in his family, who may regale him with pleasant games, or reading, or music! The fanatic Robespierre had a redeeming feature in his love for his dog and for the lower animals. I knew the mother of an illegitimate child, who, for fear of exposure, murdered her infant, but labored through long, wearisome days to support her mother. Tradition reports that Robin Hood and Rob Roy gave large portions of their plunder to the poor.

SECTION X.

UNDEVELOPED APPETENCES.

We have seen that there are native tendencies to action in all men. All of these do not have an outlet at every given time; some of them may never find a channel. In the breast of every child there is a whole host of such appetences, ready to come forth like buds in spring. The constant activity of youth arises partly from organic life, but it is excited mainly by the mental cravings. It is said that there is as much energy laid up in a dew-drop as would make a thunder-storm; there is certainly power in the breast of that infant sufficient to produce immortal results. There is force pressing in all directions, laid up and ready to burst out when an opening is made. The appetences are the varied sources of the life of youth; as the rain which has fallen into the

ground, and runs there in gathered rills, is the feeder of our fountains. The expression of the desires of the young is, "Who will show us any good?" and they are grateful to any one who will give them employment in accordance with their longings; and you see them running to every pretentious spectacle, and dancing round the blaze of crackling thorns. If a lawful means of expending their energy is not allowed, it will break out in lawless ways; making it so important to keep youth busy, if we would keep them out of evil.

Some boys and girls do not show a particular tendency towards any one kind of activity, but seem ready for any kind of work. Others early begin to run along certain marked lines: towards their father's occupation, or towards merchandise, or towards books; towards music, or painting, or mechanics, or travel, or science, or philosophy, or practical beneficence. Sometimes it is a long time, and only after repeated failures in roads on which he has entered, that the young man finds his appropriate sphere and work. One who expected to be a scholar has to go to business; and one, like Hugh Miller, who has tried a trade rises to be a man of science. I felt myself, and I believe others have felt, in the state between youth and manhood, an indefinable longing, coming out like the sighing of a stream in the quiet of the evening, and asking for a settled work in the morning. It is the unuttered prayer of a spirit which has unused capacities, craving for an object and for employment.

When they are not allowed to come out the appetences smoulder like a suppressed fire. There may be such in the breasts of persons advanced in life. The virgin may never meet with one to whom she chooses to unite herself, but she has all the sensibilities which

would make her happy with one she loved. There is an affection in the mother, ready to clasp her infant as soon as it is born. Many a boy has fine impulses which his teacher has not the skill to call forth. There are men and women who have capacities for friendships and benevolences which they have restrained from timidity or from selfishness, and which, therefore, have become gradually dried up. We must all have met with middle-aged or old men possessed of great talents and wide aspirations, but who have never found their proper field to work in, and who feel unhappy in consequence, as they expend their strength on insignificant objects. They remind me of Napoleon in Elba, devoting the intellect which used to combine armies to small farming operations. At times a conjuncture will call forth a capacity which has hitherto lain dormant, as the seed which had been in the mummy for thousands of years will burst forth in open air and a congenial soil. Thus, the death of a father has called forth energies of a hitherto inactive son, and the death of the husband has revealed hitherto unknown capacities of exertion and management in his widow.

Any one looking into the mind of a child may discover capabilities there which are to fit it for a sphere in this world. But may we not discover in the soul endowments and aspirations which do not find their fitting action in this, but seem to be intended for another and a higher sphere? How many cuttings are trained in a nursery here, only to be torn up, but in such a way and with such gifts as to show that they are to be transplanted into a better soil! There are longings in man which can be satisfied with nothing less than with God.

SECTION XI.

THE MOTIVELESS MAN.

The phrase might be applied to those who have no very strong appetences of any kind. They may have good intellectual abilities; when a work is forced upon them by circumstances, they may do it thoroughly and effectively; and from the very fact that they have no predilections, they may pass a very sound judgment on a case submitted to them. But their temperament, it is said, is sluggish, and they undertake no great work.

But the phrase seems rather to be applicable to one who has lost a motive which he at one time had. A wife (I have known many such) has tried for a long time to win back the affection of a husband, or to save him from intemperance. But all her efforts have failed, and when she comes to the conclusion that they must fail for the future she ceases to exert herself. Her whole character and manner are now marked by listlessness. She feels that it is vain to try to please, and her person and her household come to be neglected. The only means of saving her is to furnish to her a ground of hope by the reformation of her husband, or, we have to add, by his death. Much the same state of feeling is apt to be superinduced when one who has long toiled at business finds in old age that his plans have utterly broken down. He feels that there is nothing left him but to give himself to apathy, from which there is no means of rousing him. Happy, surely, are those who in such a position have motive and hope to start for a better world!

The most painful cases are those in which the man has lost motive of every kind. He has failed, or he imagines that he has failed, in so many things that his

habitual sentiment is that nothing will succeed with him. It is of no use laying any proposed line of action before him; he will scarcely listen to it, or, if he does so for a moment, it is only to sink back into indifference. But meanwhile he is not in the negative and blank position of one who is utterly devoid of incentives. For there may be ambitious inclinations lying within, in a smouldering state, which he keeps down simply because he feels that they cannot be gratified, and which have a suffocating effect upon him. With fine capacities of thought and action, he may give himself up to a life of useless lassitude. Or, making one other ecstatic effort issuing in failure, he may abandon himself to despair, or terminate an intolerable existence by suicide.

CHAPTER II.

SECOND ELEMENT OR ASPECT: THE IDEA (PHANTASM).

SECTION I.

NATURE OF THE IDEA WHICH CALLS FORTH EMOTION.

IT is of an object fitted to gratify or to disappoint an appetite of the mind. The mere existence of the appetite as a tendency or disposition is not sufficient to call forth feeling, though I have no doubt it is ever prompting it, or rather by the law of association stirring up the idea which gives it a body. There must always be an idea carrying out the appetite to call the emotion into actual exercise. If the object be before us, of course we have a perception of it by the senses, or we are conscious of it within our minds. If it be not present we have a remembrance of it, or we have formed an imagination of it. That object may be mental or material, may be real or imaginary, may be in the past, the present, or the future; but there must always be a representation of it in the mind. Let a man stop himself at the time when passion is rolling like a river, he will find that the idea is the channel in which it flows. An idea is as much needed as a pipe is to conduct gas and enable it to flame; shut up the conduit, and the feeling will be extinguished.

Other things being equal, the emotion rises and falls according as the idea takes in more or less of the appetible. I am told that a dear relative of mine has fallen

from a great height and is dangerously injured. I have a vivid image of that friend as in deep distress, and I am affected with sorrow and with pity. But I am told soon after that the account brought me is so far mistaken : a person had fallen, but he is no friend of mine, and the peculiar tenderness of my feeling is removed. On making further inquiry, I find that though he fell from a height he is not seriously hurt, and my pity ceases. Examine any other case of emotion and you will always discover an idea as the substratum of the whole, bearing it up as the stake does the living vine. I have come to see that a favorite and long-cherished project of mine may possibly succeed, and I have a faint hope. As events move on, I find that it will probably succeed, and my hope, thus supplied with fuel, kindles into a flame. After a time it becomes certain that I will attain my end, and I have now a settled expectation. My scheme is at last crowned with success, and I have joy. But the crown of green branches placed on my brow begins to wither, I am exposed to blighting cares, envy, and trouble, and there remains nothing but the dead stock of disappointment. Emotion has thus as its body an idea, which determines the life and growth, the decay and death, of the inner spirit.

The idea which thus awakens feeling is not an abstract or general notion. Pity is called forth by the contemplation, not of humanity in the abstract, but of sentient beings, ourselves or others, exposed to suffering. The dread which moves us is not of evil in general, but of some individual evil or evils, such as pain, bereavement, ill-usage, insult, contempt, contumely ; emotion is excited when we have an idea of ourselves or others exposed to these or such as these. The mental state is best expressed by an apt Aristotelian phrase which some of us

are seeking to revive, *phantasm*,¹ the faculty from which it proceeds being the phantasy. The phantasy presents a picture of ourselves or others, of a man, woman, or child in sorrow, and our commiseration flows forth apace, all this because we have a fountain within, which, however, needs an outlet.

The phantasm must be of an object which addresses the appetite in the way of gratifying or disappointing it. It must appeal to our desire for pleasure or applause, to our friendship, or to some one or other of the motives which draw mankind. There are some springs of action which seem to sway all men, such as the love of happiness and the desire to please. There are others which are confined to classes or individuals, as the love of money, the love of dress, or of a mother for her boy. The considerations which sway the people of one age, sex, or condition, do not necessarily influence all others or any others. The savage is not apt to be interested in refinements, nor the boy in abstract science; both require to have the taste created. Nobody in the company may feel an interest in that girl except her lover, who watches her every motion. Appeals which powerfully affect certain persons have no influence on others. The tale of distress which brings tears and alms from this man, meets with no response from that miser whose soul is bound up in his money bags.

In looking more particularly at the nature of the ideas which raise emotion, it will be found, I believe, that they are singular, that is of individual objects. I have not seen this position laid down anywhere; but I am prepared to defend it, always with the proper explanations and limitations. It is the phantasm that awakens

¹ Aristotle announced the doctrine I am expounding, in the language I am using. Ὁρεκτικόν δὲ οὐκ ἔνευ φαντασίας. *De Anima*, iii. 30.

sentiment. But all phantasms are singular. The phantasm of a lily is of one lily. The general notion or concept of lily, that is lily in general, is of an indefinite number of lilies, joined by their common type. There is commonly a phantasm involved in the general notion, but it is of a single one, stripped of as many peculiarities as possible, of the individuals which constitute the class, and the phantasm does not constitute the class, but is merely a sign or representative to enable us to think of it. There are various intellectual operations involved in the concept "man," that is man in general, but the image before the mind is of one man, with the things that distinguish one man from another left out as much as possible. Now, the idea that evokes feeling is not of humankind in the general, or of humanity in the abstract, but of a man, woman, or child in a state of happiness or of distress.

But this truth, which is a very important one, requires to be restricted and properly understood; otherwise it will evidently be false. Under singular ideas are evidently to be included collective ones, in which we have an aggregate of individuals, as a congregation, an army. In the ideas are to be comprehended their associations, as those which collect around our birthplace and our home. A man loves his family, his village, his school, his college, his shop, his regiment, his farm, his workshop, his country, and his church. Clubs and societies often gather round them an intense interest. There is a sense in which even abstractions and generalizations may call forth feeling, by reason of the individuals embraced in them and their associations, which may convey their sentiment to that which combines them. The appeals by orators to liberty, to order, to love, or to religion may have a stimulating influence and rouse to

action ; but the feeling is called forth by the associated ideas of persons, many or few, in whom we feel an interest. It is always the objects, and not our intellectual separations and combinations of them, which call forth emotion.¹ Whenever abstractions become very refined, or generalizations very wide, so as to be utterly separate from the objects, they cease to evoke feeling, which always comes forth most vividly and strongly when the living beings are set before us personally, as gratifying, or frustrating an affection of our nature.

We talk of mankind loving the beautiful and the good, of their delighting in nature, and being awed with the sublime. If we understand these declarations simply as general expressions of individual truths, they may be allowed to pass. But if we interpret them as meaning that there is emotion raised by the beautiful, the grand, the good, in the general or in the abstract, they leave an erroneous impression. No man ever had his heart kindled by the abstract idea of loveliness, or sublimity, or moral excellence, or any other abstraction. That which calls forth our admiration is a lovely scene, that which raises wonder and awe is a grand scene, that which calls forth love is not loveliness in the abstract, but a lovely and loving person. That which evokes moral approbation is not virtue in the abstract, but a virtuous agent performing a virtuous act. In short, it is not the abstract but the concrete, not the generalizations of the comparative power, but objects animate and inanimate, perceived or imaged, which awaken our emotional nature.

If those views be correct they furnish certain important practical results.

¹ Aristotle has remarked that common notions (*Νοήματα*) are not without phantasms (*οὐκ ἄνευ φαντάσματος*). *De Anim.* iii. 7.

(1.) We see how feeling is to be raised, either in our own breasts or in those of others. Feeling, it is evident, cannot be compelled. It will not flow at our bidding, or simply in consequence of a voluntary determination on our part; we may resolve and resolve again, but no commands, threats, or terrors will make it unlock its fountains. And if it will not come from our own bosom in obedience to an order, still less can we expect it to flow from those of others because we require it. Nor is it sufficient to address the conscience, and to show that emotion ought to flow; for it will rather delight at times to rebel against an imposed authority. Are our feelings, then, as some would maintain, beyond our control? Do they rise and fall like the winds, how and when they list? Do they flow and ebb like the tides, in obedience to impulses, which we can no more rule than Canute could command the waves of the ocean? Were this so, man would indeed be in a most helpless condition, more so than the sailor without a rudder in his ship, or the slave obliged to submit to the caprice of his master. But though a man may not be able to command his sensibilities directly, he has complete power over them indirectly. He can guide and control, if not the feeling itself, at least the idea, which is the channel in which it flows. He may not be able to move his heart to pity by an act of the will, but he can call up a representation of a sufferer, and the compassion will burst out. Or better still, he can visit the house of mourning, he can enter the abode of the poor, the sick, the forlorn, the outcast, and as he witnesses their misery, or listens to their tale of sorrow, his heart — if heart he has — will swell and heave with emotion.¹

¹ It was a favorite maxim of the Stoics that passion (*πάθος*) depended on opinion (*δόξα*) or judgment (*κρίσις*) — see Cicero, *Tusc. Dis.* iv. 6), — and

(2.) We see how powerless all those systems, whether of professed religion or morality, must be which do not set before us a living and a loving God, to call forth toward Him our feelings of admiration and affection. Pantheism would substitute the love of the good for the love of God. We do not purpose, its advocates say, to do away with piety and adoration, we would rather purify and exalt them: let men be taught to admire the grand, the perfect, the infinite, to love the fair, the beautiful, the good. We might meet this on the ground that it is setting aside the living and the true God, in favor of a creature, or rather fiction, of the human mind. But it concerns us rather at present to show that it contradicts some of the essential principles of human nature. The contemplation of the beautiful and the good, apart from a beautiful and good object, cannot evoke deep or lively emotion. Unless we place before the mind a personal, a living, acting, benevolent God, the affections will not be drawn towards Him. On the same principle, the injunction or the recommendation of virtue in the abstract, as was done in so many of the pulpits and by so many of the ethical writers of Great Britain in the middle of the last century, is found to be utterly powerless upon the heart, character, and conduct, inasmuch as it is in no way fitted to move, to interest, or engage the affections or any of the deeper principles of our nature.

(3.) Our doctrine admits an application to the art of rhetoric, as showing how feeling is to be excited. We

hence they drew the practical conclusion, that by judgment people could reach the *ἀπαθεια* which the sect so commended. The doctrine contained a truth; only it was better expressed by Aristotle, who said affection implied *φάντασμα*. The conclusion of the Stoics did not follow; for there are appetences in our nature independent of judgment, and the ideas which generate affections are governed by associations which can only be counteracted by other associations.

are never, indeed, to neglect the more important task of enlightening and convincing the understanding in the view of impressing the sensibility. If the judgment is not convinced, feeling will be merely like the fire fed by straw, blazing for a time, it may be, to be speedily extinguished, with only ashes remaining. But in order to secure consideration by the understanding, or when the understanding has been gained, it may be of advantage or it may be necessary to interest the heart. Now we have seen in what way the feelings are to be gained. No man ever stirred up feeling by simply showing that we ought to feel. Still less will it be roused by high-sounding exclamations, such as "how lovely!" "how good!" "how sublime!" Commonplace orators shout and rave in this way without exciting in the breast of those who listen to them any feeling, except it be one of wonder how they should seem to be so warm when they are saying nothing fitted to warm us. A steady tide will be raised only where there is a body like the moon attracting the waters. He who would create admiration for goodness must exhibit a good being performing a good action.

(4.) We see what is the language best fitted to raise feeling. For scientific purposes we are obliged to take terms from the Greek and Latin tongues. But these are not fitted to raise emotion; they always have the stiff bearing of a foreign language, and should be used in poetry, moving oratory, and narrative only when necessary to give clearness and accuracy of thinking.

I can conceive a language, like the manners of some men, becoming too artificial. This may to some extent be a disadvantage in scientific thought, which needs an accurate nomenclature. But it is to a far larger extent a benefit that language has come down to us from a more natural state of things, just as the most refined

circles are all the better at times for the infusion of fresh elements. The best language is that which has both kinds of phrases, — which retains the freshness of youth in the midst of the maturity of age. I have observed that the words that have descended from a more primitive state of things are those which occur to us most readily when we are expressing deep and heartfelt feeling.

(5.) Let us guard the fountains of the affections, or, in better words, “Keep thy heart with all diligence; for out of it are the issues of life.” While our knowledge of the general laws which regulate man and nature is expanded, let us take great care that we do not lose our interest in individual scenes and persons. This double advantage can be had only by our retaining our natural tastes alongside of our attainments, and by our returning from these excursions into remote regions with renewed zest to what we should feel to be the most endeared of all spots, — the home of the affections.

SECTION II.

WORKS OF FICTION.

Every one knows that the feelings are capable of being moved by imaginary as well as by real scenes. People weep over the distresses of the heroine of a novel as they do over actual sorrow; they glory in the success of a hero on the stage as they do in the exploits of one who once lived on the earth. How are we to account for this? Do we believe for the instant that the scenes are real? The common theory is that we do so. But is it necessary to resort to such a supposition? It is not judgment or belief which stirs up emotion, but the phantasm of an object fitted to gratify or disappoint an affec-

tion. It is the very idea of a human being in trouble, that raises pity; of a virtuous man triumphing, that excites admiration. If we have a tender or sympathetic nature we cannot contemplate a sensitive being as exposed to suffering, without being moved. What the novelist does is to present the picture, and the feeling goes toward the object. He often makes the representation so vivid that it evokes keener excitement than the common scenes of life. The effect of the stage scenery and the acting is to make the whole more lively. In order to emotion, there does not seem to be any need of a belief in a positive existence. All that is required is that unbelief do not interpose to keep us from taking in the scene. Hence it is needful for the novelist, the author, and the actor, to make all the accompaniments as probable and plausible as possible, lest unbelief scatter the idea and with it the feeling. I do not know that belief, the result of judgment, ever raises feeling, but when it is superinduced upon an appetible idea it secures its continuance. I acknowledge the need of a belief in the reality of the vision, to keep the eye steady and prevent it from being distracted by the other objects constantly pressing themselves on the attention.

It is to gratify the appetences of our nature by means of ideas, calling forth feeling with its excitements and attachments, that tales have been invented, first recited, then written, and then printed. People at all ages of life and of all times delight in such creations. Infants have dolls, which perform a part in a drama which they are weaving. How eagerly do children listen to stories by their mothers and nurses, and are specially moved by scenes of adventure, like Robinson Crusoe, or the Pilgrim's Progress, or of unmerited suffering, as the Babes in the Wood. In later years, people are apt not only to

have night dreams but day dreams ; and many indulge in building aerial castles. The rudest nations have their myths, expressing their prejudices, their prides, and their revenges.

SECTION III.

ASSOCIATION OF EMOTIONS. — BURSTS OF PASSION.

Association of Ideas has been discussed in the volume on the Cognitive Powers. It is admitted that our ideas are associated according to certain laws, say contiguity and correlation (Vol. I. b. ii. c. 3). The question is started, Is there association among our feelings also? Do our emotions, say, of hope and fear, of sorrow and joy, also suggest each other ; and, if so, according to what laws ? It will be found that, while there are associations of feelings, they are of a different kind from those of ideas.

In order to collect the exact truth, let us call before us the elements in emotion, and inquire how they bear upon the flow of feeling. There is the appetite, say, for, money ; this is the abiding element in the emotion and gives it its stay and stability. There is the idea of something appetible or inappetible, say, of a sum of money being lost ; this idea comes by the occurrence being told us, or according to the laws of association formulated in the passage referred to. The idea, as disappointing the appetite, produces a repugnance, followed, it may be, by an organic affection, perhaps by the wringing of the hands. It continues for a time with a succession of ideas bearing on the loss, and each raising a painful sensation. This is the psychological process. Let us try to explicate it more fully.

The appetite is the abiding principle. The idea of an object calls it forth and thereby produces feeling.

But it has been shown (Vol. I. p. 135) that whenever there is energy in an idea, the idea is called forth more readily and frequently, and in particular is this so when there is an energy of feeling. Suppose, then, that there is an emotional idea, the feeling will be apt to recall the idea. In this way the emotional state tends to propagate itself. It diffuses itself through all the powers of the mind; it suffuses like thaw through our whole nature.

The nature of the process is commonly modified by the organic affection. It should always be noticed that all emotion, properly speaking, begins within; but all our stronger mental feelings are accompanied with an excited state of the brain. When this is called forth, it continues for a time, according to physiological laws. If the soul is moved by any one emotion, the whole nervous organism is apt to be affected. The roused brain reacts on the mental train, and the combined body and mind are for a time in a state of excitement—wave succeeds wave.

Take the case of a man in a passion. He has been insulted; his honor is impugned. Ideas rise up of reputation damaged, of injury done him; these address a nature sensitive about character, and the corresponding organism is disturbed; there is a visible flush on the face, the eyes emit fire, and the whole frame is agitated. The consciousness of the man shows that a series of emotional ideas is moving on in his mind, all directed to one point by the deep lying appetite. There are ideas with the corresponding feelings of humiliation, of ill usage received, of anger, of resentment; and plans of defence, of resistance, and revenge, are suggested, and arguments to repel the attack are prepared; or, in the case of persons who lay no moral restraint on themselves, blows are resorted to, or a challenge is sent. Or look at this mother who has just had the intelligence brought her that her son

has perished at sea. There is, first, the occurrence realized with the vivid picture of the dear son sinking in the waters, gone from this world to be seen no more, pleasant memories of the past coming up cruelly to torment the present and to darken the future. Along with all this, and continuing all this, is an excited nervous state, venting itself in sobs, in tears, possibly in writhings of the body, or in frantic tearing of the hair or clothes, and ending, it may be, in prostration or in fainting.

This seems to me to be the rationale of the association of emotions. Organically, emotion puts us into a state of sensibility, and when in this state every feeling stirred up produces a greater perturbation. The feeling, in proportion to its intensity, tends to bring back the idea at its basis once and again, all to renew the feeling and the organic affection. Take the case of the sorrow of a widow who has just lost her husband. At the root of the whole is the deep affection, then an idea of the separation and the loss, and then intense mental excitement with organic disturbance. This is the immediate sorrow. As a consequence, the idea of the loss comes up again and again, to renew the sorrow. After a season there is apt to be an abatement: first, from the organic wave expending itself, so that the mental emotion does not so agitate it; and secondly, from new associations springing up, possibly new affections formed, or old affections strengthened, say a more intense devotedness of the widow to the children of the departed. If the affection has never been deep, the sorrow evaporates in this way, leaving nothing but a dry indifference, capable, like ashes, only of an occasional and momentary kindling. If the affection has been strong, the grief will abide with the widow for life, but it will be less violent, and will be relieved by pleasant reminiscences and by useful occupations.

We have here a picture of every other violent passion, such as anger, or disappointment, or shame, or remorse. The nervous affection is excited, and then it subsides. Crowds of thoughts, all tending to feed the passion, come up according to that primary law of coëxistence which brings up associations in groups, but are in the course of time varied, and, it may be, dissipated and scattered by new experiences. We thus see the advantage, if we would abate passion, of keeping away from scenes which might provoke it, and going — traveling, if need be — into new scenes which raise new associations. We are accustomed to say that time has wrought the change, but in fact it has been by these mental and physical agencies having had time to work.

Proceeding on this analysis, we can explain certain mental phenomena often commented on. Some are violently affected with grief or passion at the time, and soon lose all feeling; while others, not, it may be, so ruffled on the surface, are as strongly moved in the depths of their hearts for long years after. Again, some are all feeling at all times, and have perpetual smiles of benignity on their countenance, and expressions of sympathy ever flowing from their lips, and at times tears trickling from their eyes — all, it may be, perfectly sincere at the time; but then you cannot make them take an abiding interest in any one person, or in the best of causes. Whence the difference? It may arise so far from a mere organic mobility in the one class of persons, and an inorganic immobility in the other class. But the essential difference lies in the circumstance, that in the former there is merely a surface rill of excitement, acting on an organic impressibility, which soon runs dry, whereas in the other there is a deep fountain of affection or hatred, ready to burst out, and forcing, when it does not find, a channel.

These laws may enable us to explain a well-known mental action. A man promises to do a certain act at a certain hour. The wonder is, not that he should at times forget it, but that in ordinary circumstances he should remember it, and perform what he intended. How does it happen that in the multitude of the thoughts within him he should think of the act at the proper moment and proceed to do it? The answer to this question will bring before us a general fact of our mental nature which has very much escaped the notice of psychologists. It is that a determination to do a particular act may reach forward in its influence through a considerable period. The determination to awake at a particular hour during the night may run through our half conscious thoughts and enable us to rise about the time we wish. How are we to explain this?

It is clear that we must bring in first the law of mental energy, according to which, what we have bestowed a great deal of force on is sure to come up more frequently and readily. If our resolution is formed loosely, without any thought or earnestness, it is very apt never to come up again, or come up only after the time for action is over. It may be noticed, too, that if we form a purpose or give a promise in the midst of distractions, or when we are eagerly bent on some other end, the whole is apt to pass away from the mind, or to recur when it is too late. We are most apt to remember when our resolution relates to something towards which we have a strong natural or acquired appetite. It is almost certain to appear when it falls in with our habits, or when it is associated with something that must come before us, say with a particular place, or hour, or occurrence. The lover is not likely to forget the appointment he has made with the loved one, and should he fail to remember it it

would be taken as an evidence that his affection was not very deep. In these cases all the laws of association combine to recall the resolution or the promises. When these do not assist us our only resource is to fix the determination very deeply in our minds and bring it up from time to time, that it may become more deeply rooted and be made to come up more certainly. All such processes are themselves mental, but leave an unconscious impress on the brain, and thus favor the recollection, in a way which physiology should try to explain, but which it cannot explain at this moment.

SECTION IV.

SPONTANEOUS FLOW OF THOUGHT.

There is a train of idea and emotion which we are disposed to follow every given instant, impelled unconsciously by deep underlying appetences, natural and acquired, and flowing in the channels opened by the laws of association, intellectual and emotive.

Our floating ideas, not determined by outward circumstances or by some fixed purpose, move like clouds in the sky. Sometimes they are light and fleecy, and we walk or rest pleasantly under them. Sometimes they are bright and cheerful like the morning dawn, and we are inspired by hope and incited to activity. Sometimes they are glowing and radiant like the evening sky, and we gaze upon them with delight and linger in their splendors. At other times they are as chill as mists, and our sensations are uncomfortable and our prospects dismal. Or they are dark and scowling, foreboding rain and tempest, or are ready to burst out in thunder and lightning. Quite as frequently—indeed it is the common experience of most—they are dull and uninterest-

ing, like a gray stream of clouds, such as I have seen in Ireland, floating whole days in one direction, concealing the blue sky and darkening the earth ; and we wish to have the exciting storm rather than this monotony. Much of human happiness and misery, much of human character is determined by this flowing stream, just as the lines of ancient civilization were determined by the great rivers, the Nile, the Euphrates, and the Ganges. When the train is pleasant we commit ourselves to it and go on with it. But then we are liable to be annoyed at any moment by intruders interrupting it. Much of that fretfulness which we call temper may be traced to this source. No doubt there may be other causes operating. There may be pains, more or less keen, arising from disease or accident ; there may be the loss of objects on which we set a value ; but even the annoyances thus produced may derive their force from their disturbing a train of earnest, or vain, or proud, or lustful ideas, all pursuing their courses. A person, eagerly bent on a favorite end, finds an untoward event coming across his path, and he bursts into a passion. Or he is happy in cherishing a sense of his own ability, or courage, or worth, and there is a remark made, which ruffles his self-complacency, and his manner is changed on the instant. How unwilling are the gay and the frivolous to be constrained to turn to study, or to the business of life, with its habitual dullness and its frequent disappointments. The harshest sounds do not so grate on the ears listening to the finest music, as these interruptions do upon the easy flow of association. In this way we can account for the sensitive aversion to certain scenes and persons ; their appearance calls up unpleasant scenes in the past to disturb the complacent humor of the present. "I hate him, for he doth not prophesy good concerning me, but only evil."

When outward circumstances do not harmonize with the inward train, there is apt to be a strain and a struggle. The girl, the boy, even the man, who has been engrossed with play and amusement, is reluctant to turn to work which requires a constant effort. Much of the complaint of discontent in this world proceeds from persons not being suited to their surroundings, from their being placed in positions which have an entirely unformable shape, so that they jar on each other as they turn. Hence the propriety of so far studying the dispositions, as well as the capacities of boys in the choice of a profession; if there be a strong taste there will be the risk of a collision if it is thwarted. Chatterton, with a strong poetical predilection, could not be contented in the shop of a druggist; and David Hume, with a love for literature and reflection, found the study of law to be irksome in Edinburgh; and feeling mercantile pursuits to be still more irksome in Bristol, betook himself to France and to philosophy. We can account in this way for the incompatibilities of temper which often manifest themselves soon after marriage. There are not only the different tastes of those thus thrown so closely together, there are the different and colliding lines in which their trains of association run. The husband starts a topic in which he is intensely interested, but is surprised to find that it jars on the cherished ideas of his wife, who becomes irritated, and an expression escapes her which kindles the ire of her partner, or sinks him into moody silence, or ferments his dissatisfaction into sourness. In all such cases, it will be found that by firm moral principle and forbearance the two can have their forms so bent as to fit into each other, — as two somewhat discordant time-pieces can be made to keep the same time by being placed on the same wall. Still

it is better when from the first there is a correspondence of taste, — which may not imply an identity, for they may conform all the more when a prominence in the one fits into a deficiency of the other, when light-heartedness buoys up gravity, by which it is balanced and kept from leaving the earth and floating in the air.

Even when the train is indifferent, or so far painful, we are apt to follow it, rather than keep up a constant fight with it. It is true that the train can so far be influenced by the will detaining a present thought, which may collect other thoughts, and in time wear a new channel. But in all this we have to resist the stream, and the exertion is felt to be laborious, and wastes the energy, and is apt to be given up because of the irksomeness. Even the sluggish monastic life comes to have its attractions to many as permitting an accustomed train which is seldom disturbed, and is encouraged by the self-righteous spirit engendered; though I rather think there are cases in which, after the depression which may have led the persons to devote themselves to such a life has passed away, the old and worldly spirit awakes to take a life-long vengeance. The idle and the vagrant cannot resist the temptations presented by the freedom they enjoy in following their own ways. We can thus explain what has been called the indulgence in melancholy. The old habit can be thoroughly conquered only by the formation of new habits, that is, by channels cut out by the currents coming in from new quarters. Let it be observed, that in all this there are dominant appetences leading on a train of ideas of an emotional character.

Very different effects follow when the appetences tend towards the unpleasant, and the ideas in the train are painful. With some, especially those laboring under a diseased nervous temperament, the stream conducts from

one unpleasant topic to another : the faces of lost friends present themselves, they think only of injuries done them, of insults offered them, of misfortunes that have befallen, or they picture coming woes. The endeavor will now be, to be delivered from these associations. To relieve themselves from such pain, some betake themselves to scenes of boisterous mirth, or mad excitement. In the depression that follows a period of excitement, persons are driven to return to their old scenes of folly. It is thus that the afflicted have to leave the scenes where the misfortune occurred ; thus that the wife has to abandon the home where her husband was murdered and the youth to forsake the locality where his father disgraced himself ; thus that husbands have murdered their wives, to be rid of the memorials of domestic cruelty or of broken VOWS.

CHAPTER III.

THE THIRD ELEMENT OR ASPECT: THE EXCITEMENT WITH ATTACHMENT AND REPUGNANCE.

SECTION I.

THEIR GENERAL NATURE.

WE have seen that as the reservoir of all emotion there is an affection or an appetite, and that the waters flow out in a channel supplied by the idea. Let us now view the inward impulse as actually bursting forth. The soul is now to a greater or less extent in a moved or excited state. There is a current, smooth, leaping, or troubled, moving on with more or less rapidity. There is more than excitement; there is a feeling of pleasure in, or aversion to, the object of which we have an idea, and which is supposed to gratify, or thwart, the motive power of the mind. When the object is contemplated as good, or as bringing good, that is as appetible, we are drawn towards it, we feel an attachment to it; there is a glow of heart, a pleasurable elevation, and we feel attracted towards that which interests us. On the other hand, when it is regarded as evil, or about to bring evil, there is also an excitement, but it is painful excitement, chafing and irritating the spirit, and we draw away from the object, or we drive it away from us. There is an inclination towards the object in all those emotions which contemplate the desirable, such as affection, hope, expectation, and a disinclination towards all things that frustrate our wishes, in fear, anger, disappointment.

It is when it thus bursts out that the affection falls under the eye of consciousness. We are not conscious of the appetite, as an appetite, of the swaying motive, which lies deep down in the soul, as the root does in the ground. Just as we do not perceive by the senses the attraction of the moon, but notice it as raising the tides, so we do not discover the power of a motive till it raises a wave of feeling. We become conscious, first, of the idea, and along with this, of the excitement arising from the attractions and repulsions. We feel in a moved, often in an irritated, or agitated, state, and are impelled to action which we may allow or restrain as we will.

The excitement is produced, in the first instance, by the gratification, or disappointment, real or expected, of a motive. But when it has once been enjoyed it may come to be desired for its own sake. Some feel as if they could not live without excitement. Hence they seek out for scenes fitted to produce it. They may search for it in a variety of quarters: some in the theatre, some in novel reading, some in the dance, some in hunting or traveling, some in the competitions of trade or ambition, some by resorting to wine or other bodily stimulants. Kept within proper bounds, and when directed to proper objects, this love of stimulus may be allowed; it adds to our enjoyment and it may dispel lassitude, torpor, and *ennui*, and promote habits of activity and enterprise. On the other hand, when directed to wrong ends, or when carried to excess, even in cases in which the employments are lawful, the taste may be very injurious, wasting the time of youth when knowledge and habits of virtue should be acquired; and when declining life arrives, appearing in an unseemly and ridiculous frivolity, or issuing in discontent and restlessness.

The repulsions are as powerful, often as peculiar, as

the attractions. As men and women have personal affections and predilections, so they have also prejudices and antipathies, often bitter and incurable. They avoid certain places, persons, and societies; they shrink from certain pursuits and proposals; they cherish envy, malignity, revenge, because afraid of their pride being humbled, and their favorite ends being thwarted. Some have doubted whether the malignant passions, or the benevolent, have stirred up the larger amount of activity in our world. Even as courage impels some to fight against threatened evil, so cowardice prompts others to make great exertion to avoid it. If duty has, like the bee, its sweets, it also has its stings, and many are thereby kept from pursuing it. On the other hand, the hatred of evil in a world where sin is so prevalent, and has wrought such mischief, has called forth an incalculable amount of energy in noble minds, and kept our world from becoming an offensive and intolerable lazar-house.

The inappetible may be of two sorts. It may be the disappointment of a strong impulse, say ambition, or love. This is one sense negative; it arises from the absence of an object, but of an object for which there may still be a craving felt to be painful, because it cannot be gratified. But in other cases there may be a positive aversion to a certain end or object, to certain places, or persons, or animals. These two forms are closely related and run into each other. Take revenge: a favorite scheme has been interfered with, and we take up an antipathy to the person who has thwarted us. The sensation is a mixed one. There is gratification in indulging the appetite, but the gratification is painful as looking to evil and not to good. There is a pleasure in wreaking vengeance, but it is counteracted by pain. How different from the gratification of benevolence,

which is blessed in the exercise, and blessed in the beneficent result.

We can now understand the nature of that restlessness to which we are all liable, and which some seem to labor under perpetually. It arises from a variety of inconsistent impulses moving us at the same time, or, more frequently, from a succession of alternating hopes and disappointments. We see it in the vain man, when both praise and abuse are heaped upon him; in the ambitious man, now vaulting high and again thrown back; in the youth waiting the award of the judge in a competition; and the lover, now rejoicing in the sunshine, and now languishing in the shade. These feelings are promoted by a nervous temperament, and almost always lead to nervousness. In all cases there are active molecular attractions and repulsions which raise a distressingly heated atmosphere.

We see how "hope deferred maketh the heart sick." The heir feels it when the owner of the property lives so long. The adventurer feels it when the long planned scheme does not succeed. The maiden feels it oppressively when the long expected proposal of her lover is not made. Why all this? Because the appetite craves without being gratified; and there arises a discontent with what is occurring because it does not bring the expected good. There is a rumor of the owner of the coveted property dying, followed by his recovery; the prospect of success is darkened by a rising cloud; the wooer calls but goes away without proposing. The continuance may breed a settled depression unwholesome as a pestilential swamp. When it is seen that the object cannot possibly be gained, the heart becomes sickened by the desire still clamoring like the appetite of hunger when yet there is no food.

We see how *Ennui* is produced. Happiness, as every one knows, is greatly promoted by every one having a competent amount of work in which he is interested; when every waking hour calls forth a motive, affords room for a habit to take its course, and exercises an energy. But when there is no such labor enjoined or required, there come seasons more or less frequent, longer or shorter, in which there is no incentive, or, more frequently, in which there are motives confined like waters in a pool from which there is no outlet. The result is *ennui*, which is apt to seize on those who are without a profession or any pressing active employment, and which is the penalty which idleness has to pay for its indulgence. All persons thus situated may not fall into this humor, because they have strong tastes which carry them into amateur amusements, such as reading, hunting, music, or painting.¹ The person under *ennui*, while feeling his misery, is unwilling to be roused out of his somnolence: he has not motive enough to overcome the *vis inertiae*. It is a blessed thing for such a man, when some unexpected circumstance, it may be a dire calamity, comes to startle him like a thunder-clap, to awake him from his lethargy, and make him himself again.

Much the same experience, but with important differences, is apt to be realized by old people who have given up the active pursuits in which they engaged for so many years. For a time they feel the relaxation to be pleasant. But very soon their habits impel them in their old ways, only to make them feel the weakness laid

¹ "When I am assailed," says Luther, "with heavy tribulation, I rush out among my pigs rather than remain alone by myself. The human heart is like a mill-stone in a mill; when you put wheat under it it turns and grinds, and bruises the wheat to flour; if you put in no wheat then it grinds on, but then it is itself it grinds and wears away."

upon them. The old farmer, the old merchant, the old lawyer, having given up their business, in the expectation of enjoying an evening of peace after a busy day, are apt to feel chagrined — if they have not been cultivating tastes which may still be gratified, or if they have not heavenly light to irradiate their evening hours with the hope of a coming day.

There are various agencies at work in the ordinary experience of old age. There is the constant opposition offered to the mental energy by the lethargy of the body, especially by the immobility of the brain action, which is a necessary concurrent in all mental action. This produces other effects. There is a repression of the motives and habits, which have been in operation for many long years. Then there is the inability to acquire new habits and springs of action, owing to the mind being altogether preëngaged and fixed. The old man is like the ship left high and dry upon the beach, when the waters have left it. He sits in his chimney corner because not able to exert himself, or has no motive to exert himself, and he becomes peevish and crabbed when proposals are made which he knows he cannot execute. He lets the flow of association go on in his mind, and he goes back on the past till it becomes wearisome, and would indulge old tastes, till he finds that the objects are rotting; and he cherishes a sense of merit till he is made to see that his very righteousnesses are as filthy rags which will not keep him comfortable. All that is now occurring produces only a momentary interest, flickering like a dying candle. The light that is fitted to brighten his countenance must come not from behind, but in front, opening to him a better world.

As the feeling raised by the idea of the inappetible is painful, so we learn to avoid what would excite it.

There are persons who studiously keep out of the way of every painful scene, who never visit the house of mourning, and who turn away from distress of every kind. This love of ease, this determination to avoid all that would humiliate, produces a character of intense selfishness. It is one of our highest duties in this world to visit the fatherless and the widow in their affliction, to seek out distress in order to relieve it. The Persian king gave orders that no one clothed in sackcloth, that is, the dress of mourning, should enter his palace. But while he could thus shut out those who were sorrowing for the dead, he could not shut out death itself; and no better preparation can be made for that event than by sympathizing with it in others, in familiarizing ourselves with it, and comforting those oppressed with it.

The excitement of which I am writing is to a large extent an organic sensation, which will be considered under another head. As such, it follows the laws of the organism. In particular, it is apt, after continuing for a time, to subside; the storm is changed into a calm, the flow becomes an ebb; all this from much the same causes as give fevers their allotted time, four days, or ten days, or fourteen days, for rising and falling; that is, there is first a combination of agencies attracted to a point, and then a dissipation of them, as they lose their force. Every one has experienced this. On the back of the height there is a hollow which is deep in proportion to the previous height. It arises not so much from any special mental laws as from the wasting of the nervous energy, whose concurrence is necessary to emotive action. This makes our life, so far as it depends on feeling, to be a series of undulations, with rising and falling waves.

SECTION II.

ACTION AND REACTION OF FEELING.

We have seen (pp. 17-22) that every power of the mind craves for activity. But in order to activity, or rather accompanying activity, there must be change. When one faculty has been busy for a time, others will be apt to demand their share of employment. When the same set of ideas have been engrossing the mind it likes to have something new and fresh. The merchant, after his day's toils are over, wishes music or pleasant reading in the evening. The hard student craves for a novel, or for a game of bowls or cricket. The pent-up citizen rejoices when he can from time to time breathe and muse freely on the mountain or by the sea. So far we have mental laws. But the reaction, though in the mind, proceeds to a large extent from organic affections, to be treated of in the next chapter. When the concurring nervous force is becoming spent in the brain, mental actions are performed with difficulty, and when it is all expended mind cannot exert itself. I have felt so exhausted by mental straining directed to a point, that I could scarcely count so far as five, or name my dearest friends. Whatever be the causes, the facts are well known. The waters laid up in the reservoir run out, and the machinery will not go till a new store collects, supplied by gentle rain or pouring flood. In the subsidence, the soul feels indisposed to exertion. The lull after the storm is felt to be a relief. Quite as frequently the sensation is one of lassitude, of languor, and depression. The vessel has no wind to bear it on and it is kept back by its own inertia. After a night of somnolence there will be an awaking in the morning, and fresh activity,

provided always that there is any strength of intellectual or motive power. But the time of exhaustion may be a time of trial or temptation. The courage which was so keen in the time of passion has sunk into indifference and apathy, and the man has scarcely enough of spirit left to defend or save himself. In the season of relaxation, after victory, armies have lost all that they gained in the previous fight. In the weakness succeeding an active struggle, men and women have ceased to resist evil, have yielded to temptation, and abandoned virtue as a hopeless acquisition. As it is with individuals so is it with communities, with nations. After a time of great excitement, religious or political, or even mercantile or literary, there is apt to be a revulsion, and people are indisposed to exert themselves for any high end.

SECTION III.

NATURE RESTORING ITSELF.

This is a familiar fact. We see it in the spirits, recovering after a fall. The widow who has just lost her husband is overwhelmed with grief, and feels as if she could never again experience a moment's joy in this world; and in all this she may be perfectly sincere, though the world will not give her credit for it, when they observe what follows. For in a few months, perhaps in a few weeks, other feelings rise, perhaps new attachments spring up, and she contemplates her loss with nothing more than a sober sadness, and could not, if she wished, renew the poignancy of her first grief. In what way are we to account for this? It is clear that the explanation, if the true one, must take into account those safety valves that provide an outlet for crowded feeling, which, when it rises to a certain height, has a means of flowing out.

It is to be accounted for partly by the exhaustion of the nervous organism, to which I have so often referred as being the issue of excited feeling. This explains how the persons fall into a relaxed state after the period of agitation. But this cause would not hinder the return of the great sorrow again and again, after the prostration is over. In order to understand the process, we must take along with us two other laws. One is the natural shrinking from pain, and therefore from those overwhelming bursts which do so agitate and distract the mind. Then, secondly, the association of ideas calls in a number of other feelings tending to divert the mind. The very departed friend comes to be associated with ideas different from the loss, and these, if they do not remove the grief, tend to alleviate it, by mixing it with other emotions, so that the widow, who in the first instance could not speak of her departed husband without a burst of sorrow, can now talk of his kindness and of his virtues. In matters fitted to awaken feelings of shame, the person studiously banishes the humiliating thoughts as effectively as possible, and seeks, encourages, and cherishes ideas of a different kind, fitted to restore the self-esteem. It is astonishing how speedily persons with no very acute moral sense will outlive their deeds of dishonor, and mingle once more in society with the utmost self-complacency and assurance.

Let us look at the case of a man who has hitherto sustained a high business reputation becoming unexpectedly bankrupt, or of a woman hitherto of pure character committing an act which brings her into disgrace. At first the feeling of mortification is intense, and is rendered more so when there is a sense of guilt. The spirit is so wounded that it feels it cannot bear it (Prov. xviii. 14), and the torture must be got rid of at all hazards. There

are means of effecting this. Time brings along with it new avocations and new associations of ideas, and the painful occurrence is remembered as seldom as possible. Excuses will present themselves and be welcomed: there are others as bad as they are, there were palliating circumstances, or the acknowledged faults should be lost sight of amidst the many virtues which are possessed. Or the person may determine unblushingly to face the reproach and defy the world, and will find grounds for fighting with old friends, or with the community generally, and this may be persevered in till the spirit is cauterized by the searing process and becomes insensible. In the course of time new companionships will be formed, and lines of defense set up to stand the assaults of conscience. In the end the guilty man or woman may walk unabashed through the world, mortified only on rare occasions, when the moral monitor is awakened for a brief space from its torpor, or when society bites with its scorpion stings.

CHAPTER IV.

FOURTH ELEMENT OR ASPECT: THE ORGANIC AFFECTION.

IT is of importance to place the discussion as to the organic affection at this place rather than in an earlier chapter. The mental emotions are not the effect, they are rather the cause, of the bodily movements. Some physiologists write as if emotion were a sort of reflex act, like the sneezing which follows the tickling of the nostrils. This is a very apposite example of Bacon's *idolum specus*, in which the student of the nerves applies a law which he notices in his own province, to an entirely different class of phenomena. They speak as if, when a mother faints on hearing that her son has been drowned, that it is simply a reaction of the mind evoked by the intelligence from without. But the intelligence of the death as reaching the ear is merely the mean — Malebranche would call it the occasion — of calling into action the mental activity; the idea of the son as dead, and the disappointment of a deep and long cherished affection, these constitute the true cause of the bodily effects of the tremor and agitation. In all cases the emotion begins within, in an appetite or affection of some kind, and in the idea of something to favor or to thwart it. In many cases there is no external occasion to call it forth, as when the mother in the midst of the night awakes, thinks of her drowned son and weeps, or when a man sitting in his room suddenly recalls a past deed of folly.

I. There is a general law as to the soothing or irritating effects of emotion on the body. When the idea contemplates the good, that is, the appetible, both the psychical and the organic affections are pleasant, less or more. This is the case with contentment, cheerfulness, hope, and joy. On the other hand, when it regards what is supposed to be evil, the sensibility is to a less or greater extent disagreeable. It is so with anger, remorse, fear, and grief, under all their forms. Generally it may be held that a moderate degree of emotion is favorable to the health, both of mind and body. It should be observed, however, of all intense and vehement feeling, whether it be painful or pleasant when in a moderate degree, wearies and exhausts the frame and is apt to issue in listlessness and apathy. Our feelings are meant to be breezes to waft us along on the voyage of life, but we are ever to guard against allowing them to rise into gales and hurricanes, to overwhelm us in depths from which we cannot be extricated. By the causes now indicated we can account for the reaction which commonly succeeds a period of high excitement, whether among individuals or communities—the tide has run its course and the ebb sets in. It has not been so frequently observed, though it is equally true, that among persons of life and spirit there is apt, after a period of lassitude, to be a reawakening, and a craving for enterprise which searches for a channel in which to flow, and will find an outlet. The hungry lion will not more certainly go forth in search of prey than the man who has any force of character will, after a period of relaxation, be impelled to set out on new activities.

Hygiene takes advantage of this law, and will profit by it more and more as science advances. The physician should, in the first place, seek to put and keep in a

healthy state those organs of the body whose derangement affects the mind, such as the heart, which tends to make us excitable, the stomach, which produces irritation, and the liver, which inclines to melancholy. This may often be done by appropriate medicines. In healing these organs we soothe the temper and prevent the rise of other diseases. When children are cross-tempered the nurse gives them a dose of medicine. But secondly, and more especially, the physician should endeavor to raise those feelings which give stimulus to the frame, such as hope, which casts sunshine on the landscape and stirs up motives which lead to exertion and activity; and take all pains to remove those affections which tend to depress and to sink the soul into inactivity.

II. While we cannot at present specify scientifically the influence exercised on the body by the various kinds of emotion, we can enumerate a few laws, chiefly of an empirical character, full of interest and importance.

The emotions through the nerves act particularly on the heart and lungs, and thence on the organs of breathing, the nerves of which spread over the face, which may thus reveal the play of feeling. Every sudden emotion quickens the action of the heart and consequently the respiration, which may produce involuntary motions. If our organs of respiration and circulation had been different our expression would also have been different. "Dr. Beaumont had the opportunity of experimenting for many months on a person whose stomach was exposed to inspection by accident, and he states that mental emotion invariably produced indigestion and disease of the lining membrane of the stomach—a sufficient demonstration of the direct manner in which the mind may disorder the blood."¹ Certain emotions, such as

¹ Moore on *The Power of the Soul over the Body*, p. iii. ch. viii.

sudden fear, increase the peristaltic action, whereas anxiety and grief diminish it. Sorrow of every kind, sympathy, and pity act on the bowels. All strong passions are apt to make the muscles tremble; this is especially the case with all aggravated forms of fear, with terror and rage, but is also so with anger, and even joy. The action of the heart is increased by anger. In fear, the blood is not transferred with the usual force. Settled malice and envy give rise to jaundice, it is said, by causing the matter secreted to be reabsorbed into the capillary blood-vessels of the liver, instead of being carried out by the branches of the bile-duct. The idea of the ludicrous raises a mental emotion which bursts out in laughter; grief finds an outlet in tears. Complacency with those we converse with is manifested in smiles. We read in various languages, of lightness of heart, of the paleness of fear, of the breathlessness of surprise, of the trembling with passion, of bowels of compassion, of the jaundiced eye of envy, and all these figures embody truths recognized in universal experience. It is a curious circumstance that young infants do not shed tears, though they utter screams and fall into convulsions. These last are the effects of pain, but they do not shed tears till they have an emotion, with its idea of the appetible and inappetible.

III. Sir Charles Bell has shown, in the "Anatomy of Expression," how close and extensive is the connection of the organs that sustain life and the muscular system of the face, neck, and chest. The heart and lungs are united by nerves, and work in unison. They have no feeling when we touch them, yet they are alive to the proper stimulus and they suffer from the slightest change of position or exertion. They are also affected by the changes, and especially the emotions, of the mind. They

act on the respiratory organs, which have numerous nerves in the throat, windpipe, tongue, lips, and nostrils. There is a class of nerves appropriated to "respiration." These nerves arise in the same part of the brain. The great nerve descends into the chest to be distributed to the heart and lungs, and the others extend to the exterior muscles of the chest, neck, and face. "Thus the frame of the body, constituted for the support of the vital functions, becomes the instrument of expression; and an extensive class of passions, by influencing the heart, by affecting that sensibility which governs the muscles of respiration, calls them into operation so that they become an undeviating mark of certain states or conditions of the mind. They are the organs of expression."

He then shows that emotions by the action of the muscles chiefly affect "the angles of the mouth and the inner extremity of the eyebrow; and to these points we must principally attend in all our observations concerning the expression of passion. They are the most movable parts of the face; in them the muscles concentrate, and upon the changes which they undergo expression is acknowledged chiefly to depend. To demonstrate their importance we have only to repeat the experiment made by Peter of Cortona: to sketch a placid countenance and touch lightly with the pencil the angle of the lips and the inner extremity of the eyebrows. By elevating or depressing these we shall quickly convey the expression of grief or of laughter."

At this point Darwin takes up the subject in his "Expression of the Emotions": "We have all of us as infants repeatedly contracted our orbicular corrugator and pyramidal muscles, in order to protect our eyes while screaming; our progenitors have done the same during many generations; and though with advancing years we

easily prevent, when feeling distressed, the utterance of screams, we cannot from long habit always prevent a slight contraction of the above-named muscles; nor indeed do we observe the contraction in ourselves, or attempt to stop it, if slight. But the pyramidal muscles seem to be less under the command of the will than the other related muscles; and if they be well developed their contraction can be checked only by the antagonistic contraction of the central fasciæ of the frontal muscle. The result which necessarily follows, if these fasciæ contract energetically, is the oblique drawing up of the eyebrows, the puckering of their inner ends, and the formation of rectangular furrows on the middle of the forehead." He goes on to say that the depression of the corners of the mouth is effected by the *depressores anguli oris*. "The fibres of this muscle diverge downwards, with the upper convergent ends attached round the angles of the mouth and to the lower lip, a little way within the angles." "Through steps such as these we can understand how it is that as soon as some melancholy thought passes through the brain there occurs a just perceptible drawing down of the corners of the mouth, or a slight raising up of the inner ends of the eyebrows, or both movements combined, and immediately afterwards a slight suffusion of tears."¹

IV. Mr. Darwin, by his own observations, and by the answers given to queries which he issued as to the various races of mankind, especially those who have associated but little with Europeans, seems to have established the following points, some of them, perhaps, only provisionally and partially. Astonishment is expressed by the eyes and mouth being opened wide, and by the eyebrows being raised. Shame excites a blush when the

¹ *Expression of Emotions*, ch. vii.

color of the skin allows it to be visible. When a man is indignant or defiant he frowns, holds his body and head erect, squares his shoulders, and clinches his fists. When considering deeply on any subject, or trying to understand any puzzle, he is apt to frown and wrinkle the skin beneath the lower eyelids. When in low spirits the corners of the mouth are depressed, and the inner corner of the eyebrows are raised by that muscle which the French call the "grief muscle." The eyebrow in this state becomes slightly oblique, with a little swelling at the inner end; and the forehead is transversely wrinkled in the middle part, but not across the whole breadth, as when the eyebrows are raised in surprise. When persons are in good spirits the eyes sparkle, the skin is a little wrinkled round and under them, and the mouth a little drawn back at the corners. When a man sneers or snarls at another the corner of the upper lip over the canine or eye tooth is raised on the side facing the man whom he addresses. A dogged or obstinate expression may often be recognized, being chiefly shown by the mouth being firmly closed, by a lowering brow, and a slight frown. Contempt is expressed by a slight protrusion of the lips and by turning up the nose with a slight expiration. Disgust is shown by the lower lip being turned down, the upper lip slightly raised, with a sudden expiration something like incipient vomiting, or like something spit out of the mouth. Laughter may be carried to such an extreme as to bring tears into the eyes. When a man wishes to show that he cannot prevent something being done, or cannot himself do something, he is apt to shrug his shoulders, turn inwards his elbows, extend outwards his hands, and open the palms, with the eyebrows raised. Children when sulky are disposed to pout, or greatly protrude the lips. The head is

nodded vertically in affirmation, and shaken laterally in negation.

V. The expressions have commonly been produced, in the first instance, by the emotions of which they are the effect, and commonly the sign; and whenever the like feeling arises, the expression will follow, by the law of association. In the first instance, and it may be for a time, the action of the emotion had a purpose, it may be to protect or ward off danger, or meet opposition, now it is continued after the meaning has gone. A man walking along the edge of a precipice leans away from it lest he fall; and he will be apt to take the same posture when the precipice is so guarded that there is no longer danger. The screams of terror may first have been uttered to call in assistance, now they come forth when no assistance is at hand, or none is needed. The shout on the occasion of a happy occurrence may at first have been intended to convey the glad tidings to others, now it is the natural expression of a crowd when it is gratified. Anger and rage in children, and in primitive states of society, agitated the whole frame and led to blows; it still rouses the body and reddens the countenance, though it does not culminate in fighting. These expressions may become hereditary; this, however, because they have formed certain lines in which nervous energy flows. There are acts done, and attitudes assumed, which may have come down from a remote ancestry, and telling of primitive manners. But it should be observed that there is mental as well as organic action in all this; in the expression, actions were first called forth by emotions of the mind, and are now called forth by a like emotion. As Darwin expresses it, “*whenever the same state of mind is induced, however feebly, there is a tendency, through the*

force of habit and association, for the same movements to be performed.”¹

VI. We see what truth there is in physiognomy. It does not appear that the dispositions and character can be known by the shape or size of any muscle or bone, say, as has been vulgarly supposed, by the lines on the palms of the hand, or the form of the nose, or the curlings of the ear. But the emotions affect the nerves which leave their mark on the face and gait. According to Bell, “In all the exhilarating emotions, the eyebrows, eyelids, the nostrils, and the angles of the mouth are raised. In the depressing passions it is the reverse.” Darwin adds, “under the influence of the latter the brow is heavy, the eyelids, cheeks, mouth, and whole head droop; the eyes are dull, the countenance pallid, and the respiration slow. In joy the face expands, in grief it lengthens.” There are other signs which are natural, and, unless repressed, universal. The leaning forward of the body denotes interest in the person or object. The nodding of the head is understood as assent. On the other hand, the turning of the body or of the head expresses aversion or denial. The frown on the brow indicates displeasure. Fire in the eye, color in the cheek, agitation in the frame, with the clinched fists, are signs of anger. Blushing on the face and neck arise from shame, that is, from a sensitiveness about the opinions of others, particularly as regards one’s person, and in regard to decency. A suffused eye is a sign of pity. A softened eye, with a swelling bosom, is a mark of love. A stiff, upright head and figure is often an indication of pride. Relaxed features are the issue of weariness, inclined to repose. The drawing up or snuffing of the nostrils exhibits disgust, the same as is produced by an offensive smell. The smooth counte-

¹ *Expression of the Emotions*, ch. i.

nance implies contentment, except the person be a hypocrite. Kneeling is an appropriate attitude of submission to a superior. The upturned eye is a symbol of a soul looking to heaven in adoration. By such causes as these there are persons "whose heart is in their face." The prevailing passions, say benevolence, or good-nature, or malignity, or sourness, or dejection, or sorrow, or timidity, or self-humiliation, or lust, or haughtiness, produce an impression and expression which can be noticed and read by the practiced eye. Persons gifted with shrewdness, and who have mingled much with the world, are thus able, with amazing accuracy, and at first sight, as if by instinct, by really but lengthened observation, to guess at the character or present mental frame of those they meet with.

VII. It should be noticed that while pleasure and pain are very different from emotions, yet they may, and often do, mingle with each other. I have remarked that the emotions looking to the good are pleasant, and the pleasure intensifies the emotion, say of hope and joy, and we enjoy and seek to prolong it. On the other hand, the emotions that contemplate the evil are always more or less painful, and the pain may mix with and increase the affection. We have a vivid picture of bodily pain by Sir C. Bell: "The jaws are fixed and the teeth grind; the lips are drawn laterally, and the nostrils dilated; the eyes are largely uncovered, and the lips raised; the face is surged with blood, and the veins of the temple and forehead distended; the breath being checked, and the descent of blood from the head impeded by the agony of the chest, the cutaneous muscle of the neck acts strongly, and draws down the angles of the mouth. But when joined to this the man cries out, the lips are retracted, and the mouth open; and we find the muscles of his body rigid, straining, struggling." Now, as all the affections

that arise from the idea of evil, especially all the malign affections, produce pain, we find the sensation mingling and acting with the passion, and the result may be a terrible struggle, such as we see in Laocoön, and often in the wounded or murdered man. The fight with the suffering often adds intense violence, such as writhing and blows, to the proper action of the passion.

VIII. But bodily effects may be produced not only by real, but by imaginary objects. We have seen that every emotion implies an idea. This idea is very often of a sensible object, that is, of an object made known to us by the senses. Now it seems to be pretty well established that there are organs of the brain necessary in order to the perception of material objects. Smell, as a psychical act, is not in the nostrils, nor hearing in the ear, nor touch in the nerves, nor vision in the eye. There is need of a cerebral action in order to a conscious sensation, and in order to a perception of the objects. It is very generally acknowledged that the senses may have a common centre of sensation, a sensorium in the brain, or more probably, that each sense has a local centre. Physiologists are not quite agreed as to what these centres are. It is enough for our present purpose that there is either a general centre, or that there are special centres.

But this is not the point which it is necessary for us to establish. There is a further truth approximately and provisionally determined. It is that the organ of the brain necessary to our having a perception of the object is also necessary to our reproducing it as a phantasm, in memory or imagination. Thus: suppose that there is an organ of vision in the *thalami optici*, or more probably, farther up in the cerebrum, this organ is needed not only to give us the original figure, say the form of our mother, but is needed in order to our being able to call up her

image and to think of her when she is absent. The same remark applies to all the other senses; we need the auditory organ to recall a sound, and the organ of taste and smell to recall flavors, and of feeling to image tactual impressions, and of the muscular sense to think of objects in motion.¹ But we have seen that when ideas are of objects appetible or inappetible they stir up emotion. We have here a glimpse of the way in which the feelings work in the brain. The idea which evokes the feeling, and is its substratum, works in the cerebrum; and the excitement produced, like the original sensation, may be partly mental and partly bodily. The bodily excitement, often rising to agitation, is very manifest, and is seen in nervous movements, in changes of color, in paleness and redness of countenance, in blushing and in trembling, in laughter and in tears. It is the office of psychology to unfold the emotions; it is the business of physiology to trace the bodily affections from the brain downwards to the nerves and fibres.

¹ Professor Ferrier, in *Functions of the Brain*, has been successful in showing that there are organs of the brain which are the centres of, or at least are somehow concerned with, the sensations and perceptions given by the different senses. The organic or visceral sensations are felt in the occipital lobes, towards the lower periphery. Smell and taste need the *subiculum cornu ammonis*. Touch is felt in the *hippocampal* region. Sight has an organ in the *gyrus angularis*. Hearing has its centre in the *superior-temporo sphenoidal convolution*. All these centres are rather in the back part of the brain, which seems the organ of sensation. The centres of motion seem to be in the frontal regions, which are the organs of intelligence and will. I think we have evidence that when we are recalling or imaging any object originally perceived by the senses we need the concurrence of the corresponding centres of the brain: of the visceral centre before we can conceive of an object of appetite; of the taste and smell centres before we can conceive of an odor; of the centre of touch in order to conceive of the feeling objects; of the centre of seeing in order to our conceiving colors and visible forms; and of the centre of hearing in order to our conceiving bodies as sounding.

It is possible that when a sensible object raises emotion the action proceeds from the cerebral centres of perception down upon the motor nerves, and thence upon the bodily frame generally. It seems almost certain that this is so when the object raising the emotion is not present, and when we have merely an idea of it. The idea, let me suppose, is of an appetible object. The mother is eagerly expecting the return of a son, after an absence of years. The son, at a distance, knows that his mother is dying and may expire any instant. The widow is thinking of her lately departed husband. We recall the spot in which we saw a dear friend killed. We cannot forget the shriek which came from a man in agony. Or, using a very different sense organ, we have a remembrance of a pool with offensive odor. The murderer has a vivid image before him of the murdered man, of his writhing, and of his wounds. In many such cases the mental idea seems to have much the same effect on the organ of perception as the very presence of the object would have.

The idea of an emotional object, that is, of an object raising emotion, may become visible in the bodily frame and on the countenance. A smile appears on the mother's face when she sees her child playing, and there will be a tendency to a like smile when she merely imagines him to be happy. A sadness will gather and settle on the countenance of a father grieving over the loss of a son. Cherished lust will come forth in a bloated countenance. You may often discover the nature of the feelings by the play upon the features of one who is walking or seated in a room without being conscious of any eye being fixed upon him. You may often know whether business is prospering or not by the expression on the merchant's countenance. You may discover whether the

news conveyed by a letter received is good or bad, by the look of the reader.

As with real so with imaginary scenes. We often see pleasure or terror expressed on the countenance when persons are dreaming. As with night-dreams so with day-dreams, the face and the whole frame may be affected by them. There may be sighs drawn forth, or tears shed, or laughter bursting out, by the pictures in a novel, or the creations of the imagination. There may be marked depression, gendered by the fear of evil. Terror, arising from danger, has turned the hair from black to white, and Sir H. Holland tells us of a young man on whom the same effect was produced simply by illusory images. There may be writhings of body, produced by the remembrance of sin.

IX. The only effective way of mimicking a passion is to call up by the fancy an object or scene fitted to awaken the feeling. I rather think that sympathetic action is to be accounted for very much in this way: we put ourselves in the position of others, by calling up by the idea the same feelings, which go out in the same manifestations. Tears shed are apt to call forth tears in the beholder, or quite as readily in the listener to the tale told which makes us realize the position. It is the same with laughter, which is apt to be echoed back till the noise rings throughout a large assembly. When a company as a whole is moved it is difficult for any person to keep his composure. An alarm of fire will spread through a vast congregation, the greater number of whom are actually cognizant of no cause of fear. A panic started by a few soldiers who believe that they see danger will often seize a whole army, the great body of whom know no ground for the terror. It is easier for an orator, say a preacher, if only he can get up feeling, to move a large

audience than a thin one. There is a reflection of emotion from every person upon every other. We call this contagion, but it is contagion produced by people's being led to cherish the same feelings producing the same outward manifestation. The very contagion of disease is made more powerful by persons being afraid of, and so dwelling much on, the infection.

If this be so, then imitation, or at least sympathetic imitation, is to be explained in this way: If we have a feeling of trust in certain persons, say our neighbors, or our friends, or our party, or our associates, or our special companions, then we are inclined to act as they act, but by our coming to share their feelings, their affections, and antipathies. When we have a great admiration towards any one for his courage, or his magnanimity, we are especially led to copy him. A brave commander, by going before, may be able to lead his troops into certain death. We have all seen a noble gift, on the part of an individual, calling forth the plaudits and the liberality of many others. The same principle may overcome the sense of right and lead us to "follow a multitude to do evil."

In this way we can so far account for those violent convulsions which have been produced sympathetically by religious and other forms of excitement. We have a melancholy record of these in Hecker's "The Epidemics of the Middle Ages." Such was the dancing mania which spread over so many countries in the fourteenth century. We have a number of cases collected in Moore's "Power of the Soul over the Body." He mentions the strange delusion that "seized the minds of men in Germany, immediately after the effects of the Black Death had subsided. The delusion took the form of a wild dance, known as that of St. John or St. Vitus. It was

propagated like a demoniacal epidemic over the whole of Germany and the neighboring countries to the north-west. The sufferers formed circles, hand in hand, and continued dancing for hours together, in wild delirium, until they fell to the ground from exhaustion." We have instances of the same kind in the convulsionnaires who appeared in France in the last century. We have like examples in the present day in the dancing dervishes of the East, in the contortions of the Jumpers, and in the prostrations which are encouraged in misguided religious revivals. These affections seem to be produced by persons entering into the feelings of those with whom they sympathize, and thus bringing on the like bodily expressions. They can be subdued, not by reasoning, or by commands, or even directly by threats, but by a counter irritation, that is, an idea raising a very different feeling. "The great Boerhaave had a number of patients seized with epileptic fits in a hospital from sympathy with a person who fell down in convulsions before them. This physician was puzzled how to act, for the sympathetic fits were as violent as those arising from bodily disease; but reflecting that they were produced by an impression on the mind, he resolved to eradicate them by a still stronger impression, and so directed hot irons to be prepared and applied to the first person who subsequently had a fit: the consequence was that not one was seized afterwards." "A French medical practitioner of great merit relates that in a convent of nuns one of the fair inmates was seized with a strange impulse, and soon the whole sisterhood followed her example and mewed regularly every day for hours together." This continued until "the nuns were informed that a company of soldiers were to surround the convent, and to whip all the holy sisterhood with rods, till they promised to mew no more."

“Cardan relates that in another nunnery a sister was impelled to bite her companions, and this disposition also spread among the sisterhood; but, instead of being confined to one nunnery, it spread from cloister to cloister throughout the whole of Europe.”

X. We are here in the heart of a subject which cannot be cleared up at present, — the reaction of mind and body. If it be true that emotion produces a certain bodily state, it is also true that some bodily states tend to produce the corresponding feelings. Dr. Braid, in his very curious experiments as to hypnotism, found that a person put in the attitude of devotion became devout. I am not disposed to speak dogmatically about this mysterious phenomenon, but I believe that association of ideas has to do with it. The act of kneeling will naturally suggest the feelings we cherished when we knelt. If we take the attitude of striking the idea of fighting will be suggested. If the expression of affection, or of pity is assumed, it will call up the feeling associated with it. In the very act of bringing a cloud on the brow the idea of care will be brought up.

XI. When an emotion has an accompanying expression it will always crave for that expression. If the tendency is repressed by circumstances, or by an act of the will, there is produced a restrained sensation. At times it is distressing when the sense of the ludicrous, raised by an awkward occurrence, is held in, as it must often be when we are in a grave company, or in the house of God. What a luxury, when the position is changed, to have an opportunity of indulging in ringing laughter. How pained are we when grief cannot find an outlet. What a relief when it outflows in tears.

XII. The question arises, What effect has the expression, or the restraining of it, upon the emotion? In some

cases the expression seems to lessen, and in others to increase the feeling. In like manner, the repression in some circumstances seems to cool the affection, and in other cases to warm it. This difference so far depends on the nature of the underlying appetite, according as it contemplates a good to be desired, or an evil to be avoided. If it contemplates the good, the sensation will be pleasurable, and will allure us to prolong and renew the emotion. If it looks to the evil, the feeling is painful, and the recurrence will be avoided. But more depends on the strength of the affection. The case is like that of a wind blowing on a fire: if weak it may extinguish it, if strong it may fan it into a conflagration.

BOOK II.

CLASSIFICATION AND DESCRIPTION OF THE EMOTIONS.



CHAPTER I.

DIVISION OF THE EMOTIONS.

THE emotions are so numerous that it is necessary to classify them. This is by no means an easy work ; still a map may be drawn to indicate the boundaries and the several provinces. Our careful survey, with an analysis, will enable us to accomplish this.

There is, as we have seen, an idea involved in all emotion. Let us fix on this as the ground of the distribution. Our divisions and subdivisions will be determined and given by the nature of the objects of which we have an idea.

The circumstance that in all feeling we have an idea of objects as APPETIBLE or INAPPETIBLE furnishes a line which divides our emotional nature, like the human body, into two parallel and symmetrical sides. And here it may be proper to state that instead of the somewhat technical phrases "appetible" and "inappetible" we may often employ the words "good" and "evil." It must be distinctly understood, however, that in doing so we do not mean to designate by the terms anything morally good or the opposite. The appetible, which we call the good because our nature clings to it, may in fact be mor-

ally evil, and what we turn away from as inappetible may be morally good. Using the phrases in the sense now explained, we find that to every emotion contemplating the good there is a corresponding emotion contemplating the evil. Thus, if there be hope arising from the idea of an object as about to bring happiness, there is also fear springing from the apprehension of an object as likely to be followed by pain. If there be joy derived from the possession of good, there is likewise sorrow from the presence of ill. Every feeling looking to the light has thus a shadow arising from the obstruction of the light. These constitute the attractions and repulsions, the centripetal and centrifugal forces which keep the feelings in motion in their spheres in our emotional system, which is more wonderful than the planetary one.

But this dichotomy does not so distribute the emotions as to enable us to discover the peculiarities of each. It is like the division in natural history into the two sexes, separating the things which are most intimately connected in their nature and which ought to be viewed in their mutual relation. So we must look out for some other ground or grounds of classification. Let us consider the idea as directed to *ANIMATE* or to *INANIMATE* objects, say on the one hand to our fellow-men or the lower animals, and on the other hand to objects of nature, or of art, supposed to be beautiful, picturesque, ludicrous, sublime, or the opposite. This gives another bifid cleavage of a convenient kind.

Another distinction will require to be attended to. It is acknowledged by all that feelings are called forth when we contemplate the good and evil as bearing on ourselves. These, being self-regarding, may be called *EGOISTIC*. But I have been maintaining in this work

that man has a native affection which leads him to feel an interest in his fellow-men, and is capable of being moved by whatever affects them. These affections have been called ALTRUISTIC. We are naturally inclined to wish that others may possess whatever we regard as appetible, and that they may be preserved from all that we regard as evil.

But these dividing lines do not distribute the whole wide province into sufficiently minute and specific fields. So we may further consider the ideas as directed to the past, the present, or the future; this gives what Dr. Thomas Brown calls the RETROSPECTIVE, IMMEDIATE, and PROSPECTIVE emotions.

These separations will analyze the emotions for us as the prism does the light. There is a difficulty in finding phrases to express the various kinds, shades, and degrees of feeling. But there will be none in spreading out the components of any given emotion and arranging them in their orders. The divisions in fixing on the *differentia* of the class will always enable us to give a good definition of any emotion. Thus, "fear is the emotion (or prospective emotion) arising when we have an idea of evil about to come upon us."

While I regard the emotions as psychical and not physical, I have not overlooked the organic products. In doing so I make free use of the careful observations of Sir Charles Bell, and of Darwin, and the more popular descriptions given by some others, such as Cogan on "The Passions."

CHAPTER II.

EMOTIONS AS DIRECTED TO ANIMATE OBJECTS.

SECTION I.

RETROSPECTIVE EMOTIONS.

THESE arise from the contemplation of good or evil in the past, and this either to ourselves or others. They are the feelings gendered by the ideas brought up directly or indirectly by the memory.

SELF-SATISFACTION or REGRET is the general form of this class of emotions which, however, may appear in several modes, and may differ in intensity.

Complacency or *Displacency*. Here we do not look very minutely or searchingly into special deeds. Upon the whole, we are satisfied with the past, with what we have done, and with its results. Or we are not pleased with what we have accomplished, with our conduct, our success, or the position we have reached. These sentiments may be for good or for evil. The former, if it does not gender *Self-Righteousness*, which is a sin, may take the form of *Self-Esteem*, to sustain us and keep us from doing an unworthy deed. The latter, if a sense of sin, may lead to *Humility*, which, however, is a grace, and not a mere feeling; but, if directed exclusively to the dark side of our experience, may become a *Self-Dissatisfaction*, which restrains courageous action.

Self-Congratulation or *Self-Reproach*. It may be a passing sentiment of self-approval, because we have done

the brave deed, or offered the smart remark that we did, or it may be a momentary dissatisfaction with ourselves, because we were so thoughtless, so foolish, or because we neglected a precious opportunity of adding to our wealth, or influence, or of doing and receiving good. It may be a habitual dwelling on our own supposed good deeds, generating *Self-Sufficiency*, which may be inoffensive (except to ourselves) if we do not boast of our superiority to others, but very offensive when it leads us to deny the merits, or grieve at the success, of others. Or it may be a habitual *Self-Depreciation*, caused by the persons brooding forever on their mistakes, and looking as if they were making an apology for themselves. It may rise to a feeling of *Self-Satisfaction* and *Self-Adulation*, by thinking of our achievements, of our abilities, of our courage, or superiority to others. Or it may sink into a spirit of *Self-Accusation* or *Self-Chiding*, which chafes the spirit and prostrates the energies.

The feeling varies according to the nature of the good or evil contemplated. It is a curious circumstance that every one seems to have something of which he is apt to be vain ; it looks as if no one could live comfortably without some supposed excellence. It may be his talents, his shrewdness, his tact, his eminence in some particular branch of study or trade or trick, or it may be simply his personal appearance, his manners, his dress, his equipage, his agility in walking, in dancing, or riding. If he fails in this the feeling engendered is *Mortification*. If he is shorn of everything of which he used to be proud, the disappointment may sink deep into the heart, and the habitual mood is that of emptiness, relieved only by a gnawing at the vitals, and going on towards *Bitterness*, and a Timon-like hatred of women as women, or of men as men. The sentiment of regret may have a beneficial

tendency, or the opposite, according as it is used or is abused. On the one hand, it may rebuke and humble us, and so lead us to avoid past mistakes and pursue a wiser course for the future. On the other hand, it may ferment and sour into vinegar, and become *Chagrin*. Disappointed lovers, authors, artists, politicians, and speculators are apt to fall into this humor. If they are young they may be able to pass through this chill, and yet recover their hope and activity. But when the grand climacteric of life has been reached, and the animal spirits have been drunk up by repeated disappointments, the man may be tempted to give up all effort, and abandon himself to a satisfied or dissatisfied helplessness, accompanied with a bitterness against individuals, or the world at large, going out probably in spiteful remarks. We must all have met with disappointed men or disappointed maidens yielding to this feeling; still retaining a genuine benevolence in the depths of their hearts, but maintaining an attitude of suspicion even of proffered kindness, and shrinking from every proposal to fight the battle of life anew, after having failed. Of all people, I have found these to be the most difficult to gain; no sunshine will thaw the eternal snows upon these high and unapproachable mountain-tops.

The contemplation of the past may communicate pleasures. How delightful, with a brother, or sister, or old acquaintance, to revive and, as it were, live over again the scenes of our childhood and youth; in imagination to revisit old spots, and to converse with old acquaintances, it may be about old friends, now gone from this world. The eye gives a color to distant objects, makes mountains blue which are not blue in themselves, and clouds purple and gold which, if we were in them, would be felt as dull and dripping mist; so the imagination, especially when

we are in a good humor, gives a rich color to the scenes of the past which in themselves were tame or irksome or troubled. In particular, suffering, unpleasant in the prospect and when present, may become pleasant in the remembrance, as we think of trials through which we have passed, and dangers overcome, and victories gained in hard fights. Emotions for which we have not special names may thus be gendered by the contemplation of the past, and may be called the *Emotions of Pleasant Memories*.

It is proper that we should look on the past, for it is from the experience of the past, both from our success and our failures, that we are to gather lessons for the future. But it is foolish to dwell forever on past joys, past sorrows, or past sins. Some would extract a continued and perpetual delight from contemplating the past. But as we do so the flavor will be found to have lost its power, the sweetness to have become insipid while we roll it as a sweet morsel under our tongue. Instead of sucking on when we have drawn out the moisture, we had better throw away the rind and go forth to seek other and fresh objects of interest. As to our sufferings, we need not look back forever on the darkness; and we are especially to be on our guard against cherishing a perpetual malignity towards those who are supposed to have inflicted them. As to our sins, our first and imperative duty is to have them blotted out, and our second to remember them only so far as to keep us humble and watchful; any further mastication may only distract and sink us, or perhaps even ferment the old passions by calling up the tempting objects anew and anew.

Self-Approbation or *Self-Condensation*, in which we contemplate our past conduct as being commendable or faulty. This may be a mere passing ebullition of *Self-*

Gratulation, that we have accomplished some feat, or of *Self-Humiliation*, because we have fallen into some imprudence. Or it may become a habitual feeling of *Self-Satisfaction* and *Self-Adulation*, in which we are ever thinking of our imagined virtues, and, if of a communicative temper, ever speaking of them, — more, perhaps, to our own gratification than that of others, who would rather hear their own praises proclaimed. Or it may, as it is indulged in, become a constant complaint and a *Repining*, wasting the energy which might be devoted to a good purpose.

MORAL APPROBATION and DISAPPROBATION. Here a peculiar and very powerful and keen element is introduced; it is the power of conscience; I refer to it simply as having an Appetence, which, when gratified or frustrated, raises an emotion. When we can look upon a certain conduct of ours as being right, we have a feeling of *Self-Approval* which may soothe or cheer us, provided it does not become a sense of merit which leads us to justify ourselves before God. On the other hand, when we do that which is morally evil; when we cherish a licentious, malignant, or unholy feeling, or do a deed condemned by the moral law, the inward judge condemns and proceeds to punish.

There may be the *Testimony of a Good Conscience*. This may be a source of comfort to some, of unspeakable comfort which bears them up under calumny and persecution. When an innocent man is charged with guilt, his main support must arise from the assurance that he has not done the deed charged, or that the deed, as he is ready to maintain, is not evil. He specially needs this when public opinion is against him, when enemies are stirred up to malign him, and his very friends believe him to be guilty and abandon him.

Remorse. I fear that in the great body of mankind the conscience is in a slumbering state, not dead but dormant. There is a secret feeling that all is not right, and men are afraid to look into the state of the heart lest dark disclosures should be made; just as the murderer would visit any spot on this world's surface rather than that at which the deed was committed, just as the criminal would avoid the bar of the judge, so would the sinner avoid all those thoughts that would remind him of his sin. But there is a power in conscience which will compel us, in spite of all repression, to notice the neglects of duty of which we are guilty from day to day. The reproaches, though individually transient, do yet, by their recurrence, exercise a powerful influence, — they resemble those noxious ephemera which make up in number what they want in strength; and while the individual perishes the genus survives. People are to a large extent unconscious of it, and if the charge were made upon them they would repel it; but I believe a large portion of human dissatisfaction springs from these constantly rising and suppressed accusations, which have much the same influence on our peace as a diseased nervous system or deranged digestive organs. And, in spite of all efforts to check them, there will be times when convulsive assaults of conscience will break in upon the satisfaction of the most self-satisfied, and start "like a guilty thing upon a fearful summons." Man's peace is in this respect like the sultry heat of a summer's day, close and disagreeable at the time, and ever liable to be broken in upon by thunders and lightnings.

Among the Retrospective emotions are those which arise from the idea of good or evil supposed to have been inflicted by our fellow-men. I am not sure that we have expressions in our language to designate all these feelings with their boundary lines and shades of difference.

BENIGNANCY, *Thankfulness, Gratitude*. The feeling may be little more than a mere lively interest in those who have shown some interest in us, or bestowed a favor, or done us a good service. In such cases it is a mere complacency leading us to delight in the society of those who have been kind to us. But it may rise to a thankful and grateful spirit. It should be noticed that gratitude in its highest forms is an exercise of love which implies well-wishing or benevolence, and is more than emotion, — it implies an act of the will, and is a virtue or grace of a high order.

ANGER, *Irritation, Temper, Indignation*. The passions falling under this head arise from the idea of ill done, specially of ill usage received. When the appetite is feeble, or the offense a small one, an annoyance is given which produces an irritation like the bite of a mosquito. These disturbances may come like gnats, in streams or swarms, and produce temper ever liable to be ruffled by neighbors, by members of our families, or those we meet with in the business and society of the world. Very often the offenses which raise the keenest feeling may seem very small to mankind generally, but they have wounded the individual in the tenderest part, — his sense of honor or his ruling spring of action, and his passion boils; an attack is made, or a challenge is sent. We call the emotion indignation, when the feeling is of a lofty kind, stirred up by baseness or injustice. An indignation against evil is an element in all truly noble character. A complacency towards sin, with a constant apology for it, or palliation of it, or excusing it, is a weakness, or rather it is an iniquity, and may make us partakers of the offense.

Rage, Wrath, Malignancy, Resentment, Vengeance, Vindictiveness. We may be angry and sin not; but

this disposition may become sinful, and this in the highest degree. It is so when it is excessive, when it is rage, and makes us lose control of ourselves. It is so, and may become a vice, when it leads us to wish evil to others. It is wrath when it is deep, long-continued, and unfor-giving. It is malevolence or malignancy when it leads us to wish evil to those who have offended us. It is resentment when it prompts us to meet and repay evil by evil. It is vengeance when it impels us to crush those who have injured us. It is vindictiveness when it is seeking out ingeniously and laboriously means and instruments to give pain to those who have thwarted us. Already sin has entered: we are taking upon ourselves one of the prerogatives of God, who claims "Vengeance is mine, I will repay."

As anger arises from an idea of evil having been inflicted or threatened, the attitudes taken are those we would assume to ward off the evil. "The corporeal system immediately assumes attitudes and appearances calculated to inspire the offender with terror, and preparatory to the infliction of the chastisement he is supposed to have deserved. The countenance reddens, the eyes flash indignant fire, and the aspect speaks horror; muscular strength is abundantly increased, and powers of exertion are acquired unknown to cooler moments." (Cogan, c. ii. class I.) "Under moderate anger the action of the heart is a little increased, the color heightened, and the eyes become bright. The respiration is likewise a little hurried; and as all the muscles serving for this purpose act in association, the wings of the nostrils are somewhat raised to allow of a free draught of air; and this is a highly characteristic sign of indignation. The mouth is commonly compressed, and there is almost always a frown on the brow. Instead of the frantic gestures of extreme rage, an indignant man unconsciously throws himself into an attitude ready for attacking or striking his enemy, whom he will, perhaps, scan from head to foot in defiance. He carries his head erect, with his chest well expanded and the feet planted firmly on the ground. He holds his arms in various positions, with one or both elbows squared, or with arms rigidly suspended by his sides. With Europeans the fists are commonly clinched." (Darwin, c. x.)

"When the blast of war blows in our ears,
 Then imitate the action of the tiger;
 Stiffen the sinews, summon up the blood,

 Then lend the eye a terrible aspect;

 Now set the teeth and stretch the nostril wide,
 Hold hard the breath and bend up every spirit
 To his full height."

SHAKESPEARE, *Henry V.*

"In rage the features are unsteady; the eyeballs are seen largely; they roll and are inflamed. The front is alternately knit and raised in furrows by the motion of the eyebrows, the nostrils are inflated to the utmost. The lips are swelled, and, being drawn by the muscles, open the corners of the mouth. The whole visage is sometimes pale, sometimes turgid, dark, and almost livid; the words are delivered strongly through the fixed teeth." (Bell, *Essay vii.*)

"Under rage the action of the heart is much accelerated, or it may be much disturbed. The face reddens or it becomes purple from the impeded return of the blood, or may turn deadly pale. The respiration is labored, the chest heaves, and the dilated nostrils quiver. The whole body often trembles. The voice is affected. The teeth are clinched or ground together, and the muscular system is commonly stimulated to violent, almost frantic, action. But the gestures of a man in this state usually differ from the purposeless writhings and struggles of one suffering from an agony of pain; for they represent more or less plainly the act of striking or fighting with an enemy." (Darwin, *c. iii.*)

SECTION II.

IMMEDIATE EMOTIONS.

JOY and SORROW. These arise from the contemplation of a good or evil possessed. The emotions are intensified when the good has been attained by labor, or by a contest with evil. The good and evil will be as the appetences, original or acquired, and the consequent feelings may have a like diversity. They may possibly consist of a mere sensation, pleasant or unpleasant, and the

feeling in this case scarcely rises to the dignity of an emotion. But being intellectualized it may lead on to an idea which generates an emotion, say that of beauty. "Grief," says Cogan, "is sometimes considered as synonymous with sorrow. At other times it expresses more silent, deep, and painful affections; such as are inspired by domestic calamities; particularly by the loss of friends and relatives, or by the distress, either of body or mind, experienced by those whom we love and value" The extent of the feeling depends in all cases on the strength of the appetite, and on the degree to which it is gratified or thwarted. The phrases, joyful and sorrowful, may be applied to all the feelings falling under the head of the immediate. Let us follow them from their weaker to their stronger forms.

"In joy the eyebrow is raised moderately but without any angularity, the forehead is smooth, the eye full, lively, and sparkling, the nostril is moderately inflated, and a smile is on the lips. In all the exhilarating emotions, the eyelid, the nostril, and the angle of the mouth are raised. In the depressing passions it is the reverse. For example, in discontent, the brow is clouded, the nose is peculiarly arched, and the angle of the mouth drawn in." (Bell, *Essay* vii.) "Laura Bridgman from her blindness and deafness could not have acquired any expression through imitation, yet when a letter from a beloved friend was communicated to her by gesture language, she laughed and clapped her hands, and the color mounted to her cheeks. On other occasions she has been seen to stamp for joy." (Darwin, *c. viii.*) "Joy quickens the circulation of the blood, and in its first impulse it frequently excites violent palpitations of the heart. It renders the eyes peculiarly lively and animated, and sometimes, when the mind has been previously in a state of anxious fear, it stimulates the lachrymal gland to the secretion of tears, accompanied with redness and a sensation of warmth in the countenance." "Unusual vivacity in the eyes and smiles upon the countenance are accompanied by joyful acclamations, clapping of hands, and various other lively gestures. Where the mind is strongly agitated, and under no restraint from a sense of decorum or solicitude for charac-

ter, loud laughter, jumping, dancing, and the most wild and extravagant gestures indicate the frolicsomeness of the heart." (Cogan.) Darwin (c. iii.) quotes a case reported by Crichton Browne: "A young man of strongly nervous temperament, on hearing by a telegram that a fortune had been bequeathed him, first became pale, then exhilarated, but soon in the highest spirits, but flushed and very restless. He then took a walk with a friend for the sake of tranquillizing himself, but returned staggering in his gait, uproariously laughing, yet irritable in temper, incessantly talking, and singing loudly in the public streets." "He then slept heavily, and on awaking was well, except that he suffered from headache, nausea, and prostration of strength."

In sorrow or grief the symptoms are "violent agitations and restless positions of the body, extension of the arms, clapping of the hands, beating the breast, tearing the hair, loud sobs and sighs." "Sometimes a flood of tears relieves these pathognomonic symptoms. Universal lassitude and a sense of debility succeed, with deep dejection of countenance, and languor in the eyes, which seem to look around and solicit in vain for assistance and relief." (Cogan, c. ii. class I.) In fear or in grief the movements of the nostrils, the uncontrollable tremor of the lips, the convulsions of the neck and chest, and the audible sobbing, prove that the influence of the mind extends over the organs of respiration, so that the difference is slight between the action of the frame in a paroxysm of the passions and in the agony of a drowning man." (Bell, Essay viii.) The same author describes the overwhelming influence of grief on woman. "The object in her mind has absorbed all the powers of the frame, the body is no more regarded, the spirits have left it, it reclines, and the limbs gravitate, they are nerveless and relaxed, and she scarcely breathes; but why comes at intervals the long-drawn sigh? why are the neck and throat convulsed? what causes the swelling and quivering of the lips, and the deadly paleness of the face? or why is the hand so pale and earthly cold? and why, at intervals, as the agony returns, does the convulsion spread over the frame like a paroxysm of suffocation?" (Essay iii.) Darwin (c. vii.) describes the grief of a young woman from Nagpore, nursing her baby who was at the point of death. His reporter "saw the eyebrows raised at the inner corners, the eyelids drooping, the forehead wrinkled in the middle, the mouth slightly open, with the corners much depressed. He then came from behind a screen of plants and spoke to the poor woman, who started,

burst into a bitter flood of tears, and besought him to cure her baby." The same author tells (c. vii.) that when the suffering is somewhat mitigated, yet prolonged, they no longer wish for action, but remain motionless and passive, or may occasionally rock themselves to and fro. The circulation becomes languid, the face pale, the muscles flaccid, the eyelids droop, the head hangs on the contracted chest, the lips, cheeks, and lower jaw all sink downward from their own weight. Hence all the features are lengthened, and the face of a person who hears bad news is said to fall.

As weeping is an especial expression of grief, this may be the proper place for the physiological account of it. "The lachrymal glands are the first to be affected; then the eyelids, and finally the whole converging muscles of the cheeks." The lips are drawn aside from their being forcibly retracted by the superior influence of their antagonist muscles, and the angle of the mouth (*triangularis oris*) is depressed. "The cheeks are thus drawn between two adverse powers: the muscles which surround the eyelids, and that which depresses the lower lip." "The diaphragm is spasmodically and irregularly affected, the chest and throat are influenced, the breathing is cut by sobbing, and the expiration is slow, with a melancholy note. In the violence of weeping, accompanied with lamentation, the face is flushed, or rather suffused by stagnant blood, and the veins of the forehead are distended." (Bell, Essay vi.) The muscles round the eyes are strongly contracted during screaming, loud laughter, and analogous acts.

Content and *Discontent*, or, to use phrases of much the same meaning, *Satisfaction* and *Dissatisfaction*. The prevailing appetences have had enough of gratification to soothe them, but not, it may be, to excite them. A great portion of a healthy and happy man's life may be spent in this state, neither much exalted nor much depressed. On the other hand, there may be dissatisfaction, general or occasional, arising from affections being disturbed in a small way more or less frequently, by annoyances of various kinds, by ill health, by the anxieties of business, domestic differences, or the rivalries of rank. It is apt to manifest itself in a discontent painted on the

countenance, in a depression of the bodily frame, or in a habitual restlessness or occasional irritation of manner. The feeling is apt to settle down into a state of *Good* or *Bad Humor*.

Gladness and Depression. When these are prolonged and become continuous, they constitute *Cheerfulness* and *Dejection*. These are merely deeper manifestations of those last considered. The appetences are stronger, or they are steadily or more fully gratified. The one feeling may be that of a man who has a happy home, or a pleasant social circle, who likes his work, and whose business is prospering. The counterpart may be the temper of one who is in ill health, who has domestic unhappiness, who has quarreled with the circle in which he moves, whose business does not suit his taste, or is continually going wrong. It should be noticed that feelings belonging to other divisions are apt to mingle with those under consideration, such as pride, regrets as to the past, hopes and fears as to the future. These feelings, according as they dwell on the good or the evil, are often called *Good* and *Bad Spirits*, and may promote or injure the health.

Rapture and Melancholy. These are the highest forms of joy and the lowest forms of sorrow. They arise when the good and evil are supposed to be very great, and touch the deepest affections of our nature. There is the ecstasy of the lover when his or her love is reciprocated, of the soldier when he has gained a decisive victory, of the scientific investigator when the long looked-for discovery bursts upon his view, of the saint when he has the beatific vision. There is the prostration of spirit which sinks man and woman, when every effort to secure their favorite ends has failed. Old men are specially apt to feel in this way when they lose the reputation, the honor, the

fortune which they had passed a life-time in earning, and feel that they cannot start anew. We have striking instances in the poet Beattie and in Edmund Burke, when they lost promising sons on whom their hopes were centred, and could never be made to lift up their heads after. The cloud has come down upon the mountain top, and descends lower and lower, till at last all is wrapt in impenetrable gloom; and in this, the winter season, which has come upon them, there is no hope of its rising. They now give themselves over to melancholy, "indulge in melancholy," as the expression is, finding that it is easier for them to do so than make the exertion to be rid of it, which they feel to be hopeless and useless. (*Supra*, p. 60.)

"From his observations on melancholic patients, Mr. Nicol concludes that the inner ends of the eyebrows are almost always more or less raised, with the wrinkles on the forehead more or less plainly marked. In the case of one young woman, these wrinkles were observed to be in constant slight play or movement. In some cases the corners of the mouth are depressed, but often only in a slight degree." "The eyelids generally droop, and the skin near their outer corners and beneath them is wrinkled. The naso-labial fold, which runs from the wings of the nostrils to the corners of the mouth, and which is so conspicuous in blubbering children, is often plainly marked in these patients." (Darwin, c. vii.) "Melancholy manifests itself by dejection of spirits, debility of mind and body, obstinate and insuperable love of solitude, universal apathy, and a confirmed listlessness, which emaciate the corporeal system, and, not unfrequently, trouble the brain." (Cogan, c. ii.)

PRIDE and SELF-HUMILIATION. In the former, we form and cherish and entertain a high and self-satisfied opinion of ourselves, of our abilities, of our conduct, or of certain qualities supposed to be possessed by us, or of certain acts we have done. In the latter, we are not satisfied with ourselves, we do not believe we have quali-

fications for certain offices, and we depreciate what we have done. The one state, when it is self-righteous, may become a sin offensive to God and *Self-Conceit* denounced by man; the other, if it is yielded to, and not counteracted by a sense of duty, may become a *Poorness of Spirit* which prevents us from engaging in anything which requires courage and perseverance. The one, if we dwell only on the good qualities we possess, may become *Self-Respect* to keep us from what is mean and unworthy; the other, when it leads us to take a lowly attitude before God and our fellow-men, may become the grace of *Humility*.

“A proud man exhibits his sense of superiority over others by holding his head and body erect. He is haughty (haut) or high, and makes himself appear as large as possible, so that metaphorically he is said to be swollen or puffed up with pride. A peacock, or turkey-cock strutting about with puffed-up feathers, is sometimes said to be an emblem of pride. The arrogant man looks down on others and with lowered eyelids hardly condescends to see them; or he may show his contempt by slight movements about the nostrils or lips. Hence the muscle which everts the lower lip has been called the *musculus superbus*. It is added that the mouth is closed, ‘from the proud man feeling perfect self-confidence in himself.’” (Darwin, c. xi.)

Vanity differs from pride, inasmuch as in it people imagine that they stand high in public esteem, and are led to put themselves in positions in which they may dazzle the eyes of their fellow-men. He who cherishes it is flattered by attention paid to him, by applause, perhaps even by notoriety, and is mortified by neglect, by blame, and abuse. Opposed is the *Shrinking from public gaze*, commonly from fear of being found fault with.

Haughtiness implies not only a high opinion of ourselves but a sense of superiority to others, often shown in mien and air. In *Contempt* we express by words or by

manner that we have a low opinion of others. In *Disdain* we indicate that they are inferior to us in such qualities as worth, ability, and rank, and that we have no regard for them or no use for them. In *Scorn* we declare that they are unworthy of our notice. In *Sneering* we notice them, but only to point to their low qualities. In *Disgust* we view them as we would an offensive object, say a mal-odor. Opposed to all these is a spirit of *Meekness*, which "seeketh not its own," and does not think of its superiority to others.

"Contempt and disdain are often accompanied with a satirical smile which strongly insinuates that baseness and meanness are also intermixed with large portions of folly." (Cogan, p. I. c. ii.) "Contrasted with joy is the testy, pettish, peevish countenance bred of melancholy; as of one who is incapable of receiving satisfaction from whatever source it may be offered; who cannot endure any man to look steadily upon him, or even speak to him, or laugh, or jest, or be familiar, or hem, or point, without thinking himself contemned, insulted, or neglected. The arching of the mouth, and peculiar form of the wings of the nose, are produced by the conjoint action of the triangular muscle which depresses the angles of the mouth and the superbus, whose individual action protrudes the lower lip. The very peevish turn given to the eyebrows, the acute upward inflection of their inner extremities, and the meeting of the perpendicular and transverse furrows in the middle of the forehead, are produced by the opposed action of part of the frontal muscle and of the corrugator." (Bell, Essay vii.) "The lips are retracted and the grinning teeth exposed. The upper lip is retracted in such a manner that the canine tooth on one side of the face alone is shown; the face itself being generally a little upturned and half averted from the person causing offense." "The expression of a half-playful sneer graduates into one of great ferocity when, together with a heavily frowning brow and fierce eye, the canine tooth is exposed." (Darwin, c. x.) "In sulkiness, as seen for instance in children, there is a protrusion or pouting of the lips." (c. v.) "The most common method of expressing contempt is by movements about the nose or round the mouth; but the latter movements, when strongly pronounced, indicate disgust. The nose may be slightly turned up, which apparently fol-

lows from the turning up of the upper lip; or the movement may be abbreviated into the mere wrinkling of the nose. The nose is often slightly contracted so as partly to close the passage, and is commonly accompanied by a slight snort or expiration. All these actions are the same with those we employ when we perceive an offensive odor. We seem thus to say to the despised person that he smells offensively; in nearly the same manner as we express to him by half closing our eyelids or turning away our faces, that he is not worth looking at." (c. xi.)

SUBMISSION, RESIGNATION, PATIENCE. Under these emotions we know and feel that we are exposed to evil imposed by circumstances, or by the intention of an agent. We might be tempted to rebellion and to fighting, and the issue would be irritation, as when the rock opposes the waves. But we choose to submit to the inevitable, or we resign ourselves to what is our lot. We may rise to a far higher state, — to the grace of patience which submits implicitly to the will of God and believes that all is for good.

Resistance, Repining, Peevishness, Sulkiness, Disgust. We oppose and resent the evil to which we are exposed, or we habitually dwell on the evils of our lot; we throw the blame on our position or on our fellow-men, and complain of fortune, of fate, or of God. Often the sense of injury done is allowed to sink into the heart, breeding discontent and issuing in murmuring or in disobliging acts indicating the peevish temper within. Some yield to sulkiness, and retreat, as into a cave, from their fellow-men as unworthy of their confidence and regard.

In the look and mien of resignation there is a resistance to the impulses which would lead to rebellion and retaliation, such as anger and revenge; and this gives a suppressed and a subdued look, with possibly the hands lying over the body and the eyes cast downward.

Good and Bad Humor. These are habitual states. They may depend very much on the bodily tempera-

ment. Good humor often proceeds simply from good health, favored, it may be, by prosperity. Quite as frequently, however, it is produced by mental appetences cherished from day to day. In all cases it consists in a flow of grateful feelings running towards what is pleasing and viewing all things on the sunny side. In the opposite humor all things are clothed, as it were, in the dress of mourning. Possibly under the influence of a disordered stomach, or a diseased frame, or cherished ill-temper, the mind flits from one ungrateful topic towards another: in the past remembering only misfortunes or ill usage; in the present thinking only of deprivations, and in the future picturing only woes. It may become a *Sourness of Temper* painted visibly on the countenance, and exhibited in the manner, and rejecting all kind proposals, even those of genuine love.

“ A man in high spirits, though he may not actually smile, commonly exhibits some tendency to the retractions of the corners of his mouth. From the excitement of pleasure the circulation becomes more rapid, the eyes are bright, and the color of the face rises. The brain, being stimulated by the increased flow of blood, reacts on the mental powers; lively ideas pass still more rapidly through the mind, and the affections are warmed. I heard a child a little under four years, when asked what is meant by being in good spirits, answer ‘it is laughing, talking, and kissing.’ ” (Darwin, c. viii.)

Already some of these feelings relate to supposed good or evil to others as well as ourselves. We may now look exclusively to the emotions bearing on others.

PITY is produced by the idea of a person subjected to pain or to any form of evil. When it is continuous it is compassion towards those who suffer, and it may be those that sin. Opposed is *Hardness of Heart*, which is insensible to the wail of misery, and steels itself against the claims of poverty and suffering.

Sympathy, with *Joys* or *Sorrows*. This is a fine element of human character. It originates in the affection which we naturally have towards others. All this, however, may be a mere surface sensibility, as fleeting as the play of features on the countenance, or as the chasing of sunshine and shadow on the mountain sides, very pleasant, but evanescent,—as one observed of a sensitive person ever in smiles and tears, that he was a man of tenderness of nerve rather than of heart. Such persons feel for us, but they do not stand by us; they do not help us. In genuine feeling sympathy is rooted and grounded in love, and is a branch of love, and a grace of a high order. We are commanded to “rejoice with them that do rejoice and weep with them that weep.”

In it our heart beats responsive to the hearts of others. We enter into their feelings; we identify ourselves with them. Our very countenance is apt to take the expression of the feeling into which we enter. When we see others laugh, we are apt to laugh also. We weep with those that weep. We are disposed to run with those that run. We flee with those that flee. When others are striking a blow we are inclined to lift our arm as if to do the same. It is usually said that all this arises from the principle of imitation. The correct account rather is, that we place ourselves in the position of others, and are thus led to act as they act.

Envy. Here we have an idea of others being superior to us, and instead of rejoicing in it we feel as if we were thereby lowered and injured, and are tempted to lower and injure them. Envy is one prompting cause of our depreciation of others, of slander, and of the efforts we make to oppose and keep down our rivals.

Trust or *Confidence* in a fellow-creature, or *Suspicion*. We look on an individual as to be relied on or not to be

relied on, and a feeling of trust or mistrust arises. This feeling is apt to become especially strong when we view him as having a relation to us; and as likely to stand by us in an emergency, or to abandon us and turn against us. Some are confiding to the extent of weakness, and so are likely to be taken in; others are unreasonably and cruelly suspicious, and construe every appearance as a proof of guilt. These extremes are manifestations of a temper inclined to look on mankind with kindly or with unkindly feelings, but not stopping to weigh evidence.

Suspicion is described in the "Faery Queen:" —

"Foul, ill-favored, and grim,
Under his eyebrows looking still askance,
And ever as Dissemblance laughed on him
He lower'd on her with dangerous eye glance,
Showing his nature in his countenance,
His rolling eyes did never rest in place,
But walked each where, for fear of hid mischance
Holding a lattice still before his face,
Though he still did peep as forward he did pace."

Suspicion, while keeping the body unmoved to avoid notice, may be turning the eye in a peering manner.

Rejoicing in or Jealousy of the success of others. We have been brought into a relation more or less close with certain of our fellow-men. We are led in consequence of the social instinct to feel an interest in them and in their prosperity; we feel as if their success is our success; we are almost as much delighted with it as they are, and we are prompted to further it from interested or disinterested motives. Or, a person has come between us and those whom we love, or those on whom we suppose that we have some claim, or he is hindering our favorite ends or schemes, and we become jealous of him. When his name is mentioned, when we meet

him or we are led to think of him, especially when we are brought into collision with him, painful associations come up, and we wish that he may be disappointed. This disposition shows itself among the lower animals. The pet dog indicates its dislike of any other creature — dog or cat or child — that threatens to usurp its place. That girl is very much offended when any other child gets more attention than she does from nurse or mother. Jealousies arise in the rivalries of school, and appear in every future stage of life, and are seen in the competitions of trade, of dress, of social dignity, of popularity, of honor and reputation. It is more common in certain walks of life than in others, and is apt to come out to notice in all those professions in which the members come in collision with each other : as, for instance, among doctors, who have to consult about delicate cases ; among actors and actresses, who have to live on popular applause, which is apt to be capricious ; among authors, who have to be sustained by public opinion ; and even among popular preachers, who feel that they have a reputation to keep up, and are not awed by the responsibility of their office. Women are more disposed to feel it than men, because of their numerous small attachments, and because there is not as much opportunity of having their angles and points rubbed off and smoothed by intercourse with the world. It has to be added that when men are frustrated in a ruling passion they are apt to keep up the bitterness longer and express it more loudly than the opposite sex.

Jealousy is more specially felt when there has been an affection of some kind between the parties. It is most apt to be felt by lovers, and may disturb the intercourse of husband and wife. Lovers are so dependent on the smile of the loved one that they feel as if left in darkness

when the sunshine is withdrawn, and they attribute the withdrawal to a rival coming between. Husband and wife feel that they have a right to the pledged affection of one to the other, and are indignant at the one who has enticed it away and grieved with the one who has unlawfully bartered it.

“In jealousy the eyelid is fully lifted and the eyebrows strongly knit, so that the eyelid almost entirely disappears and the eyeball glares from under the bushy eyebrow. There is a general tension on the muscles which concentrate round the mouth; and the lips are drawn so as to show the teeth with an expression of cruelty, depending in a great measure, perhaps, on the turn of the nostrils which accompanies the drawing of the lips.” (Cogan.) “In jealousy the eyebrows are knit, and the eyelid so fully lifted as almost to disappear, while the eyeball glares from under the bushy eyebrow. There is a general tension of the muscles which concentrate round the mouth and the lips, and show the teeth with a fierce expression. This depends partly on the turn of the nostril which accompanies the retraction of the lips.” (Bell, Essay vii.)

SECTION III.

PROSPECTIVE EMOTIONS.

The emotions looking to the future are the main stimulants of activity. As we fix our eyes on the past we may be kept from going forward; we may be satisfied, and so cease to exert ourselves, or so dissatisfied as to give ourselves up to unbelief or despair. The present may induce us to linger in it; the present good may satisfy us or the present evil may bow us down to the earth. In the emotions now under consideration we look on the land before us, and are allured to go on to possess it. “We are saved by hope.” Without it we would lie down and perish; with it we rise as Mungo Park did, when, being prostrated and ready to die, his eyes fell on the “blue-bell” of Scotland, and he arose with the pur-

pose of yet seeing his native land. It is a common saying that more of human happiness may proceed from hope than realization ; the enjoyment is in the hunt rather than in the game caught. It is fortunate, it is providential that it is so. Men are not expected, after having gained some petty end, to retire from the heat of the day and give themselves over to indolence. To those who would linger too long in the shade God may send a gadfly to rouse them from their torpor and send them forth to new activities.

The prospective emotions, like all the others, may be divided into those that look to the appetible and those that look to the inappetible, in other words into the grateful and ungrateful. But there is an important class which lies in an intermediate region.

SURPRISE, *Astonishment.* An event occurs very suddenly or contrary to the usual course of things, or the expectations which we were led to entertain. It is of such a character that it must have momentous consequences. But we know not at first whether it is to be for good or for evil. It thus raises feeling ; for the mind dwells on the possible or probable evil, and becomes excited, perhaps restless, hoping or fearing, or flitting from the one to the other. This may continue for a time, till we see what the nature of the event is to be, what are its causes and its consequences ; and then the miracle comes to be regarded as a natural occurrence. The feeling is apt to be strongest among the young who more frequently meet with unexpected occurrences and are more uncertain about the issues. As they advance in life they are less liable to meet with incidents out of the course of their ordinary experience, and better able to calculate the results. The young run to every blazing fire expecting pleasure which the old know is not likely to fol-

low. The consequence is that the aged are apt to cease to feel an interest in what is passing; because their experience does not justify them in expecting from it much good or much evil.

“The first impulse of surprise deprives the subject of the power of utterance, and the first exertion of this returning power consists in loud exclamations adapted both to the nature of the emotion itself and to its confusion and wonder in relation to the object.”

“The eyes are sometimes fastened upon the author or narrator of something wonderful; sometimes they are directed upwards to be more detached from every surrounding object which might distract the attention; sometimes they roll about as if they were in search of an object that may be equal to the explanation, and the half-opened mouth seems eager to receive the desired information.” (Cogan, c. ii.)

“The eyes and mouth being widely open is an expression universally recognized as one of surprise or astonishment. Thus, Shakespeare says: ‘I saw a smith stand with open mouth swallowing a tailor’s news.’ And again, ‘They seemed almost with staring on one another to tear the cases of their eyes; there was speech in their dumbness, language in their very gesture; they looked as they had heard of a world destroyed.’”

“That the eyebrows are raised by an innate or instinctive impulse may be inferred from the fact that Laura Bridgman invariably acts thus when astonished, as I have been assured by the lady who has lately had charge of her. As surprise is excited by something unexpected or unknown, we naturally desire, when startled, to perceive the cause as quickly as possible; and we consequently open our eyes fully; so that the field of vision may be increased and the eyeballs moved easily in any direction. But this hardly accounts for the eyebrows being so greatly raised as is the case, and for the wild staring of the open eyes. The explanation of this lies, I believe, in the impossibility of opening the eyes with great rapidity by merely raising the upper lids. To effect this the eyebrows must be lifted energetically. Any one who will try to open his eyes as quickly as possible before a mirror will find that he acts thus; and the energetic lifting up of the eyebrows opens the eyes so widely that they stare the while, being exposed all round the iris. Moreover, the elevation of the eyebrows is an advantage in looking upwards; for as long as they are lowered they impede our vision in this di-

rection.” “The habit of raising the eyebrows having once been gained in order to see as quickly as possible all around us, the movement would follow from the force of association whenever astonishment was felt from any cause, even from a sudden sound or idea.” “The cause of the mouth being opened when astonishment is felt is a much more complex affair, and several causes apparently concur in leading to this movement.” “We can breathe much more quietly through the open mouth than through the nostrils, therefore when we wish to listen intently to any sound we either stop breathing or breathe as quietly as possible by opening our mouths, at the same time keeping our bodies motionless.” When the attention is directed forcibly to an object, the organs of the body not engaged are neglected, and so in astonishment many of the muscles become relaxed, and hence the open dropping of the jaw and open mouth of a man stupefied with amazement. Another cause operates. “We can draw a full and deep inspiration much more easily through the widely open mouth than through the nostrils. Now when we start at any sudden sound or sight, almost all the muscles of the body are involuntarily and momentarily thrown into strong action for the sake of guarding ourselves against or jumping away from the danger which we habitually associate with anything unexpected. But we always unconsciously prepare ourselves for any great exertion by first taking a deep and full inspiration, and we consequently open our mouths.” “Thus several causes concur towards this same, whether surprise, astonishment, or amazement is felt.” (Darwin, c. xii.)

ADMIRATION, *Wonder*, and *Veneration*. We are struck with something supposed to be great in power, in intellect, or in goodness. We anticipate important effects to follow; as we do so corresponding feelings rise and surge and swell. When the objects or consequences are good, admiration and wonder may become moral in their nature. They may become a veneration for all that is excellent towards the aged, the ancient, the grand. The *nil admirari* school may seem very wise, and may boast that they are never deceived, but as they have no *beau ideal* they never accomplish anything truly great. Wonder opens our eyes and fixes them on something high to

which it would elevate us. It is an essential element in all truly exalted character, and leads on to *Reverence* and *Awe*. It enters largely into the *Adoration* and worship which we pay to God.

“In admiration the faculty of sight is enjoyed to the utmost and all else is forgotten. The brow is expanded and unruffled, the eyebrows gently raised, the eye lifted so as to expose the colored surface of the eye, while the lower part of the face is relaxed in a gentle smile. The mouth is open, the jaw a little fallen, and by the relaxation of the lower lip we must perceive the edge of the lower teeth and tongue. The posture of the body is most expressive when it seems arrested in some familiar action.” (Bell, Essay vii.) “When subject to particular influences the natural position of the eyeball is to be directed upward. In sleep, languor, and depression, or when affected with strong emotions, the eyes naturally and insensibly roll upwards. The action is not a voluntary one; it is irresistible. Hence in reverence, in devotion, in agony of mind, in all sentiments of pity, in bodily pain with fear of death, the eyes assume that position.” “We thus see that when wrapt in devotional feelings, and when outward impressions are unheeded, the eyes are raised by an action neither taught nor acquired. It is by this instinctive motion we are led to bow with humility, to look upward in prayer, and to regard the visible heavens as the seat of God.” (Bell, Essay iv.)

“Prayer is . . .

The upward glancing of the eye

When none but God is near.”

The Prospective Emotions proper are all of the nature of —

HOPE and FEAR. The former of these arises from the contemplation of good, the latter from the apprehension of evil as about to come. The feeling varies with the nature and extent of the good or evil conceived, and of the probability of its coming.

The tendency of hope is to enliven, to cheer, to stimulate action. But it is also true that ill-grounded hopes, fostering in the first instance a false security, and so leading to disappointment, may make us despair of accom-

plishing any good end. "Hope deferred maketh the heart sick." The tendency and the final cause of fear is to hold back and repress, when we might be tempted to rush into danger. But some are so terror-stricken that they are incapable of taking any action to ward off the evil. It has to be added, that fear has sometimes called forth and intensified dormant energies. There are occasions when man acquires courage from despair. A man fleeing for his life has performed feats of ingenuity and strength which he would not have attempted in calmer hours. In all cases there should be judgment and principle exercised in seeing that we hope for proper objects, that we be afraid only of what is evil, and are ready to resist the evil when duty calls.

Hope seems to give a life and a spring to our whole nervous system so far as it is influenced by the gray matter of the brain. It is especially seen in the keen eye. It leads us to look forward as if to see, and lean forward as if to reach, the object. We elevate the eyebrow that the view may be clear. But "Fear produces an agony and anxiety about the heart not to be described ; and it may be said to paralyze the soul in such a manner as to render it insensible to everything but its own misery. Inertness and torpor pervade the whole system, united with a constriction of the integuments of the body, and also a certain sense of being fettered, or of being rendered incapable of motion. The eyes are pallid, wild, and sunk in their sockets ; the countenance is contracted and wan, the hair stands erect, or at least this sensation is excited, which every child experiences so often as he is terrified by stories of ghosts, witches, etc. The bowels are strongly affected, the heart palpitates, respiration labors, the lips tremble, the tongue falters, the limbs are unable to obey the will or support the frame. Dreadful shrieks denote the inward anguish. These are often succeeded by syncope, which, while they manifest that the sufferings are greater than nature can sustain, afford a temporary relief." (Cogan, c. ii. class I.) "Fear came upon me and trembling, which made all my bones to shake. Then a spirit passed before my face ; the hair of my flesh stood up. It stood still, but I could not discern the form thereof ; an image was

before mine eyes; there was silence and I heard a voice." (Job iv. 14-16.)

Anticipation, Expectation, Assurance of Hope, are fainter and stronger forms, growing on the idea of good, as possibly, probably, or certainly coming. Sometimes it is a feeble light, pleasing, but not moving, the soul. Or, it may become lively and exciting, a source of happiness, and an incentive to activity. Or, it may rise to a full assurance in which it has all the stability of realization: such is the hope of the return of the seasons or of a good man's fulfillment of promise; such is hope in God, in his Word and Providence. It should be noticed that the practical result depends not only on the probability of the good, but on the character of the appetite. The hope which sways one person powerfully may have no charms to another. There are people in ecstasy at being invited to a fashionable party which has no attractions whatever to others, who would rather have a day's fishing or hunting. One man is buoyed up all his life with the expectation of his reaching a high position of power or fame; another looks down on all this because he aims at securing mental cultivation or spiritual excellence. Hope has a purifying effect when properly directed; it purifies us even as the objects to which it looks, say God and heaven, are pure.

Apprehension, Dread, Terror, Horror, Despair. These are different degrees of the same feeling, determined by the greatness of the evil and the probability of its reaching us. The extent of the evil is estimated not by any absolute standard, but by the strength of the appetite which has been thwarted. To one man the loss of money is scarcely felt to be a loss, for he has not set his affections on wealth; to another it is like tearing out his heart. To many the loss of a near relative stirs the soul to its

lowest depths; in others it only ruffles the surface, like a passing breeze. When the threatened storm is very distant, or very doubtful, there is only a slight tremor, enough to give a warning; but as it comes near and descends with a hurricane power there are awful howlings and yawning gulfs. When the evil is steadily pressing on us like death, it is dread. When it comes suddenly upon us, say the news of a lost battle, it is terror. When all hope of being delivered from it is gone, it is despair, which is the darkness left when all the lights have been extinguished, and the man feels that he is lost, and is tempted to give up exertion and lie down and perish.

“Terror causes the blood suddenly to leave the extreme parts of the frame; the countenance becomes livid, the brain excited, the large arteries distended; the heart swells, the eyes start, the muscles become rigid or convulsed, and faintness, or perhaps sudden death, ensues.” (Moore, part III.) In terror the man stands with eyes intently fixed on the object of his fears, the eyebrows elevated to the utmost, and the eye largely uncovered; or with hesitating and bewildered steps, his eyes are rapidly and wildly in search of something. “Observe him farther: There is a spasm on his breast; he cannot breathe freely; the chest is elevated; the muscles of his neck and shoulders are in action; his breathing is short and rapid; there is a gasping and convulsive motion of his lips, a tremor on his hollow cheek, a gulping and catching of his throat; his heart is knocking at his ribs, while yet his lips and cheeks are ashy pale.” “The heart beats quickly and violently, so that it palpitates or knocks against the ribs: but it is very doubtful whether it then works more efficiently than usual, so as to send a greater supply of blood to all parts of the body; for the skin instantly becomes pale, as during incipient faintness. The paleness of the surface, however, is probably, in large part or exclusively, due to the vaso-motor centre being affected in such a manner as to cause the contraction of the small arteries of the skin. That the skin is much affected under the sense of great fear, we see in the marvelous and inexplicable manner in which perspiration immediately exudes from it. This exudation is all the more remarkable as the surface is then cold, and hence the term a ‘cold sweat;’ whereas the sudorific glands are

properly excited into action when the surface is heated. The hairs also on the skin stand erect, and the superficial muscles shiver. In connection with the disturbed action of the heart, the breathing is hurried, the salivary glands act imperfectly, the mouth becomes dry, and is often opened and shut. I have also noticed that under slight fear there is a strong tendency to yawn. One of the best marked symptoms is the trembling of all the muscles of the body; and this is often first seen in the lips. From this cause, and from the dryness of the mouth, the voice becomes husky or indistinct, or may altogether fail. *Obstupui, steteruntque comæ et vox faucibus hausit.*” There are other symptoms: “The pupils are said to be enormously dilated, or may be thrown into convulsive movements. The hands are alternately clinched and opened, often with a twitching movement. The arms may be protruded as if to avert some dreadful danger, or may be thrown wildly over the head.” (Darwin, c. xii.)

“Horror differs from both fear and terror, although more nearly allied to the last than to the first. It is more full of sympathy with the sufferings of others than engaged with our own. We are struck with horror even at the spectacle of artificial distress; but it is peculiarly excited by the real danger or pain of another. We see a child in the hazard of being crushed by an enormous weight, with sensations of extreme horror. Horror is full of energy: the body is in the utmost tension, not unnerved by fear. The flesh creeps, and a sensation of cold seems to chill the blood; the term is applicable of ‘damp horror.’” (Bell, Essay vii.)

“Despair is a mingled emotion. While terror is in some measure the balancing and distraction of a mind occupied with an uncertainty of danger, despair is the total wreck of hope, the terrible assurance of ruin having closed around beyond all power of escape. The expression of despair must vary with the nature of the distress of which it is the acme. In certain circumstances it will assume a bewildered, distracted air, as if madness were likely to afford the only relief from the mental agony. Sometimes there is at once a wildness in the looks, and total relaxation as if falling into insensibility, or there is upon the countenance of the desperate man a horrid gloom; the eye is fixed, yet he neither sees nor hears aught, nor is sensible of what surrounds him; the features are shrunk and pale and livid, and convulsions and tremors affect the muscles of the face.” (Bell, Essay vii.)

Shyness is a feeling arising from a sensitive apprehension as to the opinion that may be formed of us by others. It leads us to retire into the shade and hide ourselves from the public gaze; like Viola,

“Who never told her love;
But let concealment, like a worm in the bud,
Feed on her damask cheek.”

Shame is a modification of the same feeling in which we shrink from exposing our person, or it may be our guilt, for fear of reproach. *Modesty* and *Impudence* belong to the same class. In the former we shrink from displaying our excellences, or, it may be, from asserting our rights. It is not so much an emotion as a virtue. In *Impudence* we pay no regard to propriety and we defy the opinion of others.

“Some persons flush up at any sudden and disagreeable recollection.” In regard to Blushing, “The theory which appears to me most probable, though it may at first seem rash, is that attention closely directed to any part of the body tends to interfere with the ordinary and tonic contraction of the small arteries of that part. These vessels, in consequence, become at such times more or less relaxed, and are constantly filled with arterial blood. This tendency will have been much strengthened if frequent attention has been paid during many generations to the same part, owing to nerve force readily flowing along accustomed channels, and by the power of inheritance. Whenever we believe that others are depreciating or even considering our personal appearance our attention is vividly directed to the outer and visible parts of our bodies; and of all such parts we are most sensitive about our faces.” (Darwin, c. xiii.)

Anxiety. It presupposes an object in which we are interested and a threatened obstacle in the way of the attainment of it. The interest in it keeps the eye fixed on the object, and fears spring up as we discover hindrances standing, like the angel seen by the prophet’s ass with the drawn sword, in the way. When the impel-

ling passion is a tempest, the soul may be in an agitated state, like a ship in a storm, now dizzy and trembling on the ridge of the wave, and forthwith down in the depths. How tremulous the hand of the youth as he presents a letter to a patron who has the means of befriending him, and of a mother presenting a petition for the reprieve of her son. How fluttered is the lover who has sent off a proposal to a loved one and is waiting for an answer. What risings and fallings, what elevations and depressions, what ebbs and flows. How terrible the agony of the mother as she watches by the sick-bed of her son on the night of the crisis of the fever. Some have felt the anxiety so keenly that they have almost wished that the decision were against them, rather than that they should be thus tossed. In such cases the hopes only make the fears more horrific, as the lightnings reveal the density of the surrounding darkness.

Disappointment. The phrase may be used in a more general or a more specific sense. It may be applied to every case in which an appetite has been frustrated, that is, has not gained its object. I have been using it in this sense, in this treatise, in strict conformity, I believe, with the usage of our tongue. But it is employed in this place in a more specific sense, as the counterpart of expectation. A good has been hoped for and has not come. Disappointment as an emotion arises when the expected blessing is not realized. This feeling is strong in proportion to the previously entertained hope. What a darkness when a light to which we have long been looking is quenched: say when a lover finds that the person beloved has been amusing herself with him, or has jilted him; or when a man, after toiling for years or a life-time, discovers that his life plan has been wrecked and dashed helplessly in pieces. A peculiar bit-

terness is engendered when there has been a betrayal of us by those whom we loved and trusted, or to whom we committed our confidence and our money. On the other side, what a relief when a threatening cloud long hanging over us is dispelled, and we find ourselves in light and comfort, with friends whom we mistrusted standing by us.

A peculiarity is imparted to these prospective feelings when our hopes and fears have arisen from the acts of others. There is the *Hope of Approbation*, of smiles and favors from friends to whom, in consequence, we become attached. There is the fear of enmity from those who are prejudiced against us, or of revenge on the part of those whom we have offended. There is *Horror* at atrocious conduct, as, for example, when we hear of an unnatural son striking or killing a father.


I am indebted to Professor Osborn, of Princeton College, for the following account of the Anatomy of Expression : —

The principal muscles which come into play in the expression of the emotions in the face are grouped about the centres of expression in pairs. The eyes and the mouth, moreover, are especially provided with circular muscles which completely surround them. The action of these muscles not only changes the natural form of the features in repose by drawing them into new positions, but, as they shorten in contraction, the skin is thrown into a series of folds or wrinkles which have come to possess almost as important a meaning in expression as changes in the features themselves. After contraction, the muscles and features gradually relax into repose. Beside the pairs of similar muscles upon opposite sides of the face, we find pairs upon the same side with an opposed action; for example, those which respectively raise and lower the corners of the mouth, and it is a curious fact that in all cases such muscles are employed in exactly opposite emotions. The muscles, however, very seldom work singly; they usually act in groups; and in some cases the most delicate shades

of expression arise from the combination of two muscles which may be said to partly oppose each other. All the true muscles of expression are supplied by a single nerve, the Facial; others, such as those used in mastication, are only indirectly connected with expression and are supplied by different nerves.

Following Sir Charles Bell, we may consider these muscles in three groups: I. Those surrounding the eye; II. Those moving the nostrils; III. Those surrounding the mouth.

I. 1. The *Occipito-frontalis* descends over the forehead to the eyebrows. Its action is simply to raise the eyebrows and throw the forehead into transverse folds. 2. The *Orbicularis palpebrarum*. This muscle lies in a circle about the eye; the *outer* fibres are very strong and draw the eyebrows down, opposing the *occipito-frontalis*, and closing the eye violently, while the *inner* fibres gently close the eye. 3. The *Corrugator supercilii* arises from the bridge of the nose; it extends outwards immediately beneath the eyebrows, and knits the



EXPLANATION OF THE FIGURE. (After Froriep.)

1. Occipito-frontalis. 2. Orbicularis palpebrarum. 3. Corrugator supercilii. 4. Pyramidalis. 5. Levator labii proprius, alæque nasi. 6. Levator labii proprius. 7. Levator anguli oris. 8. Orbicularis oris. 9. Levator anguli oris. 10. Zygomaticus. 11. Buccinator. 12. Depressor anguli oris. 13. Depressor anguli oris. 14. Depressor anguli oris. 15. Quadratus menti.

eyebrows together in contraction. 4. The muscles of the eyeball move the pupil in different directions.

II. 5. The *Pyramidalis nasi* extends over the bridge of the nose. 6. The *Levator labii proprius atque nasi* descends at the side of the nostril, and in contraction draws up the nostril and that part of the lip lying in front of the eye-tooth. 7. The *Compressor nasi* arises from the bridge of the nose, and its action is to expand the nostrils.

III. 8. The *Orbicularis oris* surrounds the mouth, controls the closing of the lips, and draws the corners of the mouth together.

9. One elevator of the lip (6) has already been mentioned; this muscle, the *Levator labii proprius*, raises the larger part of the upper lip; while, 10, the *Levator anguli oris* is a smaller muscle which raises merely the corner of the mouth. 11. The *Zygomaticus* draws the corner of the mouth upwards and outwards. 12. The *Buccinator* lies upon the inner side of the cheek, drawing back the corner of the mouth. The following muscles of this group oppose those above. 13. The *Depressor anguli oris* draws down the corners of the mouth. 14. The *Platysma myoides* draws down the mouth and chin. 15. The *Quadratus menti* protrudes the lower lip.

We observe in the figure that the chief centres of expression, the eyes and the mouth, have their muscles arranged upon a similar plan; they each have a circular closing muscle, and a series of other muscles arranged like the spokes of a wheel to exert a counter-pull. As an example of muscles acting singly to produce a simple expression, we find the *Occipito-frontalis* raising the eyebrows and giving the look of surprise or attention, an expression which Darwin explains upon the "Association" principle, this action also being necessary when we open the eyes wide to look at distant objects. The *Corrugators* also, drawing the eyebrows together, give a fleeting expression of doubt or pain.

As a simple example of *combined* action let us look at the so-called grief muscles. The *Orbiculars*, *Corrugators*, and *Pyramidals*, acting together, draw the eyebrows downwards and together, as the frown in anger or perplexity; but when their action is partly checked by the simultaneous contraction of the *Frontalis*, the inner ends of the eyebrows and the inner corners of the eyelids are drawn into an oblique position, indicating mental pain or distress. This is accompanied by a variety of folds upon the forehead, which are very different from those seen in the simple contraction of the *Frontalis*. The first signal of real distress is given, especially in children, by the drawing down of the corners of the mouth, in the contraction of the *depressores anguli oris*.

As an example of *opposed* action, we find the first signal of

laughter is given by the *levator anguli oris* which raise the corners of the mouth: at the same time the *orbiculars* relax and the whole upper lip is raised, the mouth is still further drawn back; then as the real laughter or convulsive movements of the chest begin, the eyelids are closed, but this seems to be principally for purposes of protection. With this exception, laughter seems to reverse every muscular action which accompanies the expression of grief, illustrating the general principle of "antithesis."

The principal authorities for the above are the works of Sir Charles Bell and Charles Darwin. The latter was greatly aided by the very ingenious experiments of Dr. Duchenne upon the electrical stimulation of the nerves supplying the different muscles of expression, described in his "*Mécanisme de la Physionomie Humaine.*" In these experiments, accompanied by photography, it was in many cases conclusively shown that certain facial expressions depend solely upon the contraction of certain muscles. In other cases, where the result depended upon the contraction of a group of muscles, the experiments were less successful, and the expression, as shown in the photographs, is unnatural.

CHAPTER III.

EMOTIONS CALLED FORTH BY INANIMATE OBJECTS. THE ÆSTHETIC.

SECTION I.

ÆSTHETICAL THEORIES.

THIS introduces us to the feelings called forth by those objects which are called Beautiful, Picturesque, Ludicrous, and Sublime. Shaftesbury and Hutcheson reckoned these as constituting Senses, such as the sense of Beauty, the Sense of the Ludicrous. The French writers spoke of them as *Gôut*, which English and Scotch writers translated Taste, and discussed the nature and pleasures of Taste; and the phrase is still habitually employed in our language—as when we talk of persons of taste. Of a later date, following Kant and the Germans, the feelings to which I refer have been called æsthetic, and the science which treats of the corresponding objects, æsthetics. None of these phrases is unexceptional. They all seem to refer to bodily senses, emotions which certainly proceed from a higher department of our nature. The phrase æsthetics may be employed till another and a better be devised and generally accepted.

The opinions which have been entertained by eminent men as to the Beautiful may be represented as three in number.

(1.) *There are those who hold that it consists of some mental quality perceived by the mind, as existing in objects.* Whatever objects possess this quality are to be reckoned as beautiful, those without it are to be held as non-beautiful. This theory was started by the oldest thinker who has speculated on the subject: I refer to Plato, who may be regarded as the founder of the science of æsthetics. According to him there had been an Idea in or before the Divine Mind from all eternity; which idea is so far impressed on objects on the earth and in the heavens. So far as objects partake of this Divine Idea they are beautiful; and the mind of man, being formed at first in the image of God, is capable of rising, by means of philosophic contemplation, to a Pure Love (called ever since Platonic Love), which discerns and appreciates the beauty. This beauty consists essentially in order opposed to disorder, in harmony and proportion. It is not sensation nor utility; it is mind, king of heaven and earth, bringing forms, sounds, and colors under limitation. He treats of the subject in the "Phædrus," the "Banquet," the "Philebus," and the "Greater Hippias." He makes Socrates say, "For the Celestial Aphrodite herself, the goddess of all beauty, being well aware that mere pleasure and all sorts of sensuous gratification have no element of limit in themselves, introduced LAW and ORDER, to which limitation necessarily belongs." He is greatly struck with the properties of certain mathematical figures. "When I talk of the beauty of forms, I do not understand, as most people might, certain shapes of living animals, or of painted animals, but my argument refers to lines, straight or curved generally, and to whatever figures, plain or solid, are made with a straight or a curved outline, by rules and plumb-lines, or by compasses and the turner's lathe, — things quite familiar to

you. Now, with regard to all these things, I say that they are beautiful, not relatively, as so many other things are, but that by their very nature they are essentially and eternally beautiful, and that they are accompanied by certain peculiar pleasures which have no affinity whatsoever with the pleasurable affection produced by common irritants and stimulants. And of colors also, and the pleasures connected with them, the same thing may be predicated." He perceives a peculiar beauty in certain triangles which have remarkable properties in themselves or are capable of producing new figures by juxtaposition. He instances the right-angled isosceles triangle, which has the two angles at the base, each equal to half a right angle; the ratio, being of 2 to 1, always presents one unvarying type of great beauty.¹ With all the Greeks the τὸ καλόν consisted in that on which order has been imposed, as opposed to matter (ύλη), which is waste and formless.

Since the time of Plato this theory, which in a general way we may call Platonic, has appeared and reappeared in the speculations of profound thinkers. Aristotle views the beautiful under various forms, but represents it in his "Metaphysics" as being essentially order (τάξις), and this, in that which is bounded (φρτισμένον). The great philosophic divine, Augustine, represents beauty as consisting in order and design. Francis Hutcheson, who has written much on this subject, maintains that it consists in unity with variety. Give us mere unity or uniformity and we have no beauty; but give us variety also, and there is beauty in proportion to the variety. Give us variety merely, and there is no beauty; but let there be unity to combine the variety, and there is beauty in proportion to the unity.

¹ See *On Beauty*, by Professor Blackie.

(2.) *There are those who are seeking to show that beauty consists in certain objective qualities in the things themselves.* This theory is not inconsistent with the last but appears in a somewhat different form. According to the Platonic view, there is beauty only so far as the high quality is perceived by the mind, say proportion, harmony, or unity with variety. According to the second theory, the beauty is in the object itself, whether the mind perceives it or not. Not a few in our day are striving to express the qualities of the beautiful in mathematical formulæ.

(3.) *There are those who maintain that beauty is produced by Association of Ideas.* The influence of association engendering feelings of the beautiful was pointed out clearly and judiciously by Francis Hutcheson, in his works "On Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue" (1725) and "On the Passions." The same line of remark was followed by Beattie, the well known Scotch poet and metaphysician. The author who has carried out these views to the greatest (indeed to an extravagant) extent is the Rev. Archibald Alison, in his "Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste." I shall endeavor to give a summary of his views. He says: "In the course of this investigation I shall endeavor to show, first, that there is no single emotion into which these varied effects can be resolved; that, on the contrary, every simple emotion, and therefore every object which is capable of producing any simple emotion, *may* be the foundation of the complex emotion of Beauty or Sublimity. But, in the second place, that this complex emotion of Beauty or Sublimity is never produced unless, beside the excitement of some simple emotion, the imagination also is excited, and the exercise of the two faculties combined in the general effect." To illustrate this, he says, let us

look upon a wide, extended plain, covered with waving grain, whitening unto the harvest. We are not to suppose that there is anything beautiful in this scene, considered in itself; or that it calls forth any separate feeling to be regarded as a feeling of the beautiful. But the field raises the idea of fertility and riches; we think of the animated beings to be fed and sustained by the exuberant grain, of the happiness, plenty, and peace thereby accruing, and the whole flow of feeling constitutes the sentiment of the beautiful. We look upon a time-worn tower; there is nothing more beautiful in it than in any other aggregation of stone and lime, but our minds are carried back to long past days and deeds of chivalry and prowess, and the whole feeling constitutes a sense of the Venerable. We gaze on a water-fall; it is only a collection of rock and water, but it raises a feeling of power which branches out into varied ideas and feelings, constituting our sentiment of the Sublime.

SECTION II.

PHYSICAL BEAUTY.

The feeling of beauty, I have no doubt, commences in bodily sensation. There are sounds, colors, odors, tastes, touches, forms, which pleasantly affect the organism. These are the beginnings, and I rather think they go up, as an element, into our higher æsthetic affections. It is certain that if an object be felt as harsh by our sensory organs it will not be appreciated as beautiful. In the case of some of the senses, with taste, smell, and feeling, the special animal senses, there are only pleasant sensations, and nothing that can be described as æsthetic. But in the higher senses, in sounds, colors, and forms, there are harmonious relations in the forces operating upon

and in the organism, and these, being perceived spontaneously, though very obscurely it may be, raise higher classes of feeling which constitute the sense of beauty.

Musical Sounds. Those who have the peculiar gift feel themselves, as they listen to the strains of music, to be in a state of pleasurable excitement. From the time of Pythagoras it has been known that the sounds are characterized by definite mathematical relations. "Two sets of vibrations, regular each in itself, and bearing a relation to each other by uniting together, form a vibration which is also regular, and the whole impression is regular; whereas two vibrations which bear no commensurate ratio to each other, however regular each may be in itself, will not, by their union, produce a regular vibration, and the result is not music, but a noise. So, also, when the nerve has been affected with a particular vibration, it will necessarily accommodate itself with more ease to a new vibration, the more simple the ratios that this vibration bears to the former, so that those which bear the simplest ratios to each are most in harmony with each." Some such law as this, it is said, generalizes all the phenomena of harmony and discord. Hence it is, when two notes are in harmony the lengths and tensions of the strings producing the sound bear certain ratios to each other, and that when the notes are discordant the ratios are incommensurable. "Music," says Mr. Sully, "affords three distinct orders of gratification. First of all, in its discrete, in its melodic and harmonic combinations, it satisfies, seemingly, simple sensibilities of the ear." Helmholtz supposes that the coöperation of several continuous nervous processes in distinct fibres is an adequate cause of the pleasures of harmony. Mr. Sully continues, "Further, in its arrangement of these tonic elements, under certain forms of tune, accepted rhythm,

key, and undulation of key, it presents numerous beauties of symmetry and unity, which gratefully employ the intellectual faculties. Finally, it exercises a mysterious spell on the soul, stirring up deep currents of emotion, and awaking vague ideas of the Infinite, the Tragic, and the Serene.”¹ This is all I am able to say of the beauty of music, in which, be it observed, we have the concurrence of three distinct classes of agencies, first, the ratios in the vibrations of sound, secondly, the adapted state of the organism, and thirdly, the ideational and emotional mental state produced.

Beauty in Forms. From the days of Plato, or rather of Pythagoras, attempts have been made to find out a law of the forms felt to be beautiful, founded on mathematical principles, and capable of being expressed quantitatively. Some are laboring to discover the guiding rule of those curves which we admire so much in the gothic widow. It has been asserted that certain mathematical forms, with modifications, are the bases of the beautiful proportions in Grecian architecture. Hogarth’s line of beauty was a serpentine, formed by drawing a line round from the apex to the base of a tall cone, a figure which suggests design and grace. But this is only one of a number of lines of beauty. I confidently cherish the belief that sooner or later we may have a mathematical expression of the laws of form discerned as beautiful.

But even when this is successfully accomplished, we have not touched the more important problem, How do these mathematical forms raise the feeling of beauty? Nor have we explained everything when we show that the measured undulations which enable us to see them produce a pleasant sensation on the eye and optic organ-

¹ *Sensation and Intuition*, p. 220.

ism. For the question arises, How should this sensation produce an æsthetic feeling in the mind?

Our analysis has shown that there is an idea, or a perception, as the nucleus of all emotion. May we not find a competent idea in the contemplation of harmonious sounds and well proportioned forms? I am inclined to think that in all æsthetic feeling there is a perception, or rather a succession of rapid perceptions, of relation, order, and harmony, indicating mind or purpose. It is certain that the feeling of beauty will not rise if there be an evident want of unity, symmetry, and proportion: if there be a limb torn from the body, or a side from the tree, or a prominent hulk in one part of a building without a corresponding prominence in another to balance it. The perception of the harmony is derived from the orderly affection of the sensory organism, which, again, is produced by the orderly vibrations of the air or light. As the regular affections are noticed there is an idea of order, and of mind producing the order. This idea gives rise to a feeling which attaches us to the object which we declare to be beautiful; we are drawn towards it, and come to delight in it and love it.

Beauty of Color. "Light is pleasant to the eyes" always when it is not excessive. I believe that all the various hues into which it can be decomposed are also agreeable. A bright light attracts the eyes of infants, as also of certain insects which whirl round the candle. Children delight in bonfires, illuminations, and rockets. Red attracts the eyes of young people, and of savages, as does also yellow, to a less degree. Green, the most prevalent color in nature, has a more soothing influence, as it comes from leafage, and sky, and shallow sea. While these colors gratify the organism, I do not regard the sensations as æsthetic, any more than the pleasures of taste and smell.

The æsthetic feelings proper do not arise till we have two colors in a relation to each other. There may be a low form of beauty in what have been called melodious colors, that is, colors which glide into others that are contiguous in the scale, as when blue runs gracefully into green, as we often see in pigeons, and yellow into red, as we see in geraniums. There is a higher form of beauty, attracting the eye and stimulating the mind, in harmony of colors. Two colors are said to be in harmony and are called complementary, and when together they make up the white beam.

In the last age the accepted doctrine was that of Brewster, that the three primary colors in the beam were red, yellow, and blue, which by their mixtures give us all other colors; thus blue and yellow mixed give us green. The accepted doctrine of the present day is that of Young, accepted by Helmholtz, that the primary colors are red, green, and violet; thus yellow is made of red and green. There is a correspondence between these colors and the organism. "Dr. Young supposes that there are in the eye three kinds of nerve-fibres, the first of which, when irritated in any way, produces the sensation of red, the second the sensation of green, and the third that of violet."

It is universally admitted that complementary colors are felt to be beautiful when they fall simultaneously under the eye. But the white beam, when it falls upon our atmosphere, and upon objects on our earth, is often divided into two parts, which are complementary of each other; and these presented to the eye raise an æsthetic feeling. We may notice these harmonies in the evening sky, and they allure our eye towards them and call forth emotion. We have a like division of rays when the beam falls on plants. It falls upon the leaf and the green rays are reflected by the chlorophyl, and the others are said

to be absorbed according to laws which have not yet been determined. But these absorbed rays are not extinguished or lost. I believe they tend to come forth in some part of the plants as colors which will be complementary to the green and take the hue of red. The eye delights to see the fruit of the cherry, the rose, and the thorn, and the berry of the holly, the yew, and the common barberry, the mountain ash, and unnumbered others peeping forth from the green leaves. In like manner, when the white beam falls on the petals of flowers, the blue-red, which is the most common color of the corolla, will be reflected, and the other rays will come out in some sort of yellow.

A like harmony may be detected in the plumage of birds which often have a tawny hue, being a red-yellow, with other portions of a dark blue. In more ornamented birds we have a yellow-red with a blue-green. Many shells of mollusca are characterized by an orange-yellow ground with bluish-purple spots. It has been noticed that attention has been paid to harmony of colors in the finer specimens of stained glass, and this commonly from a delicate taste, and not from a knowledge of the scientific laws of color.

The general result reached is, that in lovely colors there is, first, a relation of the rays of light; second, an adaptation of the rays to the organ of vision; and thirdly, a pleasurable excited state which deserves to be called æsthetic.

SECTION III.

INTELLECTUAL BEAUTY.

Profound thinkers in various ages and countries have been in wonderful agreement with each other in maintaining that there is a beauty arising from harmony and

proportion. It may be maintained that the spontaneous perception of a number of relations among objects has a tendency to raise up feelings of beauty always when it is associated with mind, with order, design, benevolence, or moral excellence. We may find proofs and illustrations of this in all the relations which the mind of man can discover.

(1.) The mind feels a pleasure in observing *sameness* and *differences*. The mind demands a unity in the beautiful object, but this does not indicate a meaning unless there be also variety. There is a satisfaction in noticing the variety of our mental states, of our ideas, feelings, moods, while the self abideth. We like to see the repetition with infinite diversities of prevailing forms in the vegetable and animal kingdoms. Every part of the plant, the whole tree, the branch, the leaf, is after one model, while every part is diversified to suit its function. A great uniformity is given to the higher animals by the skeleton being formed of vertebræ, constructed of like pieces, while every part is adapted to its function.

(2.) The mind is pleased in noticing the relation of *whole and parts, particularly of means and ends*. On a concrete or a complex whole being presented to us we are anxious, for the sake of comprehending it, to have it resolved into parts, and as scattered objects fall under our eye we wonder if they cannot be combined. We are gratified when the complicated whole can be broken into comprehensible pieces, and when the pieces can be made to fit into each other to make up a regular whole. A feeling of delight is apt to be called forth when we discover a number of independent circumstances combining to the production of one end, as we notice all the parts of a machine coöperating to effect its purpose, and all parts of the bodily frame, bones, ligaments, and mus-

cles, to promote the easy movement of a joint and the comfort of the animal.

(3.) We are impelled to seek and to notice *resemblances*, and are delighted when we can coördinate objects and gather them into *classes*. The mind feels burdened when it is obliged to carry with it innumerable particulars. It is relieved when it can put these under heads. It is delighted when it discovers, either in art or in nature, that order is established, and has evidently been intended, say in the arrangement and distribution of objects in a room or in a garden, or in the forms of plants and animals. A feeling of a high order is gradually generated as we discover and contemplate species, genera, orders, and kingdoms in animate nature, and trace a progression from man to angel, archangel, and God Himself.

(4.) There is a kind of æsthetic feeling excited even by the perception of the relations of *space*: there is a sort of beauty, as Plato proclaimed, and as all mathematicians maintain, in certain mathematical figures; we feel it to be so, as we discover their properties. We have seen that there is pleasing sensation excited in our ocular organism by certain forms caused by the regular vibrations of the rays of light. These harmonies, being noticed, will produce a feeling of a very lofty character. Our minds are filled with grandeur when we contemplate the movements of the moon, the earth, the sun, and the constellations in their spheres. How interesting to notice the same shape in the tree and its leaf; to trace the spiral tendency of all the appendages of the plant, of buds, leaves, scales, branches; and to discover in pines and firs every part taking a conical shape — the whole contour of the tree is a cone, cut off any portion and the part cut off is a cone, the fruit organs are cones, and the very amenta are conical.

(5.) The relations of *time* may raise a feeling of beauty. The alternation of day and night, the periodical return of the seasons of spring, summer, autumn, and winter, the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, and the mighty cycles or æons of eternity, all elevate the mind as we contemplate them.

(6.) The contemplation of the relations of *quantity* is an intellectual rather than an emotional exercise. But symmetry, balances and counterbalances, equipoises, compensations, and harmonies, all of which are quantitative, have always been supposed to have a place in the sentiment of the beautiful. They are always required, and are noticed in architecture. They enter, in the way I have described, as ideas to stir up feeling.

(7.) Is it not because we delight to follow the relations of *active property* that we feel such pleasure in the activity which everywhere falls under our eye? We delight to see the moving cloud, the waving foliage, the driving wind, the leaping stream, and to watch the restless ocean; we experience a higher emotion when we gaze, not only on activity, but on life, on the flying bird, the frisking lamb, the gamboling colt, the romping girl, the frolicksome boy.

(8.) There is greater difficulty in showing how *causation* raises any æsthetic feeling. Yet, surely, we are pleased when we can trace an effect to its cause and notice a cause producing its effect. There is an incipient feeling of beauty raised by ingenious machinery, in which we have a number of forces uniting to accomplish an end. But the æsthetic sentiment is apt to be swallowed up in the utilitarian, which is the stronger in our nature, that is, we contemplate the useful end secured by the engines. A like remark may be made in regard to final cause as discoverable everywhere in nature. There is a

feeling of beauty called forth as we notice a conspiracy of means to produce a good end: say nerves, muscles, and joints combining to enable us to move our arm in a variety of directions; or rays of light from the sun millions of miles away, and coats and humors of the eye and the sensitive retina, and the color cones, coöperating so that we see the objects of nature with their hues and tints. But as we examine these processes our thoughts are apt to be absorbed by them, and the æsthetic feeling fades into dimness.

SECTION IV.

THE IDEA RAISING THE ÆSTHETIC FEELING.

We are not to understand, from what has been said, that the sentiment of beauty consists in a pleasant sensation or in a perception of relations. These may constitute the root and stalk, but they are not the flower; rising out of the sensations and relations there must be a feeling. This feeling, if there be any truth in our analysis of emotions, must proceed from an idea. The question is, What is the idea?

There must, I think, be some perception of relations. But such a perception does not of itself call forth the emotion. Indeed, if we look merely to the relation, and dwell upon it, no feeling will come forth. Suppose, for instance, that we study the relations of quantity in arithmetic, and inquire into complex and recondite causes in philosophic speculation, the whole mental energy will be expended in the intellectual exercise and there will be no appreciation of beauty. In order to the feeling being raised there must, so it appears to me, be some idea of adaptation, harmony, or end, in short, of some mental quality, such as order or design. It is only when the perception of relations goes on to this that the æsthetic feeling

properly so called is evoked. If it stop short of this there may be pleasant impressions, profound thought, and high admiration, but these do not amount to a sense of beauty. It is when the relations are regarded as signs of some high quality of intelligence that the feeling is called forth; and the precise nature of the feeling is determined by the nature of the idea.

It might be difficult to specify all that this idea contemplates. It may be said, generally, that it is mind displayed in an infinite variety of ways. The more prominent manifestations have been mentioned and dwelt upon by profound thinkers, from Plato downwards, who discover in nature and in art symmetry, balancings, counterpoises, proportions, harmonies, beneficences. Ruskin, in his richly-colored though somewhat fanciful works, has discovered other forms, such as sacrifice, truth, power, life, obedience. The idea of these, not in their abstract shape, but in objects, raises emotions which differ and vary according to the objects contemplated, or rather the quality discerned in the objects.

It is of moment to notice one very important element commonly entering into the emotional idea. We are apt to clothe with personality and with feeling the inanimate objects in which we are interested. In consequence these objects gather round them the feelings — which we have described in the last chapter — directed to animate objects. The feelings arising from the contemplation of living beings, ourselves or others, are the first to arise in the mind, and they are almost always stronger than those evoked by things without life or feeling. But they will go on by association to attach themselves to objects in nature and in art which seem to show mental qualities, such as power, complacency, and beneficence. We are apt to personify such objects. We even

give them a sex: the stronger we think of and represent as a male, as a man, and the more delicate and tender as a female, a woman, and we call them he and she, as if they were human; thus most nations give the sun masculine, and the moon feminine qualities. We seem to believe momentarily that the objects must have life and feeling and intention. We feel as if they possess the power they display, and mean the good they confer. We come to regard nature as rejoicing or as grieving with us. We feel as if the stormy ocean were indignant and raving; as if the tempest were offended and howling at us; as if the sea birds were chiding at us; as if the odors were enjoying their own richness; and the fruits relishing their own sweetness; and the flowers gazing on their own forms and colors; and the woods resting in their solitudes; and the streams expressing their feelings in their leapings, and in their sighings. "They drop upon the pastures of the wilderness: and the little hills rejoice on every side. The pastures are clothed with flocks; the valleys also are covered over with corn; they shout for joy, they also sing."

We have thus got a starting-point for the sentiment. The mental activity is stirred up by the sensation and the correlations, and an idea of a high kind is produced, accompanied with emotion. This idea raises up other ideas according to the laws of association, especially by the high law of correlation, bringing in resemblances, contrasts, means and ends, causes and consequents, and many others, all connected with one another, and tending to raise up like feelings. This accounts for the train of images all of a sort which Alison brings into such prominence, and which swells the river by new streams ever flowing in.

There is, therefore, a truth in the doctrine that all

beauty arises from association. But it is not just the association of ideas spoken of by Hutcheson, Beattie, Alison, Jeffrey, and the Scottish school of metaphysicians. The idea raised by the correlations perceived is a very lofty idea, it is specially the Idea of Plato, of mind in objects, of intelligence or beneficence; and it is this idea, and not the train of images, that calls forth the true emotion of beauty. When this idea with its feeling has been evoked it will be followed by a whole train of thoughts and fancies, in the manner described by Alison, thus continuing and enhancing the emotive state, and, in fact, making it very complex, and often very intense.

There is a sense, then, in which it may be said that there are beautiful objects, and that there is beauty in the object: there is a proportion, harmony, or benignancy, and it is the business of science to discover what this is. But there is a sense in which the beauty is in the mind; for it is when these high qualities are perceived that the feeling is evoked. There is a sense in which the æsthetic taste is a derivative and a complex one, implying intellectual and emotive powers, and a process. There is a sense in which it is simple and original, for the idea is suggested spontaneously, and calls forth the feeling naturally in all men.

By this theory we can account for the sameness and yet diversities of æsthetic taste among mankind. There are faculties in all men which tend toward the production of a sense of beauty, a pleasure felt in certain sounds, shapes, and colors, the disposition to observe relations, and to discover mind in them, and an emotion ready to rise. These things give an æsthetic capacity to all men, and lead to a certain community of taste. But, on the other hand, each of these implied elements may differ in the case of different individuals. This arises from the

absence or presence of the various elements, and from their relative measure of strength. A man without a musical ear can have no relish for tunes, but may have a strong passion for colors. The man of dull capacity may not be able to discern the harmonies that enter into the higher forms of beauty in art and nature. The man of low moral tone may not be capable of forming elevating ideas. The man of heavy temperament may never rise to rapture on any subject. Then, different individuals have, fortunately, a taste for different objects. Some can enjoy beauty of art but not beauty of scenery. Some love flower painting but have no pleasure in gazing on historical paintings. Some discover a beauty in this man or that woman which others cannot discern. This difference of taste arises mainly from the relative strength of the elements which produce the sentiment, from the nature of the organism in some cases, and the aptitude to observe or not to observe certain relations, or to rise or not to rise to noble ideas.

The sense of beauty differs at different periods of the age of the individual, and of the race. The fact is, the mind requires to be educated up to the perception of the higher kinds of beauty. Mere physical beauty may be felt by all who have the appropriate bodily organ, by the child, the boor, the savage. But the recognition of nobler forms of loveliness implies intelligence and, possibly, a careful training. The child, the peasant, can enter thoroughly into the spirit of the simple Scotch, or Irish, or Negro melodies, but, while he may wonder at them, has no appreciation of the grand Italian and German oratorios. He may have a pleasure in looking on a rich plain or a grassy bank, but he is astonished when he hears persons raving so about mountain peaks or passes; for himself he would rather be safe on the level ground below.

SECTION V.

WHAT IS THE TRUE THEORY OF BEAUTY?

There are some agreements and many differences among those who have speculated on this subject. The sentiment is so delicate, is often so fugitive, arises in such different circumstances, and is so complex in its associations that it is difficult to determine its precise nature. Some hold that it is, or at least that at the basis of the whole there is, a simple, unresolvable feeling. Others argue that it differs so widely in different persons, ages, and nations that it must be derived from other principles, or be the result of circumstances. Let us combine the results that have been reached in the course of our observation and reflection, and see if they correspond and come up to our actual experience.

In certain cases our sensitive organism is affected, but in a way that indicates relations and harmonies which are perceived, often in an occult way, by the mind; such is the case with colors, sounds, forms. In other cases the order is noticed without there being any organic or extra-organic act or affection, say an order of unity with difference, or a concurrence of powers. Still, all this does not amount to beauty, or the emotion of beauty. But this prepares the way for an idea which calls forth the emotion. Spontaneously we discover the result of mind, of intelligence, of design, perhaps of benevolence, in these adapted relations. This idea raises up emotion, which constitutes the true æsthetic feeling.

Regarded in this light, the sentiment of beauty may vary infinitely by reason of the mixture of the elements. The smoke curling from the cottage, in the sweet vales, say, of county Wicklow or Kilkenny, in Ireland, deepens

the sentiment of quiet and peacefulness as we cherish the idea of happy dwellers within. The Scotch and Swiss lakes are seen to sleep so quietly in scenes of terror. The deep gorges in the fiords of Norway, and of the Saginaw in Canada, guarded so strongly on both sides, are relieved by the living streams in their bosoms. The awfulness of the cataract is often illuminated by the sheen and sparkle of the waters, which may be irradiated, as at Niagara and the Staubbach, by the rainbow on its spray, compared by Byron to love and madness. Often is there life communicated to a scene in nature, which would otherwise be hard or dull, by a tree, or a plant, or a little flower clinging to the rocks, or coming out of the crevices modestly to show its beauties and timidly to look for a brief season upon the day and the scene around it. These fleecy clouds lying on our hills and dales add to their loveliness as our day-dreams give a freshness to our dull habitual life. Scenes of terror are often softened by the leafy foliage in which they are embosomed. The beauties of the Rhine are greatly enhanced by the antiquated towers associated with adventure, and the vineyards on its banks. In all such cases the sentiment is intensified by the unexpectedness of the object, by the dissimilarity and contrast. In other cases all the objects conspire to produce one effect; the mountains in deep shadow, the steep precipice, the turreted rock may all be before us and in one view. The howling wind, the agitated wave, the ship driven helplessly, all enhance our idea of the power of these moving elements. It has to be added that there may be associations which completely counteract and suppress the æsthetic feeling. The man weighed down with earthly cares, or with sorrow, cannot appreciate beauty. Solomon tells us how vain it is to sing songs to a heavy heart.

SECTION VI.

INFLUENCE OF ASSOCIATION ON TASTE.

There is truth in the doctrine which resolves beauty into association of idea. Alison maintains that the sentiment of beauty is not "a simple but a complex emotion; that it involves in all cases the production of some simple, or the exercise of some moral, affection; and, secondly, the consequent excitement of a peculiar exercise of the imagination;" and that "the peculiar pleasure of the beautiful or sublime is only felt when these two effects are conjoined, and the complex emotions produced." It is thus that "the gay lustre of a morning in spring, or the mild radiance of a summer evening, the savage majesty of a wintry storm, or the wild magnificence of a tempestuous ocean give rise to a variety of images, and the sentiment of beauty is composed of the pleasures of emotion and the pleasures of imagination." There is truth in this theory, but it is not the whole truth. It accounts for so much of the mental phenomenon. It shows how the feeling is prolonged and intensified by the image after image that is raised up. But it does not seem to me to embrace the whole. It does not show very clearly how the feeling is started at first, nor how the images pursue a certain train, all fitted to call forth emotions of one character. We have to find something in the object to evoke the feeling, and to continue the images, all of a certain kind. This we find in the sensation in the case of music, color, and form, and in the perception of relations indicative of mind in all cases. We thus reach the idea which raises the feeling, and which calls up by association other ideas of a like kind to produce their special feelings, and thus carry on the mental affection indefinitely.

Every one knows that association may give an artificial beauty to objects. I knew a girl who was acquainted with only one lady of high rank, and as she was affected with palsy the girl learned to associate lady-like manners with shaking, and so indulged in it. An unpleasant association may overcome a very decided taste. I know that a powerful relish for a certain kind of food may be counteracted by its being painful in the digestion, so that the food is now regarded with aversion. It is often remarked that familiarity may remove the first impressions left by ugliness. People offensive to the bodily sense may come to be delighted in because of their amiable or noble qualities. It is the same with scenes of nature; a man's birth-place may have no beauty in itself, but his heart, if he have a heart, ever warms towards it.

In such associations we transfer our feelings to the objects.

“ Sweet bird ! thy bower is ever green,
 Thy sky is ever clear ;
 Thou hast no sorrow in thy song,
 No winter in thy year.”

Such would be *our* feelings in the bower ; we transfer them even to inanimate objects.

“ His very foot has music in 't
 As he comes up the stair.”

SECTION VII.

COMPLEXITY OF THE ÆSTHETIC AFFECTION.

Viewed in a wide sense the sentiment of beauty is a very complex one, embracing such elements as sensations, intellectual perceptions, ideas, memories, associations, feelings. There may be more or fewer of these in any æsthetic state. When they combine and concur the sentiment is a very powerful one, and the object is

regarded as very beautiful. Thus there are scenes in which every sensation is pleasant, balmy air, blue sky, lovely flowers, where we see power working in that water-fall and conspiring agents, and ideas of plenty and happiness suggested, as that river, rising in ruggedness, is seen running into fertile plains. There are paintings in which the coloring is rich, the scenes illustrative of highest character, and associated with great historical events. Such scenes and pictures draw all eyes, and attract all hearts, and are constantly visited by persons capable of the æsthetic sentiment.

Very frequently some of the elements only are in exercise, or some of them are strong, and others are weak. As the feeling is determined by the idea, and the idea gets its force from the appetite, to which it corresponds, the sentiment takes the special color of the ideas. It is the aim of some authors, and of some artists, to furnish a set of pictures, all which raise only one kind of idea, say of sorrow, or sympathy, as by Sterne, in his "Sentimental Journey," and Mackenzie, in his "Man of Feeling," and the emotion is often made very intense. But if it is not relieved in some way the mind is led, from the very stretching and tension to which it is subjected, to break away from it. Our most successful painters furnish some kind of escape from dismal or painful scenes, as Rembrandt, by the light being made to shine in, as he used to see when a boy, in his father's mill, or as others do, by introducing an innocent, smiling child, or a bright-eyed plant, into scenes of blood or terror. A judicious introduction of such relief is often the mark of a high artist. Shakespeare is true to nature when he places so near each other dignity and buffoonery, the king and the clown, crying and laughing, though I think he often so mingles them as to become grotesque.

In some cases the sensation, say of gorgeous color in a landscape or a painting, or of luscious sound in music, may overwhelm the more intellectual elements. Quite as frequently the intellectual exercise, the perception of relations, may be carried too far and rest in itself, and arrest the higher idea and feeling; it is thus that a critical spirit may lessen the enjoyment, and the connoisseur may have less pleasure than the common observer in looking at a work of art. On the other hand, new, and often higher, beauties may be discovered in a building, or a landscape, by a more careful inspection, which detects further harmonies. In some the idea of mental qualities bulks so largely that it fills the eye to the exclusion of everything else, and they gaze on order and on love. In others the feeling, say that raised by music, puts the whole soul in a state of excitement, and very much stops contemplation. In very many cases the train of association runs in so strong a current that it carries all before it.

SECTION VIII.

THE PICTURESQUE.

This is not the same as the beautiful. That bevy of young ladies standing on one of the promontories of the Antrim coast, or of the Isle of Skye, and breaking into raptures, and crying, "How lovely, how lovely!" that company of mercantile youths, who have reached the Tell Country, at the upper end of the Lake Lucerne, and are looking up to the horrid overhanging masses of rock and snow, and exclaim, "How beautiful, how beautiful!" have certainly not been instructed (in whatever else they may have been) in the science of taste. The peculiarity of such scenes does not consist in their beauty, which always soothes and softens the mind, but

in their being picturesque or sublime, and so rousing and stimulating it.

The picturesque may best be explained by describing it as picture-like. Everything that the mind can vividly picture is picturesque. The scenes which possess this quality are specially addressed to the phantasy or imagining power of the mind. They stand before us with a marked form or a vivid outline. The mass of objects on the earth are not of this exciting character. Just as the ground colors of nature are soft or neutral, so the earth's common scenes are irregular, or simply rounded in their outline. Yet here and there arise picture-like objects from the midst of them, to arrest the eye and print themselves on the fancy. It may be noticed that the grass and grain of the earth raise up their sharp points from the surface to catch our eye. A still larger proportion of objects above us, and standing between us and the sky, have a clear outline or vivid points. This is the case with the leaves, and the coma of trees, and with not a few rocks and mountains. Rising out from quieter scenes, they enliven, without exciting the mind, and tend to raise that earthward look of ours and direct it to heaven, to which they point.

The wide extending English lawn and the American prairie are very lovely, but are not picturesque, for they want rising points and sharp outlines. For the same cause the boundless forests of Germany and America, though they have a sort of sublimity, cannot be described as having the quality of which I am speaking. Mountains, such as we have in Ireland and Scotland, will become sublime merely by their huge bulk or towering height, but are not picturesque unless they be peaked, jagged, or precipitous. All that has a sharp point, or a sharp edge; all that has a ridge, or is rugged; all that

is steep or perpendicular, is especially fitted to leave its sharply defined image in the mind. The very Lombardy poplar helps to relieve the tame plain. The church-tower or spire fixes the whole village in the memory. The wind-mill, though not the most improved piece of machinery, and though the movements of its outstretched arms, as they forever pursue without overtaking each other, are somewhat awkward, is, notwithstanding, a most picturesque object as seen between us and the sky. The ship, with its pointed masts and its white sails stretched out to the breeze, makes the bay on which it sails look more lively and interesting. More imposing, there are the bold mountains which cleave the sky, and the sea-worn rocks which have faced a thousand storms and are as defiant as ever. How placid does the lake sleep in the midst of them, sheltered by their overhanging eminences and guarded by their turreted towers: heaven above looks down on it with a smile and is seen reflected from its bosom.

There are narratives, there are tales, there are poems, which may happily be characterized as picturesque. Of this description is the vivid account of the patriarchal life in the book of Genesis: we see, as it were, the persons and the scenes before us. Such, too, are the narratives of Herodotus, in which he makes the condition and the history of ancient Egypt and other Eastern countries stand so picture-like before us. In our own language we have many picturesque writers. Defoe makes every scene so lively that we feel as if we were looking upon it, and every incident so life-like that we feel as if we were mingling in it. Sir Walter Scott, too, sets before us his old castles and dungeon-keeps, his heroes and heroines, so graphically that we cannot help feeling as if we were spectators and actors in the scenes, and not mere listeners

to a tale conjured up by the imagination of the author. It may be observed of all such picturesque descriptions that they are extremely simple, both in manner and style; the authors make the persons and events stand out clearly and distinctly before us, like a statue upon a column seen between us and a bright sky.

SECTION IX.

THE LUDICROUS.

Hutcheson says that it is difficult to speak gravely of laughter, yet the gravest writers have discoursed of it and with amazing gravity. Aristotle, so fond of bringing all subjects within the grasp of his definitions, has defined it, with some truth but certainly not with the full truth, as "some error in truth or propriety, but at the same time neither painful nor pernicious." Cicero describes it as "that which without impropriety notes and exposes an impropriety," and "a sudden conversion into nothing of a long-raised and highly-wrought expectation." This definition may fitly apply to some kinds of wit, but certainly not to all. The same remark applies to the definition of Hobbes, who gives the ludicrous a very selfish origin, and makes it always imply pride, whereas wit and humor have often a very innocent and kindly origin. According to him "it is a sudden glory or a sense of eminency above others or our former selves." Upon the whole, I am best pleased with the definition given by Samuel Johnson in his "Life of Cowley:" "Wit, abstracted from its effects upon the hearer, may be more rigorously and philosophically considered as a kind of *discordia concors*, a combination of dissimilar images, or discovery of occult resemblances in things apparently unlike." It certainly often arises from the

discovery of some unexpected resemblance or relation between things in every other respect dissimilar. But it might be equally well defined as a *concordia discors*, and arises from the discovery of unseen differences in things which seem identical. A poor, weak man in rags falls into a ditch and we commiserate him and hasten to help him. A vain fool extravagantly dressed tumbles into the same ditch and we are amused and allow him to escape from the mire as best he can. In the former case there was no incongruity between the person and his plight, in the other case there is, and the sense of the ludicrous is awakened. Punning, which is not the highest kind of wit, consists in giving a word a new and unexpected application. Parody, as, for instance, that on the "Burial of Sir John Moore," entertains us because we are ever comparing the parody with the original piece and noting their incongruity. An incident which would in no way affect us in ordinary circumstances will often raise irrepressible laughter in solemn or sacred positions. A very small event occurring in a church will raise a titter, while the same occurrence happening outside would never be noticed. The only way of securing the return of composure in such cases is to allow the laugh to get its proper utterance and to return to our proper business immediately after. I have seen a minister and a thousand grave people greatly discomposed by a little bird coming into a church and hopping from pew to pew, and pew to pulpit, with a solemn beadle chasing it and ever failing to catch it; the same bird hopping outside would have raised no such laughter. It is owing to the circumstance that wit arises from the perception of incongruity that it is so easy to raise laughter by a familiar or low treatment of sacred subjects. All such wit has in it the essence of profanity, and should be

instantly restrained. Laughter is raised when a mighty cause produces a weak effect, when great pretension issues in utter failure, when loud boasting ends in a public humiliation. Kant speaks of the ridiculous being called forth by the sudden transformation of a tense expectation into nothing.

It may be doubted whether philosophers have succeeded in giving a thoroughly adequate definition of wit, but there is a preacher who once succeeded, in the pulpit, in giving a perfect description of it, though I do not see how he could have done so without exciting the laughter as well as the admiration of his congregation. The following, from one of Isaac Barrow's sermons, is, in respect both of thought and language, one of the most comprehensive passages in the English language: "First it may be demanded what the thing we speak of is, or what this facetiousness doth import. To which question I might reply as Democritus did to him who asked the definition of a man. 'T is that which we all see and know; any one better apprehends what it is by acquaintance than I can inform him by description. It is indeed a thing so versatile and multiform, appearing in so many shapes, so many postures, so many garbs, so variously apprehended by several eyes and judgments, that it seemeth no less hard to settle a clear and certain notion thereof than to make a portrait of Proteus, or to define the figure of the fleeting air. Sometimes it lieth in pat allusion to a known story, or in seasonable application of a trivial saying, or in forging an apposite tale; sometimes it playeth in words and phrases, taking advantage from the ambiguity of their sense, or the affinity of their sound; sometimes it is wrapped in a dress of humorous expression; sometimes it lurketh under an odd similitude; sometimes it is lodged in a sly question, in a smart

answer, in a quirkish reason, in a shrewd intimation, in cunningly diverting or cleverly retorting an objection; sometimes it is couched in a bold scheme of speech, in a tart irony, in a lusty hyperbole, in a startling metaphor, in a plausible reconciling of contradictions, or in acute nonsense; sometimes a scenical representation of persons or things, a counterfeit speech, a mimical look or gesture passeth for it; sometimes an affected simplicity, sometimes a presumptuous bluntness giveth it being; sometimes it riseth only from a lucky hitting upon what is strange, sometimes from a crafty wresting obvious matter to the purpose; often it consisteth in one knows not what, and springeth up one can hardly tell how. Its ways are unaccountable and inexplicable, being answerable to the numberless roving of fancy and windings of language. It is, in short, a manner of speaking out of the simple and plain way (such as reason teacheth and proveth things by), which, by a pretty surprising uncouthness in conceit or expression, doth affect and amuse the fancy, stirring in it some wonder, and breeding some delight thereto. It raiseth admiration, as signifying a nimble sagacity of apprehension, a special felicity of invention, a vivacity of spirit, and reach of wit more than vulgar; it seeming to argue a rare quickness of parts, that one can fetch in remote conceits applicable; a notable skill, that he can dexterously accommodate them to the purpose before him; together with a lively briskness of humor not apt to damp those sportful flashes of imagination."

Every one perceives that there is a difference between wit and humor. Can the difference be pointed out and expressed? I believe that it can. Both arise from perceived incongruities, but in the case of humor the incongruity has some relation to human character, whereas wit

may arise from incongruities in thought, in word, in action. In humor we find, or place, or conceive persons in ridiculous situations or attitudes. Humor, therefore, implies some appreciation of human feeling. Hence it is that humor, however strange it may seem, is very commonly associated with sympathy. It was remarked by Sir Walter Scott of Robert Burns, when he appeared in Edinburgh, that in his conversation there was a strange combination of pathos and humor. I am sure that these two often go together, humor and sympathy. The man who never laughs, or who cannot laugh heartily, I suspect is deficient in tenderness of heart, while he may be characterized by many virtues. Certain it is that in the writings of many of our great authors pathos and humor are found in the closest connection. I believe that the fountains of smiles and tears lie nearer each other than most people imagine.

“We have seen that the muscles which operate upon the mouth are distinguishable into two classes, — those which surround and control the lips, and those which oppose them, and draw the mouth widely open. The effect of a ludicrous idea is to relax the former, and to contract the latter; hence, by a lateral stretching of the mouth and a raising of the cheek to the lower eyelid, a smile is produced. The lips are, of all the features, the most susceptible of action, and the most direct index of the feelings. If the idea be exceedingly ridiculous, it is in vain that we endeavor to restrain this relaxation, and to compress the lips. The muscles concentring to the mouth prevail; they become more and more influenced; they retract the lips, and display the teeth. The cheeks are more powerfully drawn up, the eyes wrinkled, and the eye almost concealed. The lachrymal gland within the orbit is compressed by the pressure on the eyeball, and the eye is suffused with tears.” (Bell, *Essay* vi.) “During excessive laughter the whole body is often thrown backward and shakes, or is almost convulsed; the respiration is much disturbed; the head and face become gorged with blood, with the veins distended; and the orbicular muscles are spasmodically contracted in order to pro-

fect the eyes. Tears are freely shed. Hence, as formerly remarked, it is scarcely possible to point out any difference between the tear-stained face of a person after a paroxysm of excessive laughter and after a bitter crying fit. It is probably due to the close similarity of the spasmodic movements caused by these widely different emotions that hysteric patients alternately cry and laugh with violence, and that young children sometimes pass suddenly from the one to the other state." (Darwin, c. viii.) "When the angles of the mouth are depressed in grief the eyebrows are not elevated at the outer angles as in laughter. When a smile plays around the mouth, or the cheek is raised in laughter, the brows are not ruffled as in grief." (Bell, Essay vi.)

SECTION X.

THE SUBLIME.

Every one feels that the sentiment of the sublime differs from that of the beautiful. The one pleases and delights, the other overawes and yet elevates.

It seems to me that whatever tends to carry away the mind into the Infinite raises that idea and feeling which are called the sublime. The idea embraces two elements, or, rather, has two sides. First the infinite is conceived as something beyond our largest phantasm, that is, image, and beyond our widest concept or general notion. We exert our imaging and conceiving power to the utmost; but as we do so we are led to perceive that there is vastly more beyond. Whatever calls forth this exercise is sublime, that is, excites that special feeling which we have all experienced, and which we call sublime.

The feeling of sublimity is always called forth by whatever fills its imaging power and yet suggests something further, something greater and higher. A great height, such as a great mountain, Mont Blanc, Monte Rosa, Chimborazo, raises the idea, and with it the corresponding feeling. The discoveries of astronomy stir up the

emotion, because they carry the mind into the immeasurable depths of space while yet we feel that we are not at its verge. The discoveries of geology exalt the mind in much the same way, by the long vistas opened of ages of which we cannot detect the beginning. Every vast display of power calls forth the overawing sentiment; we notice agencies which are great, arguing a power which is greater. It is thus that we are moved by the howl of the tempest and the raging of the sea, both, it may be, producing terrible havoc, in the prostration of the trees of the forest or in the wreck of vessels. The roar of the water-fall, the musical crash of the avalanche, the muttering and the prolonged growl of the thunder, the sudden shaking of the stable ground when the earth quakes, all these fill our minds, in our endeavor to realize them, and raise apprehension of unknown effects to follow. The forked lightning raises the thought of a bolt shot by an almighty hand. Thick masses of cloud or of darkness may become sublime by suggesting depths which we cannot sound. The vault of heaven is always a grand object when serene; as we look into it we feel that we are looking into the boundless. A clear, bright space in the sky, whether in a natural scene or in a painting, is an outlet, by which the mind may go out into the limitless. We are exhilarated by the streaks of light in the morning sky, partly, no doubt, from the associated hope of the coming day, but still more because of the suggested region beyond, from which the luminary of day comes. I explain in much the same way the feeling of grandeur awakened by the sun setting in splendor in the evening sky, our souls go after him into the region to which he is going. In much the same way there is always a profound feeling of awe associated with the serious contemplation of the death of a fellow man; it is, if we view

it aright, the departure of a soul into an unending eternity.

There are still grander scenes presented in the moral world, raising the feeling of sublimity, because revealing an immense power and suggesting an immeasurable power. We are affected with a feeling of wonder and awe when we contemplate Abraham lifting the knife to slay his son, and the old Roman delivering his son to death because guilty of a crime; we think of, and yet cannot estimate, the strong moral purpose needed to overcome the natural affection which was burning all the while in the bosoms of the fathers. The commander burning his ships that he may have no retreat, tells of a will and a purpose which cannot be conquered. We feel overawed, and yet exalted, when we read of the Hollanders being ready to open the sluices which guard their country and let in the ocean to overflow it, and of the Russians setting fire to their capital, rather than have their liberties trampled on. Who can read the account in Plato's "Phædo" of the death of Socrates without saying, How grand, how sublime! and we do so because we would estimate, and yet cannot estimate, the grand purpose which enabled him to retain such composure amidst scenes so much fitted to agitate and to overwhelm. History discloses a yet more sublime scene in Jesus, patient and benignant under the fearful and mysterious load laid upon Him. "Socrates died as a hero, but Jesus Christ died as a God."

But there is a second element in infinity. It is such that nothing can be added to it, and nothing taken from it; in other words, incapable of augmentation or diminution. Under this aspect it is the Perfect. As an example we have "the law of the Lord, which is perfect." Kant's language has often been quoted, as to the two

things which impressed him with sublimity, the starry heavens and the law of God. If Kant had ever seen the ocean he would have added it to the others, because of its extending beyond our vision. But neither the starry heavens nor the expanded ocean present both aspects of infinity, which are combined in only one object, and that is God, all whose attributes are perfections, which as we attempt to compass them we are lost, because of the infinitude of Him who is "high throned above all height."

SECTION XI.

BEAUTY IN NATURAL OBJECTS.

Every object in nature, every man and woman, every scene, bare sand or stagnant marsh, is not to be regarded as beautiful. It is in the midst of the commonplace that interesting objects come forth to please us, here and there, and everywhere. Let us look at those natural scenes which are entitled to be regarded as beautiful, picturesque, or sublime.

In the grassy slope, in the rich plain waving with grain, there is first a pleasant sensation and then the idea is raised of plenty, of fertility, and of the comfort of living beings; and we are inclined to stand still, or sit down, and contemplate it, allowing the thoughts to flow on complacently. In river scenery the flowing of the stream, the sheen and sparkling of the waters, give the idea of action and of life. The picture may be greatly enlivened by the pellucidness of the water, by the purling and leaping of the streams, as in the hill country of Scotland and New England, or by retired bays and wooded islets in the great American rivers. In the broad stream or ocean bay, as, for instance, in the St. Lawrence, there is often a great beauty in the flitting lights and shadows, in the

beams lying visibly on the waters, and in the varying colors, silvern and golden, of the surface, and the whole rendered more picturesque by the white sail moving across it. The sky, when clear, and of its own blue color, is always lovely; it is a sheltering canopy over us. The clouds hang over our world like drapery, and interest us by their levity, by their movableness, by their varied shapes or colors, often splendidly in harmony, as dividing the beam between them. These same clouds may awe us as in thick masses they forebode tempests, crashing and destructive. As the sun sets there is often a pleasant glow, and the scene is associated in our minds with rest after labor, repose after a journey, and his retinue of clouds, so richly dressed, raises the thought of splendor and magnificence, and our soul goes after him when he sinks, as it goes after the dying Christian into the better world. In the quiet valley, especially when, as in Switzerland, it is defended by lofty mountains, the feeling is of rest, protection, security from danger, peace without, emblem of peace within. The bold, hard rock which has withstood the elements for a thousand years, and is as defiant as ever, is associated with endurance and power of resistance, like the man of strong moral purpose who has withstood the winds and waves of temptation and the attacks of foes. The scars upon its face, like those of the warrior received in battle, the water-worn channels, the torn detritus at its base, all go to raise the idea and deepen the feeling. The twisted structure shows what torture it has come through, and yet been preserved. The ravine is the evident result of some terrible disruption of nature, and looks like a mysterious hiding-place provided for a refuge. The precipice gives the idea of height unapproachable and the danger in falling into the depth below, from which, however, we are safe because of our position;

if we are not, the sublimity vanishes in the sense of fear. An inspiring interest is often awakened by the way being seemingly shut in by forbidding heights, which, however, open as we advance, and exciting our curiosity as to what is to be disclosed.

Beauty of Trees. A boy gets hold of a fir cone; he reckons it a prize and feels a pleasure in contemplating it. He cannot tell how it should interest him, but the scientific man should be able to say. He handles it and turns it round and round, and preserves it among his toys, and brings it out from time to time to gaze on it. The scientific observer may easily notice that around its surface are two sets of spiral whorls, one going to the right and the other to the left, each to carry the eye round the cone, and that they cross each other and produce regular rhomboidal figures, which differ in each species of plant. The boy does not observe all this, but he is impressed with the general regularity, and with the special forms, with the unity and variety, and with the proportions and harmony, and an incipient æsthetic feeling is started.

The order seen so easily and clearly in the fir cone also appears, though less obviously and with greater complexity, on the tree, and is meant to be noticed by full-grown boys. Every fir-tree, indeed every coniferous plant, tends to take a definite form, and that form is the same as that of its cone, that is, conical, with the branches lengthening till they produce a graceful swell and then shortening till they come to a point. The carefully observant eye will notice that the leaves go round the stem and the branches round the trunk, as the scales do round the cones, in two sets of spirals crossing each other. But in order to our being impressed with the beauty of the tree it is not necessary to notice all this scientifically, it is enough that we have a general perception of the harmony.

Coming now to the leafy trees, we will at once notice that every tree bears a leaf after its kind; and you cannot by any artifice make any tree bear a leaf of a different kind,—make an elm bear the leaf of an oak. All these have a beauty of some kind, a graceful curvature of outline, and a correspondence of side to side, even when the two sides are not alike, there being a counterpoise to the inequality. Then it can be shown that every tree is apt, if not interfered with, to take the form of its leaf. Thus some leaves have leaf stalks shorter or longer while others have none; and it will be found that the trees on which the first class grow have an unbranched trunk shorter or longer, whereas the others have none, but are bushy from the base. It can be shown that the angle at which the branches go off from the stems is the same as that at which the veins go off from the leaf, and that the curvilinear outline of the tree and of every branch is much the same as that of the leaf. I mention these things to show that there is an observable order in the shape and structure of every tree, in the arrangement of its branches and its contour, which at once impresses the observer, and calls forth an impression which deserves to be called æsthetic. A normally formed tree in winter covered with frostwork, and with the outline fully exposed, is felt by all to be a beautiful object.

Mountains. These, as we look up to them, elevate the mind as well as the eye. Some cannot gaze on a mountain top without an almost irrepressible ambition to ascend it. As we mount we are ever turning round to get glimpses of the scene below, and when we reach the summit we do not care to repress the inclination to shout. How interesting now to look round and behold the brotherhood of mountains and the multitudinous hills, each standing boldly in its place and eager to show its special

shape and maintain its position ! We are awed as we look down the precipices, and yet we feel all the while how stable these rocks on which we stand are, and how deep their foundations. We peer into the crevices wondering what is concealed in them, and penetrate the ravines not knowing what we may meet with. We follow the windings of the valleys as they sweep down, each one gathering a stream to form a river. How pleasant to notice the plains below, and the scattered dwellings, evidently with living men and women within them. The dwellers in mountain regions have a more vivid remembrance of their country than those who have been brought up in commonplace plains, think of it more frequently, and have a greater desire to return to it. The shepherds, such as those of ancient Judea and of Scotland, are often addicted to reflection. The hunters have a spirit of enterprise called forth by their employments. Mountain tops are felt to be places for adoration : God's law is fitly proclaimed there, and He comes down there to meet with the worshippers.

Water-falls. If you visit a water-fall do it leisurely that association of ideas may have full play. It is usually in a broken, wild scene, and we may let our thoughts run wild, as a boy let loose on a holiday excursion. We hear the roar of the falling water : let it guide us. The first view of the scene gives us the idea of a mysterious convulsion which has taken place, we know not how or when, but of which we see the effects indicating vast power. Let us approach the cataract from below that it may overawe us. But in surveying it minutely let us go at once to where it is rushing on to its destination, and let us observe it taking the leap so determinedly — as if it must take it, as if it took it with a purpose, and mark that as it does so it glories in its courage and

strength. We may then survey it from beneath. We see that it thrashes on the rock with a power which we cannot resist, and vainly try to estimate. Having performed its feat you observe how it calms itself in the pool it has formed, and then glides away so peacefully. You now look up and around. The scene is horrific, but it is relieved by scenes of beauty, by the spray sparkling in the sunshine, or gilded by the rainbow colors, and by these flowers and ferns getting nourishment in the crevices and furnishing drapery of exquisite beauty. We may now sit down, and we feel secure as we see the whole guarded by these turreted towers evidently set as battlements to defend it, and we allow our thoughts to run on, and as they do so fill the mind with ideas of power and feelings of wonder.

The Ocean as seen from the shore is characterized by restlessness; "it cannot rest." It is in perpetual motion, and casts forth as wrecks the objects that have intruded into its domain. As we sail upon it we are impressed with its immensity. At times it is the very image of rest and placidity. Yet we feel that it may awake at any time from its slumbers and raise its mountain waves to overwhelm, and show its yawning gulfs to swallow us. It has its beauties in the dark hue of its deep, and the cerulean of its shallow waters, in its crested foam and its spray. It has an infinite variety in its moods and in its expressions, as now it plays and smiles and laughs, and again is dark and sullen, angry and chafing. We are constrained to look upon it with a feeling of awe. The ideas it raises are of boundlessness and irresistible power, rousing the feeling of the sublime from the lowest depth of our nature.

The Human Frame. The highest style of beauty is to be found in man and woman. A beauty may be dis-

cerned in the forms of the human body, in its symmetry, its proportions, in its angles, and in its curves. There are tints and hues which are felt to be pleasant by the optic organism. But these are, after all, the lowest elements in the beauty of the human frame. There may be a grace in the attitude assumed, in the walk, and in the manner. But the highest æsthetic power is to be found in the Expression. This may be seen in the motion and action, as showing activity, life, and strength. But it is displayed most fully in the countenance, as indicating mind or disposition, as indicating force or resolution, or refinement, or intelligence, or fire, or spirit, or gentleness and love. We gaze on certain countenances with delight, and feel as if we could gaze on them forever. The beauty appreciated will depend on the mental association of the race, the country, or the individual. The beauty of the Negro or the Indian will not be regarded so favorably by the white man. There is truth in the idea of Sir Charles Bell, that the typical form of a race is the model beauty in the estimation of that race. In all cases the emotion is made more intense when the tender passion suffuses through the whole. In many cases there may be no inward disposition corresponding to the outward signs as we have interpreted them. "Fair but false" has been the complaint of lovers in all ages. Still we cannot thereby be rid of the association even though we know on reflection that there is no moral quality; we still look with admiring interest on that countenance which is so full of mirth, joyousness, quickness, love, or tenderness.

SECTION XII.

THE FINE ARTS.

Music has been already treated of.

Architecture. I am inclined to think that there may be some mathematical law of the vibrations producing an organic impression which rouses the intellect to notice in a vague way, in the first instance, and afterwards in a more precise way, the proportions of the building which are seen to indicate skill, design, purpose. The attention being called and intelligence awakened, a series and succession of proportions and adaptations and uses are discovered, calling forth appropriate feelings, and it may be accompanying associations, carried on as long as the building is under the view. As a negative condition it is necessary that there should not be presented in any part uselessness—which is folly, disproportion, unsymmetrical sides, unbalanced appendages, heavy parts unsustained, bulky columns which support nothing, weak foundations, overwhelming crushing roofs; for these would disturb the proper flow of the ideas and feelings. But then it is necessary that there should be positive excellences in skillful arrangements, and in ideas expressed in stone, elevating the mind to high contemplation. The elements of strength, massiveness, resistance, endurance, stability, may all have their place fittingly in architecture, by raising deep ideas, as may also shade and retreat and protection. But in other buildings we are more pleased to see lightness, airiness, pointedness, heavenwardness. Of a still higher order are those buildings which show us curves of great sweep, and go out as it were into infinity. In Grecian architecture the idea is solidity, shelter, covering, cool shade, with elegant proportions on

which we fondly gaze. In the Gothic cathedral it is sweep, avenues, like those of trees, towering sky-ward and with heavenly tendency. In the old English architecture it is home, peace, comfort, with life and variety and affection.

Sculpture. The essential idea is form and expression, of the man or woman if it be a copy, or of the thoughts and feelings of the personage represented if the figure be ideal, whether of contentment, placidity, curiosity, anxiety, of hope, joy, or love, or may be determination, eagerness, courage, ambition, jealousy, hatred, and revenge. These must be marked by the posture of the body, or they must beam or flash or scowl from the expression of the countenance. When there is a group, there must be a unity in the variety, a central form to which all eyes turn with approbation or disapprobation, with a common sentiment, but with diversities of character and aims.

Landscape Gardening. We now hate to see trees clipped into the forms of beasts or birds or any other artificial shape; we shrink from rectilinear Dutch walks hemmed in by hedges, we doubt even of Italian statues of mythological persons, as somehow not in their proper place (at least when winter comes they should be sheltered in a building); and we love to have curves and sweeps, and paths that may ever lead into something new, and glimpses of distant objects, and vistas that seem to have no end. There should be trees of various kinds and shapes, planted at a respectful distance from each other, and each showing its separate form and character. There should also be clumps of trees for shelter, and to show their leafage. In flower gardening we strive to have beds of varied forms, suggestive of fertility and invention, and flowers of harmonious colors growing along-

side of each, to quicken our sensitive power. But care must be taken in imitating the variety of nature to conceal the imitation; here as in poetry, *artis est celare artem*. In many modern gardens there are so many artifices in ingenious cut beds, and meaningless dells, that we turn away from the pretty conceits with a feeling of irrepressible contempt.

Landscape Painting. Here, the first thing is to have a verisimilitude of the actual or possible scene. We are offended when called to look on a sky which, though beautiful in itself, is unlike anything we have seen in nature. But the painting will not fulfill the highest ends unless it goes farther than mere imitation, and raises within us the same feelings as the landscape itself would do, whether of peace or power or grandeur, whether it be of plain or valley or river or ocean, of hopeful spring, of rich summer, of plenteous autumn, or stern winter. The grand aim of the artist should be, not so much to make an exact picture as to raise the very sentiments we should experience, were we in the very heart of the scene, say a desert in Arabia or Sahara, or a gorge in the Sierra Nevadas or Himalayas.

Historical Painting. Here, faithfulness to time, place, and person is essential to gain our confidence; and the absence of it causes distrust and makes our nature rebel. We cannot, and should not, tolerate a modern lady, or a Scotch or Swiss girl, made to appear in an ancient or cartoon scene, say in a Bible painting. There is always a special zest when the artist is in thorough sympathy with those whom he places before us, as we feel when gazing on the homely Scottish scenes of Sir David Wilkie, and which we do not feel when he sought to give us grander scenes, as Knox preaching before the Lords of the Congregation. But the grand aim of the painter of

character should be to give us expression, true to nature in the first instance, but also portraying the thoughts, impulses, and passions of men and women. He should carry those who view the painting into the very heart of the scenes he represents, and make them experience something of the feelings which should have passed through their breasts had they mingled in the scenes,—they all the while knowing that this is a representation, for it is only when they do so that the sentiment of admiration, and other æsthetic feelings, are called forth. The painter may have a nobler aspiration; he may aim at elevating our sentiments by the exhibition of great and noble character and deeds, and in doing so show himself the higher artist. There is a genuine portrayal of human nature in the paintings of low life, of drinking and sensuality and vulgar humor, by the Dutch painters; but surely there is something vastly higher shown in the pure virgin, the noble apostles, and the holy angels of Raphael and the great Italian painters. Each class of paintings raises a genuine æsthetic feeling; but surely there is something immeasurably higher in the latter than in the former.

CHAPTER IV.

CONTINUOUS EMOTIONS.

SECTION I.

AFFECTIONS AND PASSIONS.

DOWN to this point we have been looking at single emotions. But we cannot comprehend our nature till we view the feelings operating continuously or in combination. The continued emotions are called Affections and Passions.

In these first and farthest down there is an appetite, native or acquired, which abides and ever tends to act. This is of the nature of a lake with rivers flowing into it and out of it. How many streams join in the affection of a mother for her child or the passion of a gambler for play?

In the combination implied, association of ideas, prompted by the abiding appetite, always plays an important part, and collects a host of concomitants and consequences. When a man is in a passion, what a flight of thoughts, like that of wild beasts pursuing their prey, of the indignity that has been heaped upon him, of the loss he has sustained, of the injustice or meanness of the one who has perpetrated all this, and the necessity of resisting or resenting, or of punishing the offender. When we learn of a favorite project of ours being successful, what a fluttering like that of doves to their windows. What a quiver, full of keen instruments, of the greed of gain, of the determination not to be beaten, the craving

for excitement to drown reflection, in the power that is driving on the man, who is all the while conscious that he is doing wrong, to the gambling table with the hoards of money spread out upon it, and his competitors ready for the contest.

SECTION II.

EMOTIONS COMING UP IN GROUPS.

I have already noticed the fact that ideas become associated in clusters (p. 52). An idea may have become the attracting centre of a whole body of others, each of which is emotional. When that idea starts up the whole train comes with it. We often wonder to find some one breaking out into a burst of passion without any cause or occasion known to us. But if we were acquainted with the man's history we could account for the whole; the idea has gathered round it a whole body of feelings which come in with it, and it is thus ready as a spark to kindle a conflagration. There are emotional ideas which raise excitement as readily as substances covered with pitch take fire. We have had an unfortunate collision with a man, and when he suddenly comes in contact with us the pent-up feeling bursts out, as liquor does from a vessel when it is tapped. Or, he has offended us in one of our ruling passions, and henceforth when we think of him we have the memory of his acts of supposed ill-usage, and of our mortifications and disappointments. A disappointment or a triumph, a loss or a gain, a reproach, a compliment, a success, or a humiliation may thus have become glued to a place, or an event, which will introduce its concomitant, it may be inopportunately, and in spite of our efforts to prevent it. Some have anniversaries of fortunes or misfortunes, of marriages or of deaths, which bring with them crowded feel-

ings sweet as clusters of grapes, or agitated as waves struggling in a creek.

We are all liable to bursts of feeling, such as that which moves the breast of the mother as she comes upon a memorial of her departed son, say the prize won by him in his opening youth ere he was taken from her, or the sword which he wielded so bravely in the battle in which he was slain. Such are the thoughts, mirthful and melancholy, which rise up and chase each other like a flock of birds, as the engrossed man visits the scenes of childhood, from which he has been so long separated. Such is the mountain torrent which bursts out when the sailor's wife is told that she is a widow. There is the cataract, when a prize of honor, or power, or wealth, long looked for, goes to a rival; or when the merchant has suffered a loss which he knows must make him bankrupt. Thus are we liable not only to moments of feeling, but to moods, continuing for longer or shorter time, of hope or of fear, of joy or of sorrow.

Every one must have noticed persons who have been for hours in a state of cheerfulness or even hilarity, disposed to be pleased with everything, suddenly becoming silent, or morose, or cross-tempered, or contradictory, without a cause being discovered by a neighbor, or by the man himself. People say it is a change of temper, and so it is; but we must look deeper. It may so far proceed from a stomachic or some other organic derangement, but there is a deeper element. It proceeds from the intrusion of an idea with a gangrene of feelings, and this has given a new turn to the flow of thought which generates a mood which may continue for hours.

SECTION III.

TEMPERAMENT.

This is to a large extent organic, and implies nervous action. But mental action mingles. Many great men have been liable to fits of despondency, to moods of melancholy. Such men have commonly had some high or deep aim. This may be theoretical or it may be practical; it may be benevolent or it may be selfish; it may contemplate a present or remote good. One man would build up a large fortune, another a lasting reputation, another would climb a height of ambition. One has his mind filled with what is to live forever, another expects to make a great scientific discovery, a third is rearing a new system of philosophy. This one is to be a merchant who will trade with all quarters of the globe, this other is to be a great lawyer and sit on the bench of the supreme court, a third is to be a great statesman and determine the destinies of a country, that fourth is to be a brilliant orator to sway masses of men, and the fifth a gallant soldier and a mighty conqueror. But then things in this world do not always fall out according to the wishes and expectations even of the most far-sighted. Accidents will occur to stop them, and opposition will come from quarters from which aid was expected. Under such circumstances weak minds will be apt to give up the effort. Stronger spirits will persevere. But as they do so they may have their prostrations, occasional or periodical. Mohammed will have his fits and retire into a cave, not to abandon the project but to brood over it. In such a position the eager man feels like the eagle in its cage; like the prisoner in the dungeon beating upon the walls that restrain him, and anxious to break them.

Aristotle has remarked that men of genius are often of a melancholy temperament. We can understand this. They do not find their high ideal realised in the world, and they retire within themselves, or retreat to some shade,

“ Whose melancholy gloom accords with their soul’s sadness.”

In some cases of this description the cloud comes down lower and lower upon the mountain, and at last wraps the whole soul in thickest mist or dismal gloom. But when there is buoyancy, the man comes forth from his retreat to some great work, as David did from the cave of Adullam, as Luther did after his depression the night before he had to face the great emperor and the Diet of Worms. As one of the incongruities, but not contradictions, of human character, it often happens that the man under gloom is liable in the reaction to fits of merriment, which come out from him like electric sparks, to give a grim light in the darkness. It was thus that John Knox, that Oliver Cromwell, that Abraham Lincoln had their outbursts of levity in the midst of their habitual seriousness.

From much the same causes we find at times our depressed and melancholy men to be very kind, sympathetic, and benevolent. They may wear a downcast look, they may dwell in a gloomy atmosphere, they may rather repel the young and frighten the frivolous, but underneath the encrusting ice is a flowing stream which cannot be frozen. Their benevolence has so often been received with ingratitude, their attempts to do good have so often failed, that their look has become somewhat forbidding, but beyond and within there is a loving and generous heart.

SECTION IV.

TEMPER.

Our key opens other secrets of character. We can explain what is meant by temper. This may arise in part from bodily irritation, from a disordered alimentary canal or stomach. A diseased organism is sure to have seeds in it which breed ephemera. The attacks may individually be exceedingly small, but, like those of the gnat, may be exceedingly uncomfortable. The person may be under its influence without knowing it. Incipient disease in children is often detected by a restlessness of temper. The mother knows that her boy needs the visit of a doctor when he is fretful, and relief comes, and the spirit rises, when the irritating cause is removed. It is the same all our lives. The dyspeptic feels depressed and easily disturbed; the woman of bilious temperament and liable to nervous headaches is restless, and yet indisposed to action, and is apt to get angry when compelled to make exertion. Much of commonplace human happiness springs from the vital organs acting healthily, and encouraging a pleasant flow of spirits; and much of our wretchedness from the same organs, interrupted in their natural action. The uneasiness is partly pathological, but is greatly intensified by the interference with the pleasant flow of association. Your disagreeable, unpopular people are often those who have annoyances in their own frame, which make them as disagreeable to themselves as they are to others.

Temper springs fundamentally from disappointed appetences. It is most apt to be displayed by those who have come under the sway of a great many small attachments, ever liable to be ruffled; especially when they

cling round near objects, round their children, or personal ease, or aggrandizement, or social rank and status, or dress, or furniture, or equipage, all liable to be disturbed from day to day, or from hour to hour. The person is prepared to sit down to a pleasant meal, or enjoy a quiet hour with his family, or commit himself to rest at night, when an unexpected event breaks in upon him, like a burglar, to make him flee or fight. Or he has a favorite opinion, and some one contradicts him ; or he meets with opposition where he expected assistance ; or the exertions he makes and the favors he bestows are received with ingratitude, and the man is put into a state of irritation which makes him disagreeable to himself and all who come in contact with him. The temper once kindled will be apt to throw out sparks towards all who are near, towards children and servants and neighbors, towards all who come across the man, though they may have had no connection with the original disturbance.

“ But ever after the small violence done
Rankled in him, and ruffled all his heart
As the sharp wind that ruffles all day long
A little bitter pool about a stone
On the bare coast.”¹

Such is the experience when the appetences are numerous and small. The character is weak and may become contemptible. The energy is wasted in the heat of small molecular motion, or expresses itself in spitting sparks.

SECTION V.

PREPOSSESSIONS.

A strong affection creates a prepossession in favor of whatever promotes it. We have had pleasure in the presence of certain objects, they have gratified our tastes

¹ Tennyson's *Idylls of the King*.

and fallen in with our predilections, and associations gather around them ; and when they come before us we are prepared to welcome them, and at all times we think and expect favorably of them. We have a warm heart towards our birthplace, towards the scenes in which we have passed our younger years, and towards our home. The affectionate husband and wife will delight to visit the spot in which they spent their honeymoon. We are apt to delight in those who have a pleasant countenance, a genial temper, or a lively, a deferential, or a flattering manner. Some have a preference for those who have a frank or brusque address, or who are candid in their opinions, or have an honest way of expressing themselves. Others are rather drawn to those who are affectionate and tender in their feelings. All delight in the society of those for whom they have such predilections, do not willingly believe evil of them, and are inclined to copy them.

The father and mother are disposed to think favorably of the character of their sons and daughters, do not readily listen to an evil report of them, and will believe what they say when they would not credit the same tale told by a stranger. It is proverbial that love has a blinding influence, and the woman under its power trusts the vows of her lover who may thereby become her seducer. We willingly attend to the arguments urged in behalf of causes which seem to promote our pleasures or flatter our self-esteem. He is likely to be a favorite in private and in public, to be in fact the popular man (more so than a great and good man, who may rather excite envy, as interfering with our inordinate self-esteem), whose manner and style of address are such that those whom he meets go away better pleased with themselves. It is said that those who got a refusal from Charles II. of

England went away better pleased than were those who had their requests granted by his father, and no doubt this helped to make the one die in prosperity while the other perished on a scaffold. The flatterer gains his end by speaking to us of our real or imagined good qualities; but it may happen unfortunately, or rather I should say fortunately, that we come to discover that he pays the like compliments to others, and we turn away with disgust as from one who has been trying to deceive us. The courtier studies the weaknesses of those whose favor he would gain, and addresses himself to them, but may find that the caprices of the pampered man of power become in the end intolerable. That man is not likely to be a successful agent in a good cause who sends away those whom he would gain in a humbled and repining humor. The ardent man stimulates others because he imparts to them some of the magnetic power which is in himself. There is sure to be a terrible disappointment, and perhaps even a disposition towards revenge and retaliation, when those whom our imaginations have clothed with such excellent qualities, or whom we supposed to be our friends, are seen to be unworthy, or have turned out to be foes.

SECTION VI.

PREJUDICE.

It presupposes certain tendencies, convictions, affections, or purposes which have been thwarted, and then all that is associated with the disappointments raises malign feelings which often lead to unjustifiable conduct. There are scenes at which we have suffered a humiliation, or experienced a sorrow, and we ever afterwards avoid them. Or there are people who have knowingly or unknowingly, justly or unjustly, offended us; who

have made us see their superiority and our inferiority ; who have lowered us in our own estimation ; who have wounded us in a tender part ; who have crossed our favorite ends ; who have injured or maligned us, or beat us in the rivalries of trade or the competitions, social or literary, of life ; and henceforth we look askance upon them, are apt to feel uncomfortable in their presence, and to imagine them to be actuated by ugly motives towards us. This feeling is especially apt to rise in the breasts of those who have injured any one in his good name or estate ; they fear that he may take revenge and do them mischief. In these ways prejudice is excited against not only individuals, but classes, against trades, professions, grades of society, — the rich fearing the poor, and the poor envying the rich, — against political parties, religious sects, against races, white or colored, against states and nations — “ the Jews had no dealings with the Samaritans.”

This prejudice, wrong in itself, is sure to lead to evil conduct. These antipathies are one of the principal sources of quarrels, feuds, and wars ; men clothe their enemies with evil qualities, as Nero clothed the early Christians with the skins of wild beasts, or covered them with pitch, and then destroyed them. We see the feeling working in more common cases. We do not listen patiently to the arguments urged by those who, for any cause, say by their misconduct or our misapprehension of it, have given us offense. We become predisposed against causes which have injured our prospects. The publican is not likely to feel an interest in the cause of temperance, nor the protectionist in free trade, nor the licentious man in the correction of vice, nor the infidel in the defenses of religion, nor the calumniator in the recital of the excellent deeds of one whom he has reviled.

Herod readily granted the request of the damsel who danced before him, and her mother prompted her to ask the head of John the Baptist, who had audaciously declared that "it is not lawful for thee to have thy brother's wife." The perverse boy comes to detest the faithful teacher who has admonished him so often. Politicians are apt to speak against the party which hinders them in their schemes of patriotic or personal aggrandizement. Or, what is to be explained on much the same principles, they turn with a strong revulsion against the party which they have long favored, but which, as they think, has overlooked them, or kept them down, or ill-used them. We can thus explain the mistaken zeal, often the antipathies, of the convert or pervert.

SECTION VII.

FICKLENESS OF FEELING.

Every one must have come in contact with people who have feelings of a certain kind strong and lively, but who soon lose them and become apathetic, or fall under emotions of a different, perhaps of an opposite kind. To-day they seem to be full of affection for us, and load us with expressions of regard; to-morrow they are turned away from us, and meet us with opposition or enmity, and are perhaps lavishing their friendship on others, for whom they had no regard before. There are people of whom this chameleon liability to change of affection is characteristic. They will be found to be persons with no very decided or deep motive principle, and whose emotions are very much determined by outward circumstances. Commonly they are swayed by a number of not very strong appetences, taking the direction which external events working on an irrepressible nervous tem-

perament give them. At this present time they are deeply interested in some person or end, great or small; but the seed is sown in stony places, and, having no depth of earth, it speedily withers away. New circumstances appear, unexpected difficulties spring up, as they prosecute the cause; or the person beloved gives offense, and the interest is ready to collect round some other objects. Such people appear very inconsistent, and so they are, and they do not gain our permanent confidence; but they are, after all, acting consistently with their character, which goes by impulses and jerks, and not by steady principle.

SECTION VIII.

RULING PASSIONS.

The young are apt to live under the influence of a considerable number of lighter impulses, moving the spirit as the ocean is rippled into wavelets by zephyrs. Now it is affection to father, mother, sister, brother, companion; now it is some sense of duty; now it is a desire to win esteem and to dazzle; now it is a sheer love of activity and excitement, as in play, in leaping, and dancing. As they advance in years they become soberer, partly from the less lively flow of the animal spirits, but mainly from the streams being collected into a few formed and settled channels. The fountains and streamlets that originally start and feed our streams are beyond calculation in number, but as they flow they meet, and unite in great rivers. So the numberless impulses of youth settle into a few habitual modes of action. In middle age, the earning of one's bread, the cares of a household, the business of life, the common services and civilities due to neighbors and friends demand and engross the greater portion of the motive energy. In declining life, the

grave man and woman commonly centre their regards on a few ends which they pursue, having seen the vanity of many of those which captivated them in their younger years—though some of those which they cling to may turn out to be as unsatisfactory as those which they have abandoned.

Youth might be painted as with the question ever in their mouths, “Who will show us any good?” and you see them running to every spot where others are collected, and gathering round every fire of crackling wood that is kindled. But there are many exceptions to this general account. There are boys and girls who have sobriety in their character and manner from the beginning, either because they are governed by some serious principle or principles, or because they have no very strong passions. They are your boys with aged faces, which recommend them to grave seniors but keep them from being popular with their coevals, who prefer the lively, the gay, and the roystering. In like manner there are old men and women who retain their interest in occupations which enable them to retain their youthful character, and bring them into sympathy with children.

There are cases in which one passion is strong, or a few passions are strong, in themselves or relatively to others, and they claim and gain a governing potency, and reign without a rival, or with a rival which they keep down. It is the devotion of a boy to his play; or of a girl to her father—it may be in poverty, or in wretched health; or of a mother to her son—it may be helplessly invalid, or deformed; or of the merchant to his business, or of a farmer to his land, or of a physician to his profession, or of a scientist to his researches, or of a philosopher to his speculations, or of the painter, sculptor, or architect to his art, or of the patriot to his country,

or of the politician to his party, or of the successful soldier to military aggrandizement, or of the ecclesiastic to his church, or of the Christian to the glory of God. The passion, as a centre, aggregates a crowd of associations, and it moves on like a marshaled host, with the combined strength of the whole, bearing down the obstacles which oppose. Those thus impelled are often distinguished by their energy — for good or for evil, according to the nature of the affection. Among them are to be found your strong lovers and your good haters. They often accomplish ends, in heaping up wealth, in doing brilliant feats, in making scientific discoveries, which could not have been effected by men of equal intellectual ability, but without the concentrated energy. They strike out a path for themselves; like Lochinvar, they swim the river “where ford there is none.” The man with one clear line before him has much the same advantages as a railway carriage has over one on a common road, and he moves along with the determination of a steam train on the rails set for it. Sometimes the ruling power imparts a sublimity to things that are not grand in themselves; thus the love of the mother, as she forgets her personal safety in defending her children, makes the weak woman strong and heroic. In other cases, the strong ambition being attached to weak capacities makes the person ridiculous, as the ambition of Charles XII. of Sweden did. But when there is any corresponding intellectual power strong characters are produced, such as those of Alexander, Julius Cæsar, Cromwell, Napoleon, or belonging to a different order, Paul, or Knox, or Milton, or among females, as Semiramis, Cleopatra, Queen Elizabeth, and Catherine of Russia. These affections, like the great rivers of the world, the Nile, the Ganges, the Mississippi, the Amazon, drain vast regions and draw

their waters into one great stream, which moves along with irresistible power.

This ruling passion may become terrible in its power; carrying all before it like a swollen river with torturing eddies, sucking all things as into a whirlpool, or devouring all around like the conflagration of a city. Hidden it may be from the eye, but when an object strikes it or a spark is applied to it, it bursts forth into an explosion of passion like that of a powder magazine. In other cases the dynamic is compressed towards a point which it strikes like a bullet. Those impelled by this dominant power are commonly the men and women who have had the largest share in swaying the destinies of the world. When it is evil, or when it is exclusive and not restrained by other powers meant to limit it, it may work intolerable evil, wasting households and provinces and nations, and spreading rapine and misery. When it is a selfish passion it may wither or consume the natural affections, lead parents who are superstitious to make their children pass through sacrificial fires, and persons naturally kind-hearted to become relentless persecutors, and conquerors when resisted to order the murders of myriads of innocent women and children. On the other hand, when it is good, benevolence will flow from it as rays do from the sun, and scatter a beneficent influence over a wide region, whereby vices are restrained, means are provided for healing the sick, outcasts are reclaimed, and the poor have their wants supplied.

It has to be added that few are so deeply under the dominion of one passion as to prevent others from occasionally coming in and giving a so-called personality, a supposed incongruity or contradiction, to the character; as we have seen the miser doing a generous deed to a child or neighbor for whom he has taken a fancy, and

the thief giving his money to persons in distress, and the murderer saving the lives of individuals in whom he has become interested. These peculiarities act merely as the abutting rocks at the ledges of a river, raising a ruffling here and there, but allowing the stream all the while to flow on with uncontrollable power.

SECTION IX.

COMMUNITY OF FEELING.

It is a familiar fact that feeling is apt to be increased when it is shared by others. First, in forming his opinions a man is apt to be swayed by a number of considerations not altogether directed to his impartial judgment; in particular he may allow himself to believe and act simply as others do. Secondly, a common public sentiment has usually a common appetite producing a common belief and hope, kindling a common enthusiasm, and issuing in a common movement, which individuals join because they are heartily with it. It may spring from an evil which all feel ought to be remedied, from the sense of an oppression from which they would be delivered. Take such events as the Reformation in Europe, the rising against Charles I. in England, the French Revolution, and the Proclamation of Independence in America; in all of these there were universal abuses and sources of irritation. There were thus seeds sown ready to spring up simultaneously under the first fostering circumstances, as the grain does in spring. Thirdly, arguments and appeals, fitted to sway our judgments and interest our feelings, float in the very air. These, pressed upon us at all times by dear friends, by ministers of religion, by orators, by patriots, must produce an effect. In this way a common sentiment is cre-

ated. There are states of society in which "fears are in the way," and the very air is tremulous, and there is a terror as of overhanging plague or of pestilence. In this sense fear is infectious. There are others in which there is a stimulus given to all by the oxygenated atmosphere which they breathe. Every age has its prevailing faith, and its favored medicine for curing the ills of society or regenerating the world. Ordinary minds are sure to be sucked in by the current, and go willingly along with it. Only the men of independent thought and resolute will are able to resist the swelling torrent. The school-boy, who has to oppose the practices of a set of wicked companions, shows more bravery than the soldier on the battle-field. There may be as much courage shown in resisting a deluded democracy as in facing the scowl of a despot.

It is a fact that after popular opinion has run for a time in one way it is apt to be arrested, and to flow in a very different direction; and this in rural districts, in villages, in cities, in communities, in nations, in continents, in social circles and learned societies, in religious sects, in literature and the fine arts. A period of religious fervor or precisian morals is apt to be followed, as we see in the reign of Charles II. of England, by a time of indifference, or perhaps of infidelity, of scoffing and profanity, or profligate morality. On the other hand, an age of wild skepticism and licentiousness, as we see in the first French Revolution, brings back nations to religion or to superstition and a sober morality. A long reign of conservatism, in which every abuse is protected and every proposed change frowned down, is sure to generate an opposite force going on to reform, which, gathering to excess, bursts in a thunder-storm of political convulsion, which, in its turn, drives thinking men to

gather round the cause of order. The world thus moves on, like light and heat, by vibrations, and is kept from stagnation, like the ocean, by flows and ebbs.

CONCLUSION.

The emotions may well be carefully studied, for they constitute the main means of our happiness or our misery. They are not to be eradicated, but guided.

“ Yet why so harsh ? Why with remorseless knife
Home to the stem prune back each bough and bud ?
I thought the task of education was
To strengthen, not to crush, to train and feed
Each subject towards fulfillment of its nature,
According to the mind of God, revealed
In laws congenial with every kind
And character of man.”

The emotions are all good in themselves. They all tend to promote our own welfare or that of others. They attach us to the earth on which we dwell, and to our fellow-men, and make us feel our dependence on God.

But they do not contain in themselves any principle of control. So they may lead to evil as well as good. They are to be guided on the one hand by our intelligence, which tells us what things are, and on the other hand by our conscience, which announces what things ought to be. When so ruled they give a high elevation to our nature ; and as they have descended like the rains from the sky, so their breathings mount upwards to heaven, and to God.

THE CONSCIENCE.

THE CONSCIENCE.

CHAPTER I.

THERE IS SUCH A POWER.

THIS is acknowledged even by those—such as Herbert Spencer—who give a very erroneous account of its nature. Every man is conscious of operations passing in him which bear on acts which are called moral or immoral. He feels that he should do this and avoid that; to tell the truth and not to tell a lie; to protect the innocent and condemn the criminal. We have as clear knowledge, by the internal sense, of these mental acts as we have, by the senses, of bodies with their shapes and colors. We have as certain evidence of these moral or immoral qualities as we have of the intelligent properties, such as sensations, notions, beliefs, and judgments, which have passed under our view in the volume on the Cognitive Powers. A psychology looking to one of these kinds of mental action and overlooking the other would be palpably defective.

The power which perceives and reveals the various moral acts goes by different names, as it is viewed under different aspects. It is Conscience (*συνείδησις* in Greek, *conscientia* in Latin), inasmuch as it is joint knowledge looking at a deed and perceiving a moral quality in that deed. It is a Moral Sense, in that it discovers and looks

at a separate quality, as each of the senses does. It is Moral Reason, in that it contemplates moral excellence as having a reality in the nature of things. It is the Practical Reason, in that it relates to action.

It detects and contemplates with approval or disapproval a particular quality, that is, Moral Good, or Moral Evil, which differs, our consciousness being judge, from all other qualities, bodily or mental.

Some maintain that we get all our knowledge and ideas directly or indirectly from the senses. Locke held that we obtain them from two sources: from the external and internal senses, from sensation and reflection, or, as we prefer saying in the present day, from sense-perception and self-consciousness. It should be allowed, I think, that we thus gain our knowledge of actually existing individual objects. By the one we know this and that material object; by the other, self in its present state, and may thence rise by easy inference to the idea of other spiritual beings, such as our fellow-men and God. But here, in the morally good, we have an idea which cannot be had from either of these sources. By the moral sense we know more than we do by the senses, inner or outer. We see a man lifting his hand and striking his wife; all that the eye perceives are certain forms and movements. I have a higher knowledge when I discern and decide that this act is bad. As the external senses cannot give the idea, so neither can the internal consciousness disclose it till it is already there, and if there by a power to produce it. It is not the knowledge of an individual new thing, such as a man or a tree, but a quality of things previously known, of mental acts, of a quality, as we shall see, of voluntary acts.

The voluntary act at which the conscience looks is made known directly or inferentially by consciousness,

and the conscience in reflecting on it declares it to be good or bad ; this is the joint action of the moral power. This is a new cognition ; it is the cognition of a quality, no doubt previously existing, but not, it may be previously perceived. And as there is a grand revelation when the infant gains a knowledge through the senses of sounds, colors, forms, resistances, and, as there is a still grander view disclosed, when it awakes to the consciousness of thinking, feeling, loving, there is the grandest of all when we discover certain actions to be good and commendable. This knowledge, being recalled spontaneously or at pleasure, is an idea of the most elevated kind : it is the Good, to be distinguished from the True.

As it cannot be had from the senses, so neither can it be obtained from the common intellectual powers. Memory can recall the idea when once we have it, but cannot furnish it in the first instance. Imagination can multiply and diversify the ideas if only we once possess them, but cannot supply the original apprehension. Nor can the ideas of duty, merit, and demerit, proceed from those high intellectual powers which discover such relations as space, time, quantity, causation ; we might discern all these without being able to draw the distinction between excellence and wickedness. When we look on certain affections, such as love and pity, as good, and certain deeds, such as cruelty and deceit, as evil, we are in the exercise of a special power entitled to be called cognitive.

Some make conscience to be the product of circumstances acting on the susceptibility to pleasure and pain. According to the school of Hume and Mill, the idea of moral good is generated by association of ideas. In the system of Herbert Spencer it is ascribed to heredity. According to him it came forth somehow or other, no

one can tell how (the difficulty in the system is to get the germ), in a rudimentary form, and has gone down through the lower animals to man, and from one generation to another. I am not at this place to enter upon the wide discussion thus opened; it will come before us when we have first determined what the faculty now is in man. Here I content myself with showing that, however produced, there is in moral excellence a new and distinct idea, different from the idea given by the other inlets; different, for example, from extension, color, and resistance. As sensation cannot give it, so association cannot gender it by calling up sensations in varied combinations. There are qualities here not found in sensations; there is a sense of something we owe to others, to God, and to man, to individuals with whom we have personal relations, and to society. We are constrained to acknowledge that we owe reverence, love, and obedience to God, and that we ought to love one another, and seek to promote happiness and holiness as we have opportunity. There may be sensation and association, possibly even heredity, entering into the complex state. It is by sensation that we know pleasure and pain. By association we may connect pleasure and pain with certain acts. By heredity the gathered individual experiences may be handed down from father to son. But all this while the idea of moral good is as different from the ideas given by the senses or the mere intellect as the plant is from the stone, or the animal from the plant.

In seeking to establish by such considerations and arguments the reality of a distinct moral power, we are met by two opposite parties. First, there are those who take low views of man's nature, and represent him as having no faculties different in kind from those of the brute crea-

tures. These resolve moral judgments and feelings into selfishness, or utility, or sympathy. Conspiring with them in the means, though not in the end aimed at, are those who regard man as incapable of appreciating moral distinctions apart from revealed religion. In opposition to the former of these, I maintain that man has not only a principle which prompts him to seek his own happiness, but one which leads him to approve of the good and to follow it. In opposition to the second, I hold that as revealed truth implies an understanding to which it is addressed (it says, "I speak as unto wise men, judge ye what I say"), so it also presupposes a conscience to which it appeals (Rom. ii. 15), and its object is to enlighten, to quicken, and to rectify both the reason and the conscience. As having to meet these opponents, it will be necessary to lay down some positions as to what the moral faculty cannot do.

1. It is not by the decision of the moral power that an action considered in itself is made either virtuous or vicious. The conscience points to a law above itself, which determines what is good and what is evil. It is not the touch that makes the body which it grasps solid, nor is it the eye that creates the colored surface which it simply sees, and just as little does the conscience make an action good or bad; the morality exists whether the moral sense sees it or not, and the conscience is merely the organ by which the excellence or the depravity is made known to us. And as the eye may be diseased, so may the conscience become perverted. When the eye is diseased, an attempt should be made to rectify it; and when the conscience is blunted or deceived, there should be efforts made to purify its vision. But these attempts, in the one case as in the other, proceed upon the assumed existence of a native power which it is of moment to rec-

tify, because, without it, the corresponding object could not be properly apprehended.

2. The possession of a conscience does not make any man virtuous. A man is made good, not by distinguishing between good and evil, but by choosing the good and avoiding the evil; not by having a conscience, but by what is a different thing, by the obedience rendered to the conscience. This is a very obvious truth when it is stated, but it has been strangely overlooked by those who conclude that a man is virtuous because he is possessed of a moral power with its responsive feelings. These people do not reflect that the moral monitor with its avenging feelings is ready to condemn the possessor when he is without the affections and works in which virtue truly consists. There is no intelligent being so fallen that he does not possess the moral discernment; it may be sadly perverted, but there it is in its fundamental form; and this by the appointment of God, that it may so far punish him and enable him to measure the depth of his degradation.

3. The conscience may become perverted and the means of misleading us. It follows that a man may have a power of moral discernment, and yet be very wicked, because he does not attend to its intimations. It is a sad truth that this wickedness may react on the conscience, blunt its perceptions, and pervert its decisions. Under the influence of a deceitful will, it may become defiled and corrupted equally with the understanding, the emotions, or any other mental capacity. An apostle says of certain persons, "but their mind and conscience is defiled" (Titus i. 15). When the growl of the thunder is heard, the lightning may already have struck its victim; so it often happens that the warning of the conscience is not given till the sin has been committed.

CHAPTER II.

THE CONSCIENCE AS A COGNITIVE POWER.

OUR business in this work on Psychology is to find out and describe the way in which the conscience works, neither adding to nor subtracting from its operations. In doing so we are to fix on its properties, and bring them forth to view, specifying their peculiarities. We are not to determine beforehand, that is, before inquiry, what ought to be its mode of action; we are to inquire how it actually works. We are not to make it act in the same way as the other faculties; we are to allow it to proceed in its own proper method. We are not to insist on the power which looks at moral good operating in the same way as any other power, say, sense-perception, which looks at material objects; or consciousness, which looks at self; or memory, which recalls the past. We shall see, as we advance, that it looks to a special class of objects, to acts of the will, and that its function is to perceive the good and the evil in them.

“The positive attestation,” says Dr. Martineau (“Types of Ethical Theory,” Vol. II., p. 9), “of any faculty is to be held valid against doubts springing from the mere limitation and incompetency of another, as the ear is not qualified to contradict the eye, on the ground that the light is inaudible; neither is the perceptive power entitled to question the depositions of the moral, on the ground that the distinctions of right and wrong and the essence of binding authority cannot be conceived and expressed

in terms of the senses." "Each faculty is to be dictator in its own sphere, and no further : perception among the objects of sense, conscience as to the conditions of duty ; and for this plain reason, that neither has any jurisdiction or insight with regard to the realm of the other. Moral objects cannot be tasted, seen, or heard ; nor are sapid visible audible objects appreciated by the moral sense. And hence it will turn out that the contradictions alleged between the two separate faculties are only apparent ; the postulates will really be distinct and never meet ; the opposition will be merely negative, amounting not to a confutation but to simple absence of evidence."

It should be noticed that the moral sense, so called by Shaftesbury and Hutchison, as making known new objects, reveals a reality quite as much as the external and internal senses when they show extension in body and thought in mind. True, it is not the same kind of reality which is made known by these organs, but each kind has as much of reality as the other. The generosity of a friend who stood by us in trouble is as much a reality as the money he gave us ; and we prize the one more than the other, the inward sentiment being higher in itself. Avarice is quite as much an actuality as hardness ; liberality is as real a thing as the gold and silver which it dispenses. We should habituate ourselves to look beyond the things that are seen by the bodily eye to those which are perceived by the moral and spiritual discernment of our higher nature.

But what kind of reality is in the moral perception ? The answer is, What we know it to be by our native moral perception. We know what honesty is, what self-sacrifice is, what love is, what justice is. We also know what malice is, what envy is, what revenge is, what con-

cupiscence is. All mankind believe as firmly in the one kind of reality as in the other; in the malignity that raised the false story as in the story told, in the passion that fired the shot as in the shot that caused the murder.

When we say that conscience is a knowing power, it is to be understood that it appears in all the forms in which our other knowing powers, that is, the intellectual, manifest themselves. I hold that our intelligence begins with the knowledge of individual objects. But it spreads out in a variety of ways. It plays in fancy. It soars in imagination. It mounts to faith in the unseen in time and eternity. It asserts itself in judgment. The moral capacity takes like shapes. It begins with the perception of good and evil in ourselves. But it shoots out in various branches. Children have their ideas of right and wrong. They have their tales, such as the Babes in the Wood, of innocence and atrocity. The poet and the novelist deal with heroic deeds, with seductions and murders. The ancient Greek dramatists were fond of showing us the avenger pursuing crime with a penalty, following its victims to distant countries and going down from father to son. We all sympathize morally with Shakespeare's account of the feelings which moved like waves in the breast of Lady Macbeth after the murder of the king. In particular, the moral power may take two forms.

Moral Faiths. These are among the highest exercises of the mind. We delight to dwell on deeds of excellence: of purity, of courage, of self-sacrifice, of generosity, of godliness. As we gaze upon these ideals we admire them, our characters are moulded upon them, and we become assimilated to them. In like manner the righteous soul, vexed with unlawful deeds, condemns and abhors them, and acquires that hatred of sin which is an essential element in all holy character.

Moral Judgments. All the exercises of the moral power may assert themselves in this form. We are constantly passing judgments upon our own actions and those of others. Public opinion is constantly delivering its utterances on every great event that is happening.

CHAPTER III.

THE CONSCIENCE AS A MOTIVE POWER WITH EMOTIONS.

ALL men take this view of conscience. Some, such as Thomas Brown, make it a mere class of emotions overlooking the ideas in all emotions.

Some of the highest feelings of our nature are called forth by great and good actions, by charity, by compassion, by long suffering, by courage, by sacrifice, by heroism. Some of the most terrible of feelings are stirred up by criminality in thought or act. The emotion arises according to the idea that gives rise to it. Candid, honest conduct pursued habitually from day to day generates self-approving feelings, which may have nothing of self-righteousness in them. He who stands up manfully to oppose the wrong feels himself braced by the act. He who cherishes a constant kindness has as much enjoyment in his deeds as the recipient of his kindness can possibly have. High thoughts tend to enlarge and elevate the mind. A generous deed performed diffuses a glow through the breast of the doer. Prayer, as it ascends to heaven, tends to carry up the soul thither.

On the other hand, the deepest feelings may be called forth by sin. Low and debasing thoughts produce a constant dissatisfaction. Every dishonesty tends to produce reproaches. The cheat lives under a constant fear of being detected. Every act of violence is liable to be followed by a regurgitation of temper. Habitual transgression genders perpetual remorse. It is often felt that the blood of murder can never be washed out.

CHAPTER IV.

WHAT THE CONSCIENCE REVEALS.

Preliminary. It is a Perceiving Power. It notices in certain voluntary acts a moral quality as clearly as the eye observes colors in body, and as the consciousness discovers thinking and feeling in the mind. We perceive the quality first in ourselves and then in others. On reflecting on this deed of cowardice into which we fell, we pronounce it to be mean; and on that act of charity, we declare it to be noble. We are sure that there is excellence in this daughter, devoting herself to promote the comfort of her aged mother; we condemn the son who neglects the father, so kind to him in his younger years. We are as certain that there is duty in the resolution to resist evil, as there is solidity in that lead and gold.

I. *There is obligation implied in those acts which are perceived to be good or evil.* When I simply view that coin or that sword, this brilliant intellectual feat, or that artistic taste, I believe in the existence of the things and may be constrained to admire them, but I have no conviction that there is any duty devolving on me in consequence. But when the moral power looks at, and discovers that this coin would relieve a person in poverty; that this sword might defend an innocent man from danger, a conviction arises that I have something to do with them, and that I ought to use them to promote these good ends. In the very perception of a

morally good proposal, there is implied in it as an essential element that it is *δεόν*, that there is a duty, and there is an obligation to attend to it. On the other side, when a temptation to evil is laid before us, say to tell a lie, or indulge in forbidden pleasures, there is an obligation laid on us to resist it; and if we neglect to do so, we feel that we have done wrong and deserve punishment.

The following seems to be a correct account of the requirements which the conscience makes and the judgments it pronounces. I. It authoritatively demands that certain actions be done. II. That certain actions be not done. III. It declares that the performance of the first class is commendable, approvable, rewardable, and IV. That the omission of the first or commission of the second is wrong, condemnable, punishable. It thus appears that the conscience claims authority and demands obedience; it has its precepts and prohibitions. It should be noticed that the conscience proclaims not only the first and second, but the third and fourth of the judgments above enumerated; it declares that the omission of duty or the commission of sin is to be avoided. Hence the sense of guilt and the fear of impending judgments which sin brings with it sooner or later. This feeling of reproach as to the past, and of apprehension as to the future, is one of the characteristics of our nature, and he who overlooks it is losing sight of one of the striking properties of humanity.

II. *The Idea of Law is involved in Conscience.* In this respect the conscience is different from all the other powers, such as the memory, imagination, or reasoning. These, no doubt, do in a sense take the form of a law, inasmuch as they have a prescribed rule and act in a regular manner; for instance, association of ideas follows the laws of contiguity and correlation. But it is in a different and higher sense that the moral power in man

implies a law. It points to a law above itself which it is bound to obey. Nay, it takes to itself the form of a law. "They who have no law (no written law) are a law unto themselves which show the work of the law written in their hearts" (Rom. ii. 15). It is a law not in the same sense as gravitation is a law, chemical affinity, or the law of resemblance in association of ideas; but as the edicts of a government, the commands of a father, of a master, or of God: there is something enjoined, required. The idea of this law, unchangeable and eternal, reaching over all intelligences, is one of the highest which the mind of man can attain. It involves right, title, claim. It implies obedience and disobedience, merit and demerit, and genders the idea of reward and punishment as beyond mere happiness and misery, and as it is in fact deserved happiness and misery.

The idea of law seems, by a single logical step, to carry with it the idea of a lawgiver. Kant seems altogether right when he maintains that the law, which he describes truly and felicitously as the categorical imperative, justifies as a corollary the Being of God as a moral governor being always accompanied by the perception of design in the universe. Upon our recognizing the living God as governor, the conscience announces that we are responsible to Him, "so then every one must give account of himself to God." But if we are to render an account there must be a day of reckoning in this life or the life to come. He who hath appointed the law so authoritatively, and proclaimed it so emphatically, must needs inquire whether it has or has not been obeyed; in other words, must be a judge. But this work is not fully discharged in this present state of things, and therefore we look for another. There are times, indeed, when God seems to set up a judgment on earth, and calls men

before it. There are examples ever and anon of studiously concealed wickedness being brought to light and exposed, of the arm of violence being arrested when the blow was about to descend, and of the deceitful man being caught in the net which he laid for others. These cases, however, are not uniform, nor are they without palpable exceptions. They are confirmations of our moral decisions, but they do not come fully up to their demands which insist that what is partial here be at last universal. Our moral nature giving these intimations to the world at large seems to carry a special message to every man that he must appear before the judge. To the great body of mankind the conscience is the monitor which tells them of the world to come.

III. THE CONSCIENCE GIVES THE IDEA AND SENSE OF SIN. It gives these as clearly as the idea and sense of moral good. It approves of the good, but it also disapproves of the evil. It as certainly forbids the one as it commands the other. The law which commends the duty condemns the disobedience to it; putting and pressing the question, but not answering it: How are we to be delivered from it? I cannot close this paragraph without remarking how strange it is that our high academic moralists, as Chalmers used to call them, should discourse so eloquently about the beauty of moral excellence, without ever calling attention to the fact that man falls so far beneath it.

IV. THE CONSCIENCE IS NOT MERELY COÖRDINATE WITH THE OTHER POWERS; IT IS ABOVE THEM AS AN ARBITER AND A JUDGE. It would through the Will guide, restrain, and control the memory, imagination, judgment, and all other powers, proclaiming that it is superior to them and has authority over them, and deciding when they are to be curbed, and when they are to

be allowed full operation. It tells the memory when it should bring up the past; the imagination when it should be forbidden to enter malignant or unchaste regions; and the judgment that it should look at the whole facts before it comes to a decision. This is the great truth established by Bishop Butler, and constitutes the one excellence of English ethics.

V. It looks to acts of the will and decides upon them. This it does directly, and then through them it has influence on all our actions, in the mind and beyond it. In fact, it is the Practical Reason, by its motive power enlivened by feeling, prompting, curbing — as the rider does his horse — the habitual acts of the man and forming his character. But the will which thus falls under the conscience has a very wide jurisdiction, embracing more than is commonly allotted to. Its essence is *Choice*, and there is will of which the conscience judges in every act in which there is choice. Whatever it be that is in a man's power either to accept or reject, either to do or not do, is within the province of the Will. It embraces not only volition or the determination to act, but with concupiscence, attention, preference, all the volitional acts that sway the other exercises of the mind. All this will be unfolded when we come to speak of the Will as a department of the mind.

CHAPTER V.

THE CONSCIENCE IN ACTUAL EXERCISE.

THE office of the conscience is to show us what is good and what is evil, just as it is the design of the intellect to show us what is real and what is not real, what is true and what is false. Let us look at the forms which it takes and the way in which it works in the human heart. It is ever performing its functions in one way or other; but often in a very unsatisfactory manner, silent when it should speak, and speaking when it might be silent, mistaking the character of an action, and declaring good to be evil and evil good. Let us view it in its Corrupt and in its Rectified forms. In illustrating this subject it is of importance to bear in mind, that when we speak of the conscience doing this and that, we are not so to personify it as to make it a living agent like the soul itself. The conscience is nothing else than the mind directed to a particular class of objects, to voluntary acts; and in all its acts other powers of the mind may join with it.

1st. There may be a *Slumbering Conscience*. It does not perceive or feel the obligation of the good to which it should prompt us; and it does not discover the evil against which it should warn us; it is set as a watch dog, and does not sound the alarm. There can be a reason given for all this. It is somnolent, and does not wish to be disturbed, it says, "a little more sleep, a little more slumber, a little more folding of the hands in sleep."

The man does not wish to do that which is good, it requires such labor and self-sacrifice; he would rather not hear of it; he would rather not know of that poor relative or neighbor, or dependent, whom he might aid in difficulty. The thought of his omissions and commissions does not gratify his pride, and he would rather not be troubled with them. Persons of this temper may pass through life with a wonderful amount of contentment and self-complacency, practising the ordinary virtues of their family, or social or business circle, but with little or no reproach as to the neglect of higher duties; feeling, if not saying, We have not been cruel to our household or dishonest in our business, we have not been thieves or murderers, and so we are good: —

2d. *An Accusing Conscience.* This is apt to be felt in the first instance in slight restraints, as slight as the checks by which the rider guides his steed. But there is a more decisive struggle when the man is evidently bent on going out of his course, and the conscience has to issue its order, and when it is disobeyed it has to whip and lash. The feeling is, "I should not have done this;" it is one of regret and compunction, all arising from an accusation or charge being made. The effect of this warning is to startle and alarm, and if this is properly attended to it may lead to repentance, as now required by the conscience, and a resolution to avoid the deed for the future. But frequently the issue is different.

3d. There is an *Excusing Conscience.* In this we have not only the moral sense, but the heart or will raising up exculpatory "thoughts." So the Apostle (Rom. ii. 15) says, giving the whole complex powers: (1) that there is a law written in the heart; (2) that the conscience comes in with its joint witness; and (3) that the thoughts accuse or charge, or else excuse. To avoid the

accusing, the excusing begins and stirs up a nest of thoughts which would, by their contentions, distract the attention and ward off the blow. These internal discussions may take a variety of shapes. First an attempt may be made to overlook the deed, to drown the still small voice by louder noise, say, the bustle of business or the din of folly. But if this be impossible, if there has been manifest evil done, pain inflicted, chidings on the part of those we esteem or love, then these terrible assaults like the strong wind, and the internal struggles like the earthquake, and the convictions burning like the fire will so arouse the soul that it must attend to the voice which, if not so loud, is more penetrating than all its precursors, asking, "What hast thou done?" The effort will now be to palliate the offense, to plead extenuating circumstances, to set some supposed good done over against the sin, generally to cover the evil out of sight, to bury it beneath a load of earth. This can be accomplished by the "thoughts" the more easily and effectively, because the evil deed may have been of a concrete or complex character, and may be viewed under favorable aspects. This deceitful speech was to cover a friend; this profane word was to express our sense of ill usage; this rude word to rebuke an improper deed; this lust had love in it; this covetousness proposed to gain wealth for a good end. The thoughts in their natural action will thus construct a covering which may become as hard and impenetrable as that of the shellfish. The accusing will thus lead to excusing, the charge to the defense. Many seem to live all their days in this intermediate, disputed country, flitting from the one to the other, ever driven back from the reproach to the excuse, and the excuse allowing some new offense with its charge. Surely this is an unhappy position, exposed to

attacks on both sides; yet it is that of the great body of mankind, "the thoughts meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another." Out of this may come —

4th. *A Perverted Conscience.* In consequence of these conflicting thoughts, of these accusations and excuses, the conscience may become confused, uncertain in its decisions, and ever falling into error. In consequence of viewing things obliquely, the eye has got out of its proper place and can see nothing correctly. It may call that which is good evil and that which is evil good. Thus Paul could claim that he acted conscientiously, and yet he thought with himself that "he ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth;" and so he breathed out threatenings and slaughter and "made havoc of the church, entering into every house, and haling men and women, committed them to prison." The bitterest persecutors, religious and anti-religious, the inquisitors of Spain, and the bloody fanatics of the French Revolution, have in many cases been conscientious but with a terribly perverted conscience, looking to a very different law than that to which it should ever look, the royal law of love. I have noticed that those who have been trained in secret societies, collegiate or political, and in trades-unions, that priests, Jesuits, Thugs, Molly McGuires, have their sense of right and wrong so perverted that in the interests of the body with which they have identified themselves they will commit the most atrocious crimes, not only without compunction, but with an approving heart and with the plaudits of their associates. By such training and binding connections the conscience has got a twist, and has become crooked, and cannot be made straight by any human means. The same thing is seen in the excuses and defenses proffered by tradesmen, by business and professional men, for the

trickeries commonly practised. In all these cases some good end is contemplated by the mind and approved of by the conscience, the promotion of a great cause, of the church, or of a noble brotherhood of men, or of a high profession, or of the individual's own well-being, and other aspects of the deed are kept studiously out of view.

5th. *A Troubled Conscience.* This arises when there is a warfare without either side gaining the victory. It may have been with a severe conflict in which there has been a terrible charge on the part of the accuser, and a stout defense on the part of the excuser, ending in a drawn battle in which the opposing parties are left frowning on each other. It is apt to be continued in a guerrilla war with daily offenses and daily defenses. The soul which is the scene of such conflicts becomes wasted and sterile and produces no such fruit as it ought. Sometimes, especially after the commission of a great offense, say, a fit of drunkenness, this troubling becomes a fever with a high pulse, a constant restlessness and sleeplessness and struggle, which waste and do not strengthen. At these times the sins come back into the recollection as it were with a detective glaring and reproachful eyes. As they do so, they stir up a succession of feelings, accusations, compunctions, regrets as to the past and fears as to the future, which chase each other as wave does wave in an agitated ocean, but with constant crossings and crestings and foam.

6th. *A Blunted Conscience.* This is apt to be the enduring issue of a long contest with it. The heart being exasperated, and this being intolerable ("a wounded spirit who can bear?"), a strong determination is formed to cauterize it, and it is "seared as with a red-hot iron." It now loses all sensibility of touch and quickness of perception. The man does evil without knowing it, and when

he feels the reproach coming he has an opiate to soothe it. So after having one or two falls rough as a cataract, the stream of life passes sluggishly on to its termination in swamps and mud.

7th. *A Pacified Conscience.* At this point one of the most difficult of all questions in Ethics is started. How, when sin has been committed, is the conscience to be pacified? The conscience will insist, first, that there be repentance; secondly, that there be confession when a party has been offended; thirdly, that there be reformation; and fourthly, reparation where injury has been done. But is this enough? First, there is the difficulty of getting penitence and a change of conduct; for there is a strong disposition to continue in the sin and to justify it. Then it is often impossible to make reparation of any kind to the person injured, he may be beyond our reach, may, for instance, be dead; or the evil inflicted may have been moral: the person has been tempted to sin, and the sin is working its effects which the tempter is not able to counteract. But on the supposition that all this has been done, the question still presses itself: Is this sufficient? The natural conscience seems to say that it is not. For after committing a flagrant act, men have commonly been led by native impulse to look round for an expiation of some kind, to propose to give an offering, or perform a laborious service, or practice a painful abnegation. But after they have made the sacrifice, it does not follow that the conscience is appeased. On the contrary, after the most excruciating tortures have been submitted to, it seems still to frown like Sinai's top, and to leave its sentence upon us. People may say that in all this the conscience is perverted and has become the slave of superstition. But let those who advance this objection tell us plainly when the conscience should be satisfied, and let us know

what they, following the law of conscience, would say to the liar, the perjurer, the drunkard, the adulterer, the murderer. This is a question which the Ethical philosopher is bound to attempt to answer. As he does so, he may find and be obliged to acknowledge that he cannot give a reply satisfactory to reason, satisfactory to himself, and he may gather valuable lessons from his felt inability. The law requires love and obedience; the conscience, when the act is fairly presented to it, will condemn all selfish and malignant feeling, and all disobedience. But that law is evidently broken! what is to be done now? To repent, may be the reply. That repentance is the present duty, and that the conscience demands it, is admitted by all. But that past sin: is there any provision in that law which requires it to admit present repentance, even when genuine, as an atonement for past transgression? The sin as a violation of God's law remains; and the conscience seems to be clamoring for some expiation, and yet cannot, or at least does not, say what it would accept. In this state of uncertainty and fear all manner of expedients are resorted to, if possible, to allay the chidings of the accuser. First, gifts may be offered as a bribe to the God whose law has been broken. But these being of doubtful efficacy, privations and pains are resorted to, to appease offended powers and turn away wrath. Pilgrimages are undertaken; enjoyments in meats and drinks and meetings for mirth are denied. Stripes and other lacerations are inflicted, and fathers and mothers give the fruit of the body for the sin of the soul. Then whole holocausts of men, women, and children have been offered to enraged demons when nations are afraid of impending judgments.

To this point conscience, and natural ethics founded on it, carry us, and here they leave us in a land of shadows, doubts, and difficulties. It is when we are thus wander-

ing that the religion of Christ meets us, and tells us of a righteousness which fulfills the law, and of a suffering and death to make atonement. If these were offered by any other, the thought might start difficulties, but being presented by God, the lawgiver, governor, and judge, the doubts all disappear, and the conscience is satisfied in union with Him who delivers us from the power and dominion of sin. Millions have rejoiced in the glad tidings thus brought them. Surely all should feel grateful if they can hear of a way by which they may be delivered from the burden of past sin, to start on a life of new obedience.

8th. *A Purified Conscience.* In order to this, it is necessary that the conscience be first pacified, for without this it would still accuse, and there would be chafing and rebellion. But the inward monitor being trusted, there is peace and a preparation for purity. The moral sense being quickened discovers the evil at once, and shrinks from it. Having its vision purified, it perceives the good, approves and appreciates it, and acknowledges the obligation to attend to it. The conscience always looking to the law may become the regulator of the life, and may come to rule easily as well as effectively, for it has met and conquered opposition. Sinful pleasure ceases to be a temptation, it has lost its attractions. Habits and tendencies — the results of habits and new affections will concur to lead the man in the right way. It is thus that we are sure of certain men that they will not do a mean or dishonorable or malignant or profane act, and we can trust their word and confide in their acts. They may come to be and to do good naturally; that is, all the dispositions of their new nature tend in this way.

9th. *An Approving Conscience.* This may take the form of a self-righteous spirit, offensive to God and most

unbecoming on the part of one who has done evil. The truly good man is kept from this by a sense of demerit and that humility which is one of the foundation stones of his excellence. With this accompaniment self-approval may be an allowable, nay, a commendable frame of mind, and may exercise a sustaining, a cheering, and an elevating influence. Every right-minded man will be afraid to lose the approval of his conscience, for then he has nothing to fall back upon in the hour of trial, when foes attack and friends forsake him. It is one of the main encouragements to a spirit of independence. The laboring man is borne up by it when he goes through his daily toil, determined to flatter no one, and to owe no man anything.

“ And looks the whole world in the face,
For he owes not any man.”

It is proverbial that an evil conscience makes a man a coward, for he does not know when some one may charge him with his sin, which he must either confess to his humiliation or deny with a lie, and he feels that he has no inward strength to fall back upon. On the other hand, a good conscience gives a man courage to resist the evil when it is coming in like a flood, and to stand by a good cause when friends, companions, the whole world may be against him. It is especially comforting and sustaining when a man is falsely accused and multitudes are believing the charge. It has in thousands of cases strengthened the martyr to die not only in patience, but in triumph.

CHAPTER VI.

DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH OF THE CONSCIENCE.

THE vital, the burning, philosophical question of the present day relates to the development of the conscience. It divides itself into two. Is the conscience developed? If it be so, does this interfere with its authority?

I. Is the conscience developed? If so, out of what? Out of the original elements, whatever they be, of which matter is composed? Out of atoms or molecules, or out of centres of mechanical power, or out of monads (of Leibnitz)? There is really no evidence of any of these being able to produce conscience. I suppose it may be assumed that a cause cannot communicate what it has not. There is no proof that a pound weight can balance a hundred pounds, that a mechanical impulse can produce life, that a mass of matter, say of clay or ice or gold, can produce a thought or a sentiment. I presume there is no moral power in the original atom or molecule or force centre, and I do not see how it ever can give what it has not itself got. They tell us that it comes in somehow, they cannot tell how, by the combination of the original powers, and goes down by heredity. It may be allowed that heredity might hand it down if it once had it. But if it has not got it, it cannot transmit it. Observation gives us no instance of a combination of material particles being able to produce the judgment and the sentiment which discerns between good and evil, which tells us that it is wrong to tell a lie. On the other

hand, it may be allowed that if once we had a germ of moral perception and discernment it might be propagated. Nobody imagines that material particles could spring up of themselves, but, being created, they can work in certain ways by the powers they possess. Darwin demands three or four germs created by God before he can account for the development of animals. We continually observe a weak infant bodily and intellectually growing up into a strong man. So, if we once had conscience as a germ, we might conceive it growing and expanding.

II. Supposing that there is development in conscience, the question arises, Is its authority, and in particular its supremacy, thereby dethroned? Ancients and moderns have been in the way of appealing to its decisions as infallible. It is now urged that it is the product of circumstances, and that its decisions are different in different positions.

As to whether development interferes with the authority of conscience, this depends on the nature of the development. If the evolution is fortuitous or fatal, we might not be entitled to argue that the product carries with it any weight. Thus circumstances generate prepossessions and prejudices, the prejudices of individuals and classes, of soldiers, of tradesmen, of lawyers, which, so far from being justifiable, are to be condemned. So it might be with a conscience developed out of positions and occurrences. Hereditary beliefs, so far from being always right, are often wicked and degrading,—such are the superstitions of the heathen, and family, tribal, and national hatreds. There are cases in which conscience seems to sanction weak and injurious customs, such as the abstaining from foods which are nutritious, and requires us to make harsh and unreasonable services in

the lacerating of the body, or in carrying on destructive wars against nations and creeds.

But there are cases in which there may be development and yet authority. We must here presuppose that the conscience does now claim authority. It declares that we ought to love God and love our neighbor. This sense of ought and obligation may have been handed down from one generation to another. This fact surely cannot render its claims invalid.

It is acknowledged by Professor Huxley that development does not interfere with the argument from design in favor of the existence of God. Herbert Spencer shows that development in the geological ages makes for happiness by increasing the field of enjoyment as living creatures rise in the scale. And this certainly looks as if it were the act of a benevolent being. It can be shown that the evolution we have in nature contains evidence of adaptation of one thing to another, of purpose and ends in the promotion of the comforts of the animal. Sooner or later there will be a work written after the manner of Paley, exhibiting instances of teleology in the way in which the various organs of the body have been formed and made to fit into each other. All this proves that evolution is a law or work of God, quite as much so as gravitation or chemical affinity or vital assimilation is. Suppose, then, that, as the result of development, we have a conscience which points to a moral law, which is of the nature of a categorical imperative, enjoining this and forbidding that, and pointing to a God guaranteeing the whole: we must regard this law as authoritative and carrying with it the sanction of God. It is admitted, on the supposition that individual men were created by God with the law in their hearts, that this law has claims upon our obedience. But its claims

are not annulled when it is shown that conscience is the result of a long process, all under the control of God, and evidently tending towards the production not only of happiness, but of morality.

Put the further supposition that there has been in the development a germ of some kind there at the beginning or superimposed at a certain stage, we have now an hypothesis worthy of consideration and in no way interfering with the Divine authority of the moral power. That power has been there all along, and comes forth into action in certain circumstances, and is liable to be modified, to be strengthened or weakened, by the surroundings. Regarding God as producing the original germ, guiding and guarding the evolution of it, we may regard the conscience as the vicegerent of God, and speaking to us in the name of our Governor and Judge.

The question of the validity of the moral power is quite analogous to that of the validity of the intellectual power. It is quite certain, I think, that there is an evolution and a growth of intelligence. But this does not lead us to set aside or distrust our intelligence. The intelligence is a cognitive power, and it perceives things without and within us. It grows with our growth, and ever reveals more truth. The man knows more than the child, and the savan, the philosopher, and the theologian knows more than the uneducated man. This circumstance does not lead us to doubt of our understanding. Just as little should the growth of the moral power in man lead us to doubt of its authority. The two are on the same footing. If the one is to be trusted in its own field, that is, in determining what is true and what is false, so is the other to be trusted in discerning between good and evil. If the power of knowing the good is to be set aside, we must be prepared on the same ground to

abandon the mind's power of discovering truth, and we shall be obliged to drop into skepticism, or at least agnosticism.

The conscience grows as all living things do; but it grows from a germ. The faculties of the mind, like the properties of body, are all of the nature of tendencies. Sense-perception, for example, is such a tendency. It does not act till it is called forth, and it is called forth when material objects are presented it. It is much the same with other mental capacities. The fancy is a seed, but does not bud and blossom and bear its rich fruit unless it has knowledge and experience as its material and its nutriment. There are intellectual capacities in infants and in savages; but they need to be called forth and ripened by light and by heat directed towards them. It is the same with the moral power; it is in all men native and necessary; but it is a norm requiring to be evolved.

It grows as the oak grows. As the tree needs earth in which to root itself and air of which to breathe, so the conscience needs a seat in our mental nature, with a stimulus to make it germinate and expand. All along it is so far swayed by its surroundings. Its health will depend on the climate. When reared in a bare soil, it will be dwarfish. When exposed to cold and blighting, it will be stunted and gnarled. In a good soil and a healthy atmosphere, it will be upright and well-formed. In particular, it grows and spreads out with the intelligence which enables it clearly to apprehend facts and to discover the consequences. All this may be admitted, while we hold that the moral power could not have been produced without a native moral norm any more than a plant or animal could have been produced without a germ.

From this account it appears that the conscience is liable to be deceived and led astray. In particular, it may be swayed by the desires and wishes of the heart; in short, by the will. It is, as Butler so often calls it, a faculty of reflection, and does not perceive objects directly, as the external senses and the consciousness do. It is dependent so far on the representation given to it. If that be perverted, the judgment of conscience, right enough in regard to the representation, may be wrong as to the thing itself. On the supposition that the white thing we see in the wood is a ghost, we might very properly be alarmed; but we have no fear when we discover it to be a white sheet. If that idol is a god, as the man's ancestors told him, he does right to worship it; but as the Christian knows it is no god, he feels under no obligation to pay it any reverence. If this farm is mine, as the Irish peasant argues, I am justified in resisting all attempts to drive me from it. He sees this to be wrong only when he is convinced that the property belongs to his landlord. Parents made their children to pass through the fire to Moloch, because they thought it would pacify the god. A friend of mine was under the delusion that God required him to sacrifice the object that was dearest to him, and was about to proceed in consequence to put his wife to death; he had a correct enough moral perception, but was under the sway of a deranged understanding. Saul thought he ought to crush the rising Christian sect because he regarded them as apostates; and he changed his conduct when he saw that they were following the true faith. The Hindoo casts his female child into the Ganges, and the African exposes his mother to perish by a fountain, as being convinced that it is better they should thus die than be exposed to a life of hunger and privation. The Jesuit

reckons himself justified in deceiving the enemies of the Church, because of the great good which may thereby be accomplished.

But with all its defects and mistakes, the conscience is indestructible, quite as much so as the understanding is. In children and in savages, it has to occupy itself with very insignificant objects ; but still it is seen working, and it is capable of being developed by an increase of intelligence. Criminals have resisted it, and so blunted it, but at times it will deal its blows upon them with tremendous force. Deceived and silent as to certain deeds of wickedness, it will show itself alive and awake as to others. We have cases of robbers committing murder with little or no compunction, but greatly distressed by the neglect to perform certain superstitious rites which they regard as binding on them. On the other hand, there are men very honest in their transactions with one another, but who do not seem to be humbled or distressed by the neglect of the duties which they owe to God.

It seems to me that conscience is of the very nature, personality, and identity of the soul. Deprive any one of his power of discerning good and evil, of distinguishing between cruelty and benevolence, candor and deceit, purity and impurity, and you have so far stripped him of his humanity quite as much as if you had shorn him of the power of distinguishing between truth and error.

The question arises, What is the moral norm which, seated down in the depth of our nature, never changes ? It may be difficult to express this accurately, owing to the mixing up of other things with our moral judgments and sentiments. But we perceive that there are certain acts which call the moral discernment into exercise. Thus we approve of disinterested love, and regard the affection of a mother for her boy as a virtue. But there are cases

in which the mother shows her love to her son in ways which we disapprove, as when she indulges him in what is injurious, or shows an unjust preference of him over other boys. This shows that in moral good there is not only love, but a law regulating love. Love ruled by law thus seems to be the quality in intelligent beings commended by the conscience. And the opposite of this, a lawless love or selfishness or hatred, seems to be sin, which is a transgression of the law.

THE WILL, OR OPTATIVE
POWER.

THE WILL, OR OPTATIVE POWER.

CHAPTER I.

THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF WILL.

It is self-evident that there is such a power. We are conscious of it, in fact we know it,—we feel it working. It is different from all the other faculties of the mind. It has a power in itself. A tempting proposal is made to us: we may obtain a large fortune by telling a lie. Prior to any exercise of will in such a case, other powers must operate; we have to understand what is proposed. The wealth has spread out its allurements to the appetences, and the conscience may have declared that there is deceit and that it is evil. But we have now to decide whether we are or are not to tell the falsehood. We decide to follow the path of integrity, and we reject the proposal. There is now more than the understanding and the love of money and conscience. With all these we might, in our free will, have told the lie and got the possession. We might have accepted; but we have chosen to reject, and in doing so we have exercised will.

Let us ascertain what is involved. The essential element is CHOICE. Two courses are open to us, and we choose one rather than the other. But it is not necessary that there should be two courses or two objects. One only may be before us, and we adopt it. In all such cases, occurring every hour of our waking existence,

there is an act of a special, of a peculiar kind, different *in toto*, as the consciousness testifies, from the action of matter, different from the exercises of understanding, of the conscience, or the emotions.

As will takes the form of adoption, so it may also manifest itself in rejection; we scorn the proposal to tell a falsehood. Indeed, in all cases in which there are two or more ways before us, we exercise both choice and rejection; in choosing the one we virtually set aside the other, at least in comparison with the one preferred.

It is of special moment to distinguish the will from other principles of man's nature, particularly from the emotion with which it is often combined and with which it is apt to be confounded. We have shown that in all emotion there is excitement, with attachment or repugnance; we look with complacency or displacency on the object of which we have an idea. But in will there is something more, something more decisive: we accept the object or event, or we put it away from us. When we see a fine picture, we cannot but admire it: this is emotion. But we covet it, knowing it to belong to another, and we would appropriate it except for fear of exposure: then we have a wish regarding it, and it is evil.

Ethical writers, in order to save morality, have found it necessary to draw distinctions of some sort in regard to the will. They often distinguish between desire and volition, declaring that there is nothing good or evil in desire, while there may be in volition. A man, they say, may not be responsible for his desires, which may often be independent of his will and even contrary to it. He may be said to be praiseworthy or blameworthy when his desires come forth in acts. Now, without affirming that there is no such distinction, or that it is unimportant, I do not regard it as the essential one in the matter of

human responsibility. Good and evil do not consist primarily in outward deeds; they lie in the heart or will. There may be evil in all forms of covetousness, in envy and malice, even when they do not come forth into corresponding acts. "Whoso looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart." Our moral nature approves of this maxim. The correct ethical statement is, wherever choice enters, responsibility may be involved.

CHAPTER II.

VARIOUS FORMS OF VOLUNTARY ACTS.

FROM an early date distinctions of some kind were drawn as to the operations of the will. Thus Aristotle distinguishes, though not very clearly, between

Βούλησις, choice of ends.

Βουλῇ, choice of means.

Προαίρεσις, deliberate preference of things in our power.

The will appears at first as weak and infantile. It grows with the growth of mind, and specially of the intelligence and character. It is first in a sense instinctive; it may rise into attention, desire, wish; into volition, deliberate preference or rejection, obstinacy. It may be the mere passive wish that makes no effort. It may be the mere moving of the arm to ward off a pressing danger. It may become a purpose to gain far distant ends, to remove evil, to avoid temptation, to bear up in the midst of trouble, to contend with sin within and corruption around us. It may be settled into what is called a strong will, continued for years in the midst of obstacles, opposition, and suffering, and in the end succeeding or making shipwreck.

I. INSTINCTIVE OR SPONTANEOUS WILL, so called for want of a more explicit phrase. It is entitled to be regarded as will, for there is a succession of volitions, which, however, are so spontaneous in their nature that they can scarcely be said to have anything voluntary in them; there is certainly no thoughtful or deliberate

choice. The most important element is an instinctive one, stirring up an impulse which prompts to a momentary, voluntary act. It is thus the infant soon learns to cast off by its hand a fly, or some other offensive object, or to seize an object with a pleasing color. It is thus we hasten to ward off a blow, to prevent a fall. There is momentary will in every step we take in walking; otherwise our feet would not carry us to the point towards which we would wish to go. Our habitual acts come soon to be of the same nature as our instinctive ones (it is probable, indeed, that a large portion of our instinctive actions are the result of a continued *ἐξέτις*, or habit), and are raising up a series of immoral acts of will. I believe that vastly more than half our movements are thus impulsively voluntary, half instinctive and half intentional.

II. DESIRE. This is not necessarily voluntary. It may be a mere inclination for food, for rest, or for action to avoid pain or to catch pleasure. All our natural dispositions tend to raise up desires without any necessary interference of the will: such are the desire for society, for esteem, for fame, for power. These all instigate to action, which needs will to execute it, and then certainly the process becomes voluntary. Desire and volition thus join in our mind every waking hour of our existence.

In these instinctive acts, involuntary or voluntary, there is nothing either morally good or evil. They become reprehensible only when we do not keep them in due order; when we allow them to run to excess, or lead us into forbidden courses. When we direct them aright, when they are made to accomplish good ends, they become virtuous and commendable, and our desires may become holy and elevating.

III. ATTENTION, which is an act of the will. Here,

the mind is directed to certain objects before it, and as long as it fixes itself upon them, it detains them. These objects may be presented by any of the mental powers: by the senses, the memory, the reason, or any combination. Such fixed contemplation is necessary to our being able to form a clear and correct apprehension of any vast or complicated subject. When a number and variety of objects come before the mind simultaneously or in succession, they appear dim and scattered. When the eye is opened, it must in ordinary circumstances take in a number of them, with their varied forms, colors, and distances; but our apprehension of each of them is vague and confused. It is the same with the crowd of thoughts which troop into our minds when we consider some general subject; it is as when we are introduced to a large company, — it is only as we single out one after another of the individuals that our idea of the whole and of the parts becomes discriminating. When the attention is directed to any one object, it stands out distinctly from the others, and then, by the laws of association, a whole host of related objects gather around it, and we come the better to know its nature. Sir Isaac Newton has declared that, if in any point he excelled others, it was because he gave his attention exclusively to the topic he was studying. We have a similar testimony from Thomas Reid, who represents the Scotch school. Dr. Chalmers was fond of representing Attention as combining the intellectual and the moral; by fixing the mind, we can make the intellectual moral, and by neglecting to do so, we may make it immoral.

IV. REJECTION. What is presented is repelled. Sometimes this repulsion is altogether instinctive. It is merely turning away from a repulsive object, say in taste or smell, or when we change our position to avoid pain,

or drive away an annoyance. But it may become a very strong determination to oppose what is evil. It may have to resist the attractions of pleasure, the assaults of temptation, the tempests of passion, and desperate opposition. In this nature of ours, with its perverse tendencies, and in this world of ours, so full of evil, the resistance needed may require to be very determined and very prolonged. To be able to say No to plausible proposals is an essential power in all lofty character. A power of resistance may give great strength to the character, though if it is not judiciously guided it may become mere obstinacy. I read the imprecations of the Psalms as an expression of indignation against wickedness, which is an element in all holy character.

V. WISH. It is of moment to distinguish between our mere instinctive appetences, desires, and aversions on the one hand, and our acts of choice on the other hand. Wish is always an act of the will. By it we may select a thing, or at least choose out a thing; or we put it away from us. This may become a very powerful sentiment; we may muse upon an object, we may long for it, we may clasp it and cherish it. The aspirations of the heart may be among the grandest and most inspiring of our affections, elevating the soul from earth to heaven. Such breathings have made the Psalms so universally read by devout people. The soul longeth, even fainteth, to behold the beauty of the Lord.

VI. PREFERENCE. This is the *προαίρεσις* of Aristotle, regarded by him as an essential element in virtue. This makes all virtue voluntary, a doctrine which is true only when we make it embrace wish as well as positive decisions of the mind. In this higher form of Will we come to a positive and decided determination: we elect an object or a course of conduct, and in doing so we have

commonly to choose among a number of competing ways spreading out their allurements before us. Such an act decides the whole conduct for good or evil, and has commonly long influence, leading us promptly and peremptorily to stop our ears to the voice of the siren alluring us to evil, and it may be forming in the end the whole character, making it firm and stable. All such wishes and preferences are within the heart. But they come forth into action, in which case we have

VII. VOLITION. This is Will in action. Towards this point all its acts tend, and this is its consummation. The child sees a flower with a bright color and seizes it. The man perceives a more substantial object as he regards it; his eye is attracted by gold, capable of bringing so many enjoyments, and he proceeds to earn it, only, it may be, to find its pleasures as evanescent as the petals of the flower. This is simply a higher exercise of the same will power. Exercised from day to day under, it may be, strong native or acquired impulses, it produces the man of strong character.

VIII. A STRONG WILL. This is a somewhat loose but expressive phrase, denoting a disposition rather than an individual act. It is a continued resolution and determination prompted by a dominant passion, such as the love of glory or of power. It manifests itself in resistance to everything that opposes the man's favorite projects. It would bear down all obstacles that may come in its way; it is the special organ of destructiveness in ambitious men. It is as often found in weaker woman as in stronger man, leading her to devise innumerable means to accomplish her ends—to gain a lover, or to thwart a husband. It incites the youth to reach the greatest height in scholarship or in civil and military pursuits. As he climbs the mountain he may have to

mount rocks and cross ravines; but he will not stay till he reaches the summit to obtain the commanding view, or it may be to find himself in mist and cloud. A promontory which for a thousand years has defied wind and waves is a symbol of such a character.

CHAPTER III.

THE WILL ASSOCIATING ITSELF WITH OTHER MENTAL ACTS.

THE Will may be associated with every other mental faculty. And wherever it goes it may carry good or evil and consequent responsibility.

The Senses may be influenced by it. It is well known that there are inferences of the understanding mingling with many of our perceptions of external objects. In our mature life we feel as if we instinctively know the distances of objects as certainly as their shape and color. But it has been generally admitted ever since the days of Berkeley that the measurement of distance by the eye is an acquired and not an original endowment. It has been ascertained that the knowledge of distance by the ear is also an acquisition of experience. But in most cases there is need of more or less attention in order to the mind adding the acquired to its instinctive knowledge. Indeed, physiological research shows that there is need of a concurrence of the will in most of the healthy exercises of the senses. Without attention the whole impression on the mind is like the shadow of a passing cloud upon a lake, not ruffling the surface at the time, and speedily passing away. The objects before the eye in the room in which we are accustomed to sit, to work or to study, must in a sense be perceived by the eye, as must by the ear the ticking and striking of the clock, and the beating of the wind upon the window ; but how

dim and fleeting is the whole scene unless there be something to fix the mind upon the object! In sight there is need of a setting of the eye in order to distinct vision, and this is to some extent dependent on the will. Every one knows that in the use of the stereoscope the two images may not be blended into a solid till the mind has taken in the figure. The facile use and improvement of the senses depends to a large extent upon the attention to the objects. The sportsman will notice a hare or a wildfowl where the unpracticed eye sees only the bare ground with its herbage. The Indian will place his ear on the ground and discover signs of the approach of a hostile band many miles away, when the ordinary ear can hear no sounds whatever. In this way we account for the finer perception of the other senses when the person has been deprived of one of his senses. As the result of practice, the blind man has commonly a much more acute and accurate touch than others. There are authenticated cases of his being able to discern differences of colors by the touch, either by certain roughnesses on the surface or by the actinic or heat action of different colors.

We ascend a height and look abroad on an extended scene in a loose and dreamy mood of mind; how vague and imperfect is our apprehension of the whole! It is not till the attention is fixed on one part after another that the hills rise up to their proper height, and the plains extend into their full sweep, and the sea is distinguished from the land, and the cattle dot over the field, and the grain waves in luxuriance, and the wood shows its deep shade, and the village appears so cheerful, and the old tower looks as if it were set to guard the whole. Of a like nature is the influence of attention. On every perception it lends distinctness to the dim, individuality

to the general, and brings into clear light and exposes to the view what would otherwise have lain in the shadow of obscurity.

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS is equally swayed by attention. I believe that consciousness is a concomitant of all our intelligent acts, of our ideas, our feelings, our resolutions. But, as our thoughts and emotions flow on, we commonly pay little attention to them ; indeed, we are commonly so interested in the objects we think about that we pay little or no regard to what we think about them. In fact, it is because we are so concerned about the objects that the current of ideas flows on. But we can detain any state of mind and ascertain its nature, can determine whether it is a thought, a fancy, or a feeling. Consciousness when thus exercised may be called Reflection, in which the mind bends back and looks in upon itself and its actings. In detaining the thought it detains all that is associated with the thought, such as remembrances, judgments, imaginations, joys and sorrows, hopes and fears, elevations and humiliations, bright prospects and dark, which pursue each other like shadows and sunshine on the mountain side. The widow has her grief ever renewed and a sadness given to the countenance by her husband being called up and dwelt upon. The Christian has his character moulded by looking unto Jesus, the author and finisher of his faith, and beholding his glory as in a glass is changed into the same image.

THE REPRODUCTIVE POWERS are very much swayed by the will. Thus the mind has a power of —

Retention. This is very largely determined by the amount of energy we have bestowed on the thought. We seem to be conscious at the moment of everything that passes through the mind while it passes ; but then

it is apt to pass away forever unless it is stamped, as it were, on the soul by the force exerted upon it, more particularly by a resolution to detain it in order to examine it and to think about it. We can thus fix what we choose in the mind, in order to its being recalled when it pleases us, or possibly when it may be very inconvenient. For, alas! we may retain in this way that which is to trouble us, and which will insist on intruding, in spite of our efforts, to tempt or to torment us. By cherishing vain, proud, lustful, or malignant feelings, which should be instantly banished, we may be forming a corresponding character to abide with us through life. The wayward feelings and the prejudices which now carry us along at their pleasure are the result of a long train of voluntary associations which we have hugged and fondled, till now they refuse to depart when we command them. On the other hand, it is possible to lay up in this way a number of pleasant and profitable memories, which may ever be adding to our happiness and prompting us to what is good, and so help to train and discipline the mind and make the present determine the future.

THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS is to a large extent dependent on the energy bestowed on an idea, which energy commonly takes the form of Attention. There are laws of Association, which are called secondary by Thomas Brown; laws of Preference, by Hamilton. These determine, among a number of ideas which might come up according to the primary laws of contiguity and correlation, which shall come up at any given time. We have seen and conversed with, at one and the same time, four people in one room; next time I enter the room I think of one of them, but not of the others. The reason is, I had a long talk with him and became interested in him, and now he and the conversation come up afresh. Now

the main Secondary Law is that those ideas come up most frequently on which we have bestowed the largest amount of force of mind, and this may be intellect, feeling, or will. Thus, if we wish to give strength to an idea, we may secure this by thinking about it, and showing attention to it, and inviting it to visit us once and again. Such an idea will become the centre of a cluster gathered around it, and, as it comes up, will bring its companions with it. Each member will be associated with other thoughts or feelings with which it has been conjoined, or with which it has some correlation, and thus we can command a vast field of thought. It is thus that, when our mind is so trained we can, on sitting down to compose a paper, insure a great flow of observations, illustrations, arguments, all tending towards the point which we wish to reach. Thus the orator can command a long train of thoughts, phrases, fancies, flatteries, warnings, denunciations, all tending to persuade his audience to take a particular step.

MEMORY is powerfully swayed by the will from the causes already mentioned. Every student of philosophy knows the distinction as drawn by Aristotle between *μνήσις* and *ἀνάμνησις*, which may be translated Memory on the one hand, and Reminiscence or Recollection on the other. It consists essentially in this: that in the one there is only the spontaneous flow of the laws of association left to themselves, whereas in the other there is the interposition of the will; we seek out, we hunt for, to use an expression of Aristotle's, what we know that we want. In both there is only, after all, the operations of the laws of association; but in the one we allow the train to carry us whither it will; whereas in the other we detain present thought, and turn it round and round till it brings up that which we are in search of, or

drives away the unpleasant or evil thought which we would banish. By being constantly stimulated, guided, and restrained, the thoughts will become controlled and regulated, receiving what is profitable and rejecting what is deleterious.

THE IMAGINATION, like the trained horse, may be made to carry us fleetly to the point we would reach, and yet be thoroughly under control. Dugald Stewart accounts for the vagaries, the extravagances, the inconsistencies of our dreams by supposing that in them the stream of thought flows on uncontrolled, whereas we always restrain the wanderings of the fancy in our waking moments. Whatever may be thought of this theory, which I believe contains a truth, but not the whole truth, it is certain that we can control the imagination, as we govern the horse by whip and spur and bridle. Our imaginations, like our other mental operations, are very much determined by the force which has been thrown into the original ideas from which they are drawn. The painter, by fondly dwelling on natural scenes, or on striking historical incidents, can fill his mind with images which will come up of their own accord, and then he can shape them into the forms which he wishes them to take.

THE COMPARING, JUDGING, AND REASONING POWER. It is proverbial that the heart sways the head, that "the wish is father of the thought." This means that the will with its volitions and its wishes is apt to sway the intellect in its judgments and in its reasonings, which I may remark are just judgments, in which we compare two terms by means of a third. It is not difficult to account for this by the laws whose operations we have been tracing. In all judgment there is comparison of objects, two or more, of objects apprehended, of objects represented. Now the apprehension may be a misapprehen-

sion, the representation a misrepresentation, and the judgment pronounced will in consequence be a perverted one. It is at this point that the will interposes for good or for evil. It may bring the objects before the mind as they are, and present them in a clear light, and the judgment pronounced will in consequence be a sound one. Or, acting as an interested or passionate partisan, it exhibits an imperfect, a partial, an exaggerated or distorted case to the judge, who pronounces a wrong sentence. This I believe to be the main cause of the errors into which we fall; they spring not from the wrong judgments of the understanding, but from the prejudices of the heart, presenting things not as they are in themselves, but as we would like them to appear. Vague resemblances carelessly observed are regarded as identities. Inadequate analyses, imperfect estimates, specious analogies, and plausible hypothetical causes are suggested and mislead the judgment. On the other hand, a candid disposition and a truth-loving spirit are the best securities for reaching the truth in all matters, speculative and practical. Without these, the intellect will always be more or less blinded, inconsistent in its decisions and crooked in its walks. With these, it will sooner or later attain certainty and assurance in all matters bearing on our faith and our creed for this life and the life to come.

THE CONSCIENCE, of all the mental powers, is the one most likely to be swayed by the moral rudder. The rationale of this can be given. The conscience is a joint faculty, and in one of its potencies is a reflex power. Bishop Butler, bringing his moral theory into congruity with Locke's intellectual theory, called it "a faculty of reflection." It originates nothing, starts nothing, but simply looks in upon, and judges what is presented. But the deed may be presented in too favorable a light, or an

injuriously unfavorable light, probably under a flattering aspect so far as our own acts are concerned, and possibly under a depreciatory light as respects the deeds of others. It is thus we are to account for those perversions of conscience which have so puzzled ethical writers. They are to be ascribed not so much to the conscience as an arbiter as to the wishes of the heart which is bent on what gratifies selfishness or strong passion, and for this purpose furnishes false pictures. Very often the action of which we have to judge is a complex one, with intricate relations, and only those favoring a certain end are brought into view. A good line of action which we are not willing to perform is represented as leading to inconveniences, and we turn away from it. An evil course of conduct which we are bent on following is seen as leading to pleasure, and the moral monitor utters no admonition. Doubts may arise as to the soundness of our moral condition, but these being humbling and painful are driven away with all convenient speed. Hence the difficulty of getting a favorite sin condemned. Charge it at any one time or point, and it instantly takes the name and credit of some virtue to which it bears a partial resemblance. Cowardice says it is prudence, cunning claims to be wisdom, lust calls itself love.

From the general cause now referred to have proceeded, if I do not mistake, those irregularities and apparent inconsistencies in the decisions of conscience which so puzzled and confounded ethical and metaphysical inquirers. The approval of deceit when successful among the ancient Spartans, of the widow burning herself at the funeral pile of her husband in India, of the murder of female children in the South Sea islands, and of the exposure of the aged to starvation in some parts of Africa, all originated in false views of the heroism of the youth who

succeeds in compassing a difficult end, of the devotedness of the widow who declines living after her husband has died, of the helplessness of children and the old when there is no provision for their sustenance.

THE EMOTIONS. The analysis of the Emotions in this treatise shows how the will sways the feelings. At the basis of all emotion there is an idea of something appetible, of something to be desired or avoided. Now, by means of this idea, we can so far command our feelings. We can detain the idea that gratifies us, say by elevating us, or by flattering our vanity. By calling up something else we can banish what runs counter to our inclination, or lowers us in our own esteem. In one sense feeling is not under our command; it will flow out when it pleases and as it pleases. There are times when we feel our hearts to be cold as ice and hard as a rock, when we should expect and wish them to be full of life and love. Again, there are seasons when our emotions flow out in torrents, when we make the utmost efforts to restrain them. But still we can indirectly guide and directly suit ourselves to it. We may not be able to command compassion to flow at every time, or indeed at any time, but we can enter the house of mourning, and visit the widow and fatherless in their affliction, and our hearts, if hearts we have, will be moved and melted. We may be angry, and think we do right to be angry, with some one who we think has acted an unworthy part towards us, but when we find him in deep trouble our heart relents, and we hasten to his rescue.

CHAPTER IV.

THE WILL AS EXERCISED IN THE MORAL VIRTUES.

SOCRATES did not give the will a place in virtue, which he delighted to define as an act of wisdom foreseeing consequences. He represented vice as folly, and a favorite maxim with him was οὐδείς ἐκὼν κακός. Some think that vice enters as an element into the more complex account of virtue by Plato. But will, προαίρεσις, was first formally introduced into the definition of virtue by Aristotle.

It is acknowledged by all our higher ethical writers that in order to constitute a deed virtuous there must be more in it than merely a becoming outward act. In order to make an act truly good the motive must be good. The payment of a debt is not regarded as a virtuous act if it is done through mere selfishness or a fear of punishment. Courage, the old Roman *virtus*, is a good act when employed in defending what is recognized as a just cause, or to repel what is evil. We value a kind act when we feel that it proceeds from kindness, and not from hypocrisy. A just deed is commended when it is done because it is just. Temperance, that is the government of the lusts and passions, is a virtue when it is cultivated in order to avoid the evils of ungoverned licentiousness. Aristotle is right in giving voluntary preference an important place in all these cardinal virtues of the Greeks and Romans.

CHAPTER V.

WILL IN THE CHRISTIAN GRACES.

IF there be will in the heathen virtues, much more must there be so in the Christian graces. As the mind is capable of them, psychology should unfold them to the view, and this whether they be religious or irreligious.

Faith is opposed to sense; it is always in something not now before us, in something unseen. It may consist in the mere assent of the mind to a proposition, as when we believe that gravitation is a property of matter, or that the sun will rise to-morrow. Here there may be no exercise of will.

But there are faiths in which there is an exercise of wish or will. Faith is the phrase employed to designate the mind's acceptance of religious truth. In the Christian religion, faith is the grace by which we receive Christ and rest upon him. Even in religion there may be a faith which is merely speculative, as it is often called, to distinguish it from a living or a heart faith. Theologians have not always succeeded in drawing the distinction between this and a living faith. The difference, as it appears to me, consists essentially in the one being an assent of the understanding, whereas the other contains an additional act of will, a concurrence of the will. *True religious faith is therefore the consent of the will to the assent of the intellect.* It is always of the nature of trust or confidence, the phrases applied to it in the Old Testament Scriptures. With the Christian it

is faith or trust in the revelation which God has been pleased to make of his will in his works, but more fully in his Word; it is specially faith in Jesus Christ as set forth in the Word. This faith carries with it the power of the understanding and the will, both of the head and of the heart. As being an act of the will joined on to judgment, it carries with it a practical power. Such faith must always lead to works, and, if the faith is pure, to good works. It worketh, and worketh by love.

Repentance. Here there is an exercise of conscience, there is a sense of sin. We condemn certain affections which we have cherished and acts that we have performed, and we grieve over these. But there is vastly more in penitence than regrets. The essence of it is what the New Testament calls *μετάνοια*, a change of mind or intent. Hitherto we have been walking in one way, and now we turn and walk in another way; and in all this there is choice and a decision — a purpose of new obedience.

The same is true of all the other graces. In Christian *Hope* we look for things that we have chosen as being good. In *Patience* we submit to what God has been pleased to lay upon us; we acknowledge it to be good, and we fall in with it. In *Humility*, in *Poverty of Spirit*, we accept the lowly view which we have been led to take of ourselves, when we compare our character and conduct with the law of God. In *Meekness* we accord with the account of ourselves which God has given in his Word, and submit to the will and the dispensations of God.

CHAPTER VI.

THE WILL AS AN ELEMENT IN LOVE.

I HAVE referred to love in treating of emotion. But there is more in love, considered as a grace, than mere feeling. Love manifests itself in two forms.

The Love of Complacency. We delight in the object or person beloved. It is thus that the mother clasps her infant to her bosom; thus that the sister interests herself in every movement of her little brother; thus that the young man seeks the society of his companions, and is grieved when he is separated from them; thus that the father, saying little but feeling much, follows the career of his son as he contends in the rivalries of the world; thus that throughout our lives, our hearts, if hearts we have, cling round the tried friends of our youth; thus that the wife would leave this world with her last look on her husband; thus that the father would depart with his sons and his daughters around his couch. There is "a last look which love remembers:" that given, for instance, when the ship moves away with the dear friend on it, and when the soul leaves the earth to wing its way to heaven. Love looks out for the persons beloved. The mother speedily discovers her son in that crowd. The blacksmith

"Hears his daughter's voice
Singing in the village choir."

The Love of Benevolence. This is a higher form of love. In this we not only delight in the contemplation

and society of the persons beloved ; we wish well to them, we wish them all that is good. " Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them : for this is the law and the prophets." We will oblige them, if we can ; we will serve them, if in our power ; we watch for opportunities of promoting their welfare ; we are ready to make sacrifices for their good. This love is ready to flow forth towards relatives and friends, towards neighbors and companions, towards all with whom we come in contact ; it will go out towards the whole family of mankind. We are ready to increase their happiness, and in the highest exercises of the affection to raise them in the scale of being and to exalt them morally and spiritually.

Now, this second is the higher aspect of love ; the other belongs, in man, to a lower department of his nature. It is an exercise merely of emotional clinging, and may contain nothing virtuous or holy ; it may be merely like the attachment of a dog to its master. The love of benevolence is of a higher kind ; we wish to do good, we strive to do good to those whom we love. The one is like a genial heat in a closed apartment ; the other is like an open fire radiating heat on all around ; the one is like a lake reflecting heaven on its bosom ; the other is a fountain welling up and carrying with it a refreshing influence. It flows out in a great number and variety of forms : in compassion, in pity, in tenderness, in long-suffering and patience. " Charity suffereth long, and is kind ; charity envieth not ; charity vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up, doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not her own, is not easily provoked, thinketh no evil ; rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth ; beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things."

But it may be asked, How can this benevolence be exhibited by us towards God, who is independent of us, and needs not our aid? The answer is, We identify ourselves with Him, and strive to promote his glory and the causes in which He is interested. We make it our prayer: Thy kingdom come, Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven.

These two forms of love, while they may be distinguished, should never be separated. But in fact they have often been divorced, the one from the other. How often do men show the love of complacency without the love of benevolence? They delight in the society of, and they receive gratification from, persons whom they do not seek to benefit. They do worse: they injure those to whom they are attached, as the ivy is apt to destroy the tree which it embraces and adorns. They do so by indulging, by flattering, by tempting them. The doting mother spoils the child whom she so fondles. The seducer ruins the unhappy one whom he clasps in his foul embrace. There is a love that is not lovely. It is in fact a refined form of selfishness. In our gratification we lay hold of, and hug to our bosoms, objects which we only corrupt. I apprehend that much of human sinfulness consists in tearing asunder what should be kept united, in selfishly turning persons to our uses only to tempt and destroy them. It has often been observed that the worst things are the perversion of good things. Abused intellectual gifts make the dangerous villain. Abused sensibilities make the accomplished tempter. Abused affections gender the keenest of all miseries.

CHAPTER VII.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE WILL ON CHARACTER.

THE character of man depends on three different circumstances: on Heredity, on Surroundings, and on his Will.

1. Every one starts with certain mental tendencies. This used to be called his nature, which it certainly is; it is now traced to heredity as its cause. It has come down through father and mother from an ancestry. It is apt to appear in early childhood, and it runs on to old age. In many cases this inherited character is very marked. We discover that the person belongs to a certain race or a certain family, not only by his features, but still more clearly by his mental qualities; by his public or his craven spirit; by his prodigality or his penuriousness; by his courage, or by his cunning.

2. Most men are liable to be swayed by the circumstances in which they are placed. There are some who act merely as others act. Others have their shape given them, like pebbles on the shore, by the rough seas in which they have been rolled. But is every man's whole character determined solely by such agencies?

3. Man has a Will lying beneath and behind all these, ready to act at any time and to counteract and control them, even as the igneous matter in the bowels of the earth has consolidated, upturned, or lowered the orderly strata, and given their forms to our hills and vales, to our continents and islands.

The will should restrain the impulses which are inconvenient, which degrade their possessors and lead them into trouble and into sin. It may and should enter into a holy war with these, and check every actual appearance of them. This is the *temperantia* to which the Greeks and Romans attached so much importance; the restraining of the lusts and evil passions, and subjecting them to law. By watching and resisting these evil propensities they may not be eradicated, but they will be regulated; instead of being masters they will become servants, allowed to act only by permission of their superior.

But these restraints will produce only a negative character, hard as the case of a shellfish. The will may also cherish all that is good within, and getting good from without, especially from above, may seek out fields for the employment of the faculties and affections, and devote them to benevolent ends. I hold that in this way a man may form his own character, morally, with intents and ends and practical working. I believe that every one who sets himself earnestly to accomplish this may to a great extent succeed. True, there will be occasional failures when he forgets to be watchful, but the wise man will thereby come to know himself better, and be ready to avoid temptations, and lay on restraints at the proper time.

All this is perfectly consistent with family peculiarities, the influence of outward circumstances being allowed to remain. One does not like to see every man aiming to be the same as every other, or indeed as any other man. We are pleased to see tribal and household traits; to see a Frenchman act like a Frenchman, and a Scotchman as a Scotchman, and an American as an American; and to notice the effects of a man's training, and of the positions, favorable or difficult, in which he has been placed,

just as we like to see the healthy youth full of life, and the soldier not concealing the scars of the wounds he has received in battle. An outburst of nature always warms our heart towards the individual from whom it comes. But let the whole be subordinated to the control of a will guided by principle.

These personalities break up the uniformity, like that of Chinese society, produced by sameness of position and by heredity. They introduce into society a new and a fresh life. We have now persons who act not necessarily as others do, but who strike out new paths. Taking their own way, they walk with all who are going in the same direction; but if their road strikes off they will follow it, even though they should have to proceed alone. Such independent men furnish a wholesome element in society; like living streams flowing into the lake, they keep it from becoming a stagnant marsh. They supply pleasant heights scattered over what would otherwise be wearisome plains. These free wills constitute the only spontaneous generation in our world. They introduce not only new varieties, but new species, which enter into the struggle for existence and prevail, constituting the progressive power in development, and tending to raise our world upward to a higher plane.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE WILL HAS FREEDOM.

EVERY faculty of the mind has its own peculiarities, and it is the business of those who would make themselves acquainted with it not to judge of it by other powers, but to look at it as it is in itself and as it acts. The will, in particular, has properties which belong to no other mental operation. The actings of the other powers are undoubtedly regulated by the dominant law of cause and effect. But is it so with the exercises of the will? Are all our volitions the necessary result of antecedents without and within?

I am very unwilling to throw myself into this conflict of the ages. I do not profess to be able to clear up every difficulty, and to answer every objection. But I see certain truths to which I cling most resolutely.

First, there is a certain feeling, or rather conviction, attached to every voluntary act, but which is not attendant on the actings of any other powers. We express this by saying that we are free. We are free to go to the right side or to go to the left, in walking round a table. We are free to sit in the house or to go outside. We are free to receive or refuse a visitor. We are free to accept a gift offered or to decline it. We are free to take a bribe or to reject it. We are free to tell the truth or to tell a lie. In all these cases I know that while I have taken the one course I might have taken the other. It is not so with the exercise of the other powers. If a man is before

me in clear day, I cannot be made to believe that he is not there ; but we may, as we please, do him a kind or an unkind deed. We speak harshly to him ; but we are conscious that we might have spoken pleasantly. If I receive ten pounds, and again other ten pounds, I know that I have received twenty, and there is no choice left me ; but I know also that I may spend this money in paying my debts or on sinful pleasures, and here there are purpose and preference.

But is this choice of mine determined by causes acting above the will and independent of the will ? I reply that there is no proof that it is so. It is often said that the will is always swayed by motives ; in fact by the strongest motive. But the language is ambiguous. It may be a mere truism, that what sways the will does sway the will, for by my motive is simply meant what sways the will. Or it may mean what is not proven, what I believe not to be true. By motive may be meant a power or powers out of the will acting independently of it. I hold that in all motive there is a concurrence, or rather a consent of the will. Till this is given, there can scarcely be said to be a motive ; there is simply incentive or temptation. The man, it is said, was swayed by the love of money in doing a dishonest act, and it is affirmed that the love of money was the motive. But over many the love of money has no power, or no such power. The power is given to it as a motive by the will, by a long succession of acts, it may be creating an appetite, and, above all, by a present act, clinging to the money.

We must distinguish, in the motive, that which is independent of the will and that which has the concurrence of the will. For the former we are not responsible, always excepting so far as we may have produced it by

previous voluntary acts. But many of our acts, no longer voluntary, are the result of acquired habits formed by the will. A man has for years cherished malignity towards one who has offended him, and on meeting him is tempted to inflict a blow, which kills him. Now here there is causation, not only in the blow, but in the temper from which it proceeded. But the temper has been caused by repeated acts of the will. And for all this the person is responsible first and last. The blow may be the consummation and the worst act, but the others were bad in themselves, and specially in this that they led to the murder. The drunkenness fallen into unexpectedly at the social party is the visible sin, but it was the outcome of the tippling for months or years. He who sows the poisonous seed may be more criminal than he who eats the fruit.

The appointment whereby objects act according to their nature is the deed of God. So far as man does not join in with it he is not responsible; but so far as he consents and concurs he makes the deed his own. Whoever else may be to blame for it, he also is to blame. The drinks are intoxicating, according to a law of nature, but so far as he takes them he is chargeable for them and the consequences. When he consents to an evil deed, when he opposes a good proposal, when he rejects a truth, he makes the deed his own, and is accountable for it, and cannot roll his own blame on another, even though that other be also to blame.

So far all seems to me to be clear. Difficulties may be started as to the consistency of God's causation with man's freedom. But the clearing of these perplexities lies with the higher Metaphysics rather than with an Inductive Science, whose office it is to unfold facts.

CHAPTER IX.

THE WILL THE SEAT OF RESPONSIBILITY.

BY this I mean that man is responsible for his voluntary and for his voluntary acts exclusively. For instance, there is nothing either virtuous or vicious in the exercise of mere intelligence. I speak of mere intelligence, for, as we have seen, the voluntary power may associate itself with any one exercise of the intellectual powers for which, in that case, we are responsible. But speaking of understanding not exercised with will, but following the constitutional laws which God has planted in the mind, I cannot see that it is either virtuous or vicious. There is nothing morally commendable or the opposite in the operation of perception, of memory, or imagination, or the faculties which perceive resemblances, observe causes or other relations. That I see the trees bare in winter and covered with leaves in summer ; that I remember to-day what I saw yesterday ; that when I see a house burning I infer it must have been kindled, — in all this there is, there can be, nothing either of virtue or vice. This will, I think, be acknowledged by all. But I am inclined to go a step farther, and to hold that moral good and evil do not lie, at least directly and immediately, in the possession or operation of conscience or the flow of instinctive feeling. I observed, when treating of the conscience, that it is upon voluntary acts that it pronounces its judgments, declaring that they are good or that they are evil. Virtue and vice do not consist in the possession of a

conscience, but in that at which the conscience looks, and of which it approves or disapproves, in a holy or unholy will. It may be doubted whether a person possessed of mere emotion could, in any circumstances, be regarded as responsible. It is when the element of will, the optative, the freedom of choice, is working, that we declare man to be a responsible agent.

But in making will the seat of responsibility I give it a larger place than most philosophic and ethical writers do ; I make its essence to be choice or the opposite of choice, rejection ; and I believe that there is this element not merely in volition or the final determination to act, but in other steps which may never reach the length of outward acts. Under will I include not merely the volition or determination, but wishes, desires, and the opposite, voluntary aversions and antipathies. This gives the will a wide range, but not wider, I believe, than the place and consequent power which it has in the human constitution. Accountability is as wide as the will, and embraces all tendencies to good or evil created by voluntary acts on our part. The drunkard is responsible not only for his individual acts of drinking, but for the habit which he has formed, and for all the iniquities of profanity, quarreling, or licentiousness which he may commit in the state of intoxication. The prejudiced skeptic will have to render an account not only of his rejection of evidence, but that hardness and obstinacy which have been gendered, and which render him incapable of listening to truth with candor. In this way responsibility, though applicable primarily to acts of will, may through them reach every part of man's nature and conduct.

While wish and volition are both acts of will, they differ in their influence. Wish may reach over ourselves

only, but volition may have an effect on many others, directly or indirectly, at this present time and forward into a prolonged future. It is said that in moving his finger a man starts a force which may take the round of the universe; it is certain that, in performing a particular act or in uttering a word, good or bad, he may put in motion a moral potency which may reach over widely scattered nations, and go down through many generations. Who can estimate the influence exercised over thought and character by the words uttered by such as Socrates or by the greater than Socrates? Deeds have produced yet greater effects, such as the battles of patriots, the sufferings of martyrs, and above all the death which has been the life to so many.

CHAPTER X.

IDEAS GIVEN BY THE MOTIVE POWERS.

IN Volume First it has been shown how the different Cognitive Powers give us each a new idea. The senses give us Extended Space and Resisting Energy. Self-consciousness reveals Self and Personality. The two, the outer and inner, senses make known Substance. The Memory furnishes the Idea of Time. The Imagination in its widening power genders such an idea of the Infinite as the mind of man can hold. The comparative powers show us various Relations, such as that of Personal Identity, of Composition, of Classes, of Space and Time, of Proportion, Activity, and Causation.

The Motive Powers also furnish us each with an idea. The Conscience shows us Moral Good and Evil, with their annexes Merit and Demerit, Sin, Desert, Reward, and Penalties. The Emotions disclose to us the Lovely and the Unlovely, with their colors, shades, hues, and tints, attractive and repulsive, specially the Beautiful, the Picturesque, the Ludicrous, the Sublime. The Will, as it has freedom, so it imparts the idea of Freedom in its various forms of Wish, Attention, Rejection, Preference, Resolution, Volition.

The capacity to form such lofty ideas distinguishes mind from matter, man from the brute, and shows that man is fashioned after the likeness of God. All the rays of light shining on earth proceed from the Fountain of Lights in the heavens.

CHAPTER XI.

CONCLUSION.—MAN'S RELIGIOUS TENDENCIES.

MAN is commonly represented as a religious animal. Certainly he has some sort of religious instincts or inclinations. If this be so, and he exhibits them so universally, it is the business of psychology to expose them to the view and unfold their elements.

It is clear to me that this characteristic of man is not a simple faculty, like the memory or the conscience. It is complexity with various composites, and varying with the elements involved. There are motives, there are capacities which prompt to religious ideas and feelings, often very crude, in all men.

All the stronger capacities and cravings of our nature, in seeking a foundation, go down deeper than the crust of our earth. All the higher mount into a sphere above our earth and atmosphere. All the streams which we see flowing on are believed to rise in a fountain and go on to an ocean. We may have very obscure ideas as to where the fountain and what the ocean is.

Causation about the deepest intellectual principle in our nature, and acting without cessation, goes out beyond the tangible and visible. The manifest effects, that is new things or changes in old things, lead the mind to a cause which is seen itself to be an effect leading on to a higher cause till we reach the Uncaused. The law of cause and effect is not satisfied till it comes to this independent substance and calls in a god.

The conscience, which is the most potent principle in our moral nature, imperatively says that we should do this and not do that, is a law in the heart, and points to a power above itself which we are required to obey. When we become aware that we have not obeyed it, we have a fear of one to condemn us, and it may be punish us.

The order, the beauty, and beneficence of nature, made up of a number of scattered powers, point to One who has arranged them all. More powerful, there are events which look like interpositions of a higher power to favor or to frustrate us. There are times when men feel that God's thunders are rolling over their heads and that his lightnings are ready to strike them, and they are prompted to fall down and cry, "O God, we thank thee!" "O God, deliver us!"

We cling to the belief that all does not die when the body dies, and that there may be a world waiting to receive us. Our love for our friends who loved us prompts us to think that the souls of our fathers and mothers, sisters and brothers, have not died with their bodies, and that they may still feel an interest in us, as we have certainly a service to perform towards them. This last circumstance seems to be regarded by Mr. Spencer as the main power in keeping alive the belief in another world. It is not the chief one; but affection makes it an influential one.

So much on the one side. Man naturally believes in some sort of god and in a world to come. But it is equally true that he takes narrow, one-sided, perverted, often grotesque views on these subjects. Religion in the minds of the great body of mankind appears in the form of superstition. So, instead of God making man, man makes God after his own image, with human pas-

sions, prejudices, and lusts; and he fashions his God as the heathen does his idol — of gold or silver, of wood or clay. The possession of the instincts of which we have been speaking does not make a man truly religious; he is made so by the use to which he turns them. The kind of God is determined by the inclinations to which he yields, and this goes down by heredity. With the African he is a rain-sender. With those who look exclusively to his power he is Baal, the fire-god. With the lustful the being worshiped is Venus or Astarte. With the conscience-stricken he speaks in the thunder and strikes with the lightning.

Paul's account is the only theory that explains the whole facts (Rom. i. 20, 21). On the one hand "The invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead." On the other hand, "When they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful," "and changed the glory of the uncorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things." The tendency is still the same. With certain physicists he is a mere piece of mechanism. With some sentimentalists he is mere feeling. With pantheists he is the order of the universe.

It is the office of pure religion, natural and revealed, to widen this narrowness and straighten this crookedness, and to clothe God with full perfections: "God is a Spirit," "God is Light," "God is Love," and to combine these in one as the colors do in the sunbeam.

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